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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Messono, Omang; Asongu, Simplice; Tchamyou, Vanessa |
| Abstract: | This study examines the effects of the historical prevalence of infectious diseases on contemporary gender equality. Previous studies reveal the persistence of the effects of historical diseases on innovation, through the channel of culture. Drawing on the Parasite-Stress Theory, we propose a framework which argues that historical prevalence of infectious disease reduces contemporary gender equality. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) in a cross-section with data from 122 countries between 2000 and 2021, we provide support for the underlying hypothesis. Past diseases reduce gender equality both directly and indirectly. The strongest indirect effects occur through innovation output. Gender equality analysis may take these findings into account and incorporate disease pathogens into the design of international social policy. |
| Keywords: | infectious diseases; gender equality; economic development |
| JEL: | B15 B40 B54 I31 J24 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119329&r=evo |
| By: | Ernst Fehr (Department of Economics, Zurich University. Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland); Thomas Epper (IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 - LEM - Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France; iRisk Center on Risk and Uncertainty); Julien Senn (Department of Economics, Zurich University. Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | Parsimony is a desirable feature of economic models but almost all human behaviors are characterized by vast individual variation that appears to defy parsimony. How much parsimony do we need to give up to capture the fundamental aspects of a population’s distributional preferences and to maintain high predictive ability? Using a Bayesian nonparametric clustering method that makes the trade-off between parsimony and descriptive accuracy explicit, we show that three preference types—an inequality averse, an altruistic and a predominantly selfish type—capture the essence of behavioral heterogeneity. These types independently emerge in four different data sets and are strikingly stable over time. They predict out-of-sample behavior equally well as a model that permits all individuals to differ and substantially better than a representative agent model and a state-of-the-art machine learning algorithm. Thus, a parsimonious model with three stable types captures key characteristics of distributional preferences and has excellent predictive power. |
| Keywords: | Distributional Preferences, Altruism, Inequality Aversion, Preference Heterogeneity, Stability, Out-of-Sample Prediction, Parsimony, Bayesian Nonparametrics. |
| JEL: | D31 D63 C49 C90 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ies:wpaper:e202310&r=evo |
| By: | Mankat, Fabian |
| JEL: | C70 C73 Z13 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc23:277666&r=evo |
| By: | Salazar Restrepo, Verónica; Szentes, Balázs |
| Abstract: | This paper examines an environment inhabited by self-interested individuals and unconditional cooperators. The individuals are randomly paired and engage in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game. Cooperation among players is incentivized by institutional capital, and selfish individuals incur a cost to identify situations where defection goes unpunished. In this environment, we explore the coevolution of types and institutional capital, with both the distribution of types and capital evolving through myopic best-response dynamics. The equilibria are shown to be Pareto-ranked. The main finding is that any equilibrium level of institutional capital exceeds the optimal amount in the long run. Thus, forward-looking optimal institutions not only foster a more cooperative culture but are also more cost-effective compared to the myopically optimal ones. |
| Keywords: | cooperation; evolutionary dynamics; prisoner's dilemma |
| JEL: | J1 |
| Date: | 2024–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:119490&r=evo |
| By: | Roberta Dessi (Toulouse School of Economics, France); Junjie Ren (National University of Singapore, Singapore); Xiaojian Zhao (Monash University, Australia) |
| Abstract: | The available evidence from anthropology, economics, and psychology suggests that sensitivity to the emotions of shame and guilt varies across cultures. So does (over)confidence in ability and skills. Is there a connection between these observations? We address this question theoretically and empirically. We find significant evidence, consistent with our model, of a negative relationship between the cultural importance of shame relative to guilt and individual confidence. The relationship holds across countries, and for U.S. immigrants relative to their culture of origin. |
| Keywords: | Self-confidence, shame, guilt, cultural transmission, motivated beliefs |
| JEL: | Z1 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2023-24&r=evo |
