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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Yann Algan (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR); Clément Malgouyres (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Thierry Mayer (ECON - Département d'économie (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR, CEPII - Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales - Centre d'analyse stratégique); Mathias Thoenig (UNIL - Université de Lausanne = University of Lausanne, CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how economic incentives influence cultural transmission, using a crucial expression of cultural identity: Child naming decisions. Our focus is on Arabic versus Non-Arabic names given in France over the 2003-2007 period. Our model of cultural transmission features three determinants: (i) vertical (parental) cultural transmission culture; (ii) horizontal (neighborhood) influence; (iii) information on the economic penalty associated with Arabic names. We find that economic incentives largely influence naming choices: Would the parental expectation on the economic penalty be zero, the annual number of babies born with an Arabic name would be more than 50 percent larger. |
| Keywords: | Cultural Economics, Cultural Transmission, First Names, Social Interactions |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03342466&r=evo |
| By: | Ingela Alger (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - UT - Université de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Laurent Lehmann (UNIL - Université de Lausanne = University of Lausanne) |
| Abstract: | We model the evolution of preferences guiding behavior in pairwise interactions in group-structured populations. The model uses long-term evolution theory to examine different interaction scenarios, including conditional preference expression upon recognition of the partner's type. We apply the model to the evolution of semi-Kantian preferences at the fitness level, which combine self-interest and a Kantian interest evaluating own behavior in terms of consequences for own fitness if the partner also adopted this behavior. We seek the convergence stable and uninvadable value of the Kantian coefficient, i.e., the weight attached to the Kantian interest, a quantitative trait varying between zero and one. We consider three scenarios: (a) incomplete information; (b) complete information and incomplete plasticity; and (c) complete information and complete plasticity, where individuals not only recognize the type of their interaction partner (complete information), but also conditionally express the Kantian coefficient upon it (complete plasticity). For (a), the Kantian coefficient generally evolves to equal the coefficient of neutral relatedness between interacting individuals; for (b), it evolves to a value that depends on demographic and interaction assumptions, while for (c) there are generally multiple uninvadable types, including the type whereby an individual is a pure Kantian when interacting with individuals of the same type and applies the Kantian coefficient that is uninvadable under complete information with zero relatedness when interacting with a different typed individual. Overall, our model connects several concepts for analysing the evolution of behavior rules for strategic interactions that have been emphasized in different and sometimes isolated studies. |
| Keywords: | Evolution of semi-Kantian preferences, Group-structured populations, Fitness, Convergence stability, Uninvadability, Homo moralis |
| Date: | 2023–08–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04378838&r=evo |
| By: | Ron Boschma; ; |
| Abstract: | There is an ongoing dialogue that explores how the Global Production Network and Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) literatures can make promising crossovers. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by outlining a theoretical-analytical approach to regional studies on Global Value Chains (GVCs). Building on the EEG literature on relatedness, economic complexity and regional diversification, this approach aims to develop a better understanding of the ability of regions to develop new and upgrade existing GVCs, and why regions may experience the loss or downgrading of existing GVCs. We present the features of this relatedness/complexity approach to GVCs, and discuss potential fields of applications. |
| Keywords: | Evolutionary Economic Geography, Global Value Chains, Global Production Networks, regional diversification, relatedness, economic complexity |
| JEL: | B52 F23 O19 O33 R10 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:2402&r=evo |
| By: | Leo Chi U Seak; Simone Ferrari-Toniolo; Ritesh Jain; Kirby Nielsen; Wolfram Schultz |
| Abstract: | The past decades have seen tremendous progress in fundamental studies on economic choice in humans. However, elucidation of the underlying neuronal processes requires invasive neurophysiological studies that are met with difficulties in humans. Monkeys as evolutionary closest relatives offer a solution. The animals display sophisticated and well-controllable behavior that allows to implement key constructs of proven economic choice theories. However, the similarity of economic choice between the two species has never been systematically investigated. We investigated compliance with the independence axiom (IA) of expected utility theory as one of the most demanding choice tests and compared IA violations between humans and monkeys. Using generalized linear modeling and cumulative prospect theory (CPT), we found that humans and monkeys made comparable risky choices, although their subjective values (utilities) differed. These results suggest similar fundamental choice mechanism across these primate species and encourage to study their underlying neurophysiological mechanisms. |
| Keywords: | Independence axiom, utility, risk, choice |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:liv:livedp:202316&r=evo |
| By: | Grunewald, Andreas; Klockmann, Victor; von Schenk, Alicia; von Siemens, Ferdinand |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the potential reinforcement of motivated beliefs when individuals with identical biases communicate. We propose a controlled online experiment that allows to manipulate belief biases and the communication environment. We find that communication, even among like-minded individuals, diminishes motivated beliefs if it takes place in an environment without previously declared external opinions. In the presence of external plural opinions, however, communication does not reduce but rather aggravates motivated beliefs. Our results indicate a potential drawback of the plurality of opinions-it may create communication environments wherein motivated beliefs not only persist but also become contagious within social networks. |
| Keywords: | Belief bias, Social interaction, Motivated beliefs |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wuewep:282999&r=evo |
| By: | Fiorito, Luca; Erasmo, Valentina |
| Abstract: | Largely forgotten today, Albert Galloway Keller was one of the foremost sociologists of his time. A brilliant scholar and a staunch disciple of William Graham Sumner, Keller spent his entire academic career at Yale, first as a student and then as Professor of the Science of Society, the chair formerly held by his mentor. The main coordinates of Keller’s sociology are to be found in his major work, Societal Evolution (1915), where he sought to apply Charles Darwin’s mechanism of variation, selection, and transmission to Sumner’s general scheme. Although Keller gave priority to social variables, his evolutionary sociology retained many elements of the typically Progressive Era preoccupations with heredity and the biological quality of individuals. The aim of this paper is to examine in some detail Keller’s views on eugenics and related issues, and to assess whether and to what extent these biologically deterministic elements played a role in his Darwinian approach to institutional change. |
| Date: | 2024–02–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:58qzy&r=evo |