nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2024‒10‒14
four papers chosen by
Matthew Baker, City University of New York


  1. Aggregate Shocks and the Formation of Preferences and Beliefs By Ms. Paola Giuliano; Mr. Antonio Spilimbergo
  2. Cliometrics of Growth. By Claude DIEBOLT; Faustine Perrin
  3. Institutions and Cooperation: A Meta-Analysis of Structural Features in Social Dilemmas By Jin, Shuxian; Spadaro, Giuliana; Balliet, Daniel
  4. Family Stress and the Intergenerational Correlation in Self-Control By Cobb-Clark, Deborah A.; Tayeb, Haniene

  1. By: Ms. Paola Giuliano; Mr. Antonio Spilimbergo
    Abstract: A growing body of work has shown that aggregate shocks affect the formation of preferences and beliefs. This article reviews evidence from sociology, social psychology, and economics to assess the relevance of aggregate shocks, whether the period in which they are experienced matters, and whether they alter preferences and beliefs permanently. We review the literature on recessions, inflation experiences, trade shocks, and aggregate non-economic shocks including migrations, wars, terrorist attacks, pandemics, and natural disasters. For each aggregate shock, we discuss the main empirical methodologies, their limitations, and their comparability across studies, outlining possible mechanisms whenever available. A few conclusions emerge consistently across the reviewed papers. First, aggregate shocks impact many preferences and beliefs, including political preferences, risk attitudes, and trust in institutions. Second, the effect of shocks experienced during young adulthood is stronger and longer lasting. Third, negative aggregate economic shocks generally move preferences and beliefs to the right of the political spectrum, while the effects of non-economic adverse shocks are more heterogeneous and depend on the context.
    Date: 2024–09–13
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/195
  2. By: Claude DIEBOLT; Faustine Perrin
    Abstract: This chapter lays the theoretical foundations of long-run economic growth. After providing an overview of the three fundamental regimes that have characterized the process of development over the course of human history on the basis of the seminal work of Galor and Weil (2000), we review existing theories offering explanations of the different stages of development. In particular, we examine the predictions and underlying mechanisms of the traditional theories of economic growth and the theories of demographic transitions. We then show the relevance of the Unified Growth Theory to explain and capture the underlying mechanisms of the development process. Finally, we highlight the importance of integrating a gendered perspective in the study of long-run economic growth.
    Keywords: Economic History; Economic Development; Growth; Demographic Transition; Unified Growth Theory; Gender.
    JEL: A33 N1 O1
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2024-35
  3. By: Jin, Shuxian; Spadaro, Giuliana (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Balliet, Daniel
    Abstract: Cooperation underlies the ability of groups to realize collective benefits (e.g., creation of public goods). Yet, cooperation can be difficult to achieve when people face situations with conflicting interests between what is best for individuals versus the collective (i.e., social dilemmas). To address this challenge, groups can implement rules about structural changes in a situation. But what institutional rules can best facilitate cooperation? Theoretically, rules can be made to affect structural features of a social dilemma, such as the possible actions, outcomes, and people involved. We derived 13 pre-registered hypotheses from existing work and collected six decades of empirical research to test how nine structural features influence cooperation within prisoner’s dilemmas and public goods dilemmas. We do this by meta-analyzing mean levels of cooperation across studies (Study 1, k = 2, 340, N = 229, 528), and also examining how manipulations of these structural features in social dilemmas affect cooperation within studies (Study 2, k = 909). Results indicated that lower conflict of interests was associated with higher cooperation, and that (1) the implementation of sanctions (i.e., reward and punishment of behaviors) and (2) allowing for communication most strongly enhanced cooperation. However, we found inconsistent support for the hypotheses that group size and matching design affect cooperation. Other structural features (e.g., symmetry of dilemmas, sequential decision making, payment) were not associated with cooperation. Overall, these findings inform institutions that can (or not) facilitate cooperation.
    Date: 2024–09–02
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:9r2qb
  4. By: Cobb-Clark, Deborah A. (University of Sydney); Tayeb, Haniene (ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course)
    Abstract: We examine the correlation in self-control between parents and their young-adult children. Analyzing two decades of population-representative panel data, we exploit variation in the family environment during childhood to investigate how family stress related to: i) parenting responsibilities; ii) parents' relationship quality; iii) household finances; and iv) poor mental health shapes the transmission of self-control across generations. A finite mixture model is used to account for unobserved heterogeneity in young adults' capacity for self-control. Our results indicate that some young people may be particularly sensitive to growing up in a stressful environment, opening the door for family stress to shape the intergenerational transmission of disadvantage through the formation of self-control.
    Keywords: intergenerational self-control, Brief Self-Control Scale, finite mixture models
    JEL: D91 D10 J13
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17265

This nep-evo issue is ©2024 by Matthew Baker. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.