| By: | Eric Schniter (Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | "Experimental research in the realm of human-robot interactions has focused on the behavioral and psychological influences affecting human interaction and cooperation with robots. A robot is loosely defined as a device designed to perform agentic tasks autonomously or under remote control, often replicating or assisting human actions. Robots can vary widely in form, ranging from simple assembly line machines performing repetitive actions to advanced systems with no moving parts but with artificial intelligence (AI) capable of learning, problem-solving, communicating, and adapting to diverse environments and human interactions. Applications of experimental human-robot interaction research include the design, development, and implementation of robotic technologies that better align with human preferences, behaviors, and societal needs. As such, a central goal of experimental research on human-robot interactions is to better understand how trust is developed and maintained. A number of studies suggest that humans trust and act toward robots as they do towards humans, applying social norms and inferring agentic intent (Rai and Diermeier, 2015). While many robots are harmless and even helpful, some robots may reduce their human partner’s wages, security, or welfare and should not be trusted (Taddeo, McCutcheon and Floridi, 2019; Acemoglu and Restrepo, 2020; Alekseev, 2020). For example, more than half of all internet traffic is generated by bots, the majority of which are 'bad bots' (Imperva, 2016). Despite the hazards, robotic technologies are already transforming our everyday lives and finding their way into important domains such as healthcare, transportation, manufacturing, customer service, education, and disaster relief (Meyerson et al., 2023)." |
| Keywords: | Trust, Robots, AI, Experiments, Evolution |
| JEL: | B52 C72 C90 D63 D64 L5 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:23-14&r=evo |
| By: | Zhou, Peng (Cardiff Business School); Guo, Dong |
| Abstract: | Facing the sanctions from the West since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia quickly converged to a strong counter-sanction strategy. The US and the EU staggered the strengths of sanctions in turns, with the EU first imposing relatively stronger commercial sanctions first and the US relaying with stronger financial sanctions later. Using US-EU-Russia sanctions as an example, we develop a multilateral, evolutionary game to capture the strategic complementarity between the sanctioners and the sanctionee, as well as the strategic substitutability between the leading sanctioner and the co-sanctioner. In an extended model, the sanction technology is introduced to endogenize how sanctions are designed before deployment. The model is then calibrated to match the summarized stylized facts, to demonstrate the simulated evolutionary paths, and to verify the derived strategic dependence. |
| Keywords: | Sanction; Strategic Dependence; Evolutionary Game Theory |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2023/28&r=evo |
| By: | Arnaud Deseau (Aix-Marseille Univ., CNRS, AMSE, Marseille, France) |
| Abstract: | The Malthusian trap is a well recognized source of stagnation in per capita income prior to industrialization. However, previous studies have found mixed evidence about its exact strength. This article contributes to this ongoing debate, by estimating the speed of convergence for a wide range of economies and a large part of the Malthusian era. I build a simple Malthusian growth model and derive the speed of convergence to the steady state. A calibration exercise for the English Malthusian economy reveals a relatively weak Malthusian trap, or weak homeostasis, with a half-life of 112 years. I then use β-convergence regressions and historical panel data on per capita income and population to empirically estimate the speed of convergence for a large set of countries. I find consistent evidence of weak homeostasis, with the mode of half-lives around 120 years. The weak homeostasis pattern is stable from the 11th to the 18th century. However, I highlight significant differences in the strength of the Malthusian trap, with some economies converging significantly faster or slower than others. |
| Keywords: | Convergence, Homeostasis, Malthusian trap, Preventive checks, marriage, fertility, Malthusian model, Beta-convergence |
| JEL: | J1 N1 N3 O1 O47 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2326&r=evo |
| By: | Kettlewell, Nathan (University of Technology, Sydney); Tymula, Agnieszka (University of Sydney); Yoo, Hong Il (Loughborough University) |
| Abstract: | We study the heritability of risk, uncertainty, and time preferences using a field experiment with a large sample of adult twins. We also offer a meta-analysis of existing findings. Our field study introduces a novel empirical approach that marries behavioral genetics with structural econometrics. This allows us to, for the first time, quantify the heritability of economic preference parameters directly without employing proxy measures. Our incentive-compatible experiment is the first twin study to elicit all three types of preferences for the same individual. Compared to previous studies, we find a greater role of genes in explaining risk and uncertainty preferences, and of the shared familial environment in explaining time preferences. Time preferences appear more important from policy and parenting perspectives since they exhibit limited genetic variation and are more than twice as sensitive to the familial environment as risk and uncertainty preferences. |
| Keywords: | risk preferences, ambiguity aversion, time preferences, twin study, genetics |
| JEL: | C93 D15 D81 D91 Z13 |
| Date: | 2023–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16633&r=evo |