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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Graziella Bertocchi; Angelo Dimico; Gian Luca Tedeschi |
| Abstract: | We analyze the relationship between natives' attitudes towards citizenship acqui- sition for foreigners and trust. Our hypothesis is that, in sub-Saharan Africa, the slave trade represents the deep factor behind contemporary attitudes toward citi- zenship, with more intense exposure to historical slave exports for an individual's ethnic group being associated with contemporary distrust for strangers, and in turn opposition to citizenship laws that favor the inclusion of foreigners. Wefind that individuals who are more trusting do show more positive attitudes towards the ac- quisition of citizenship at birth for children of foreigners, that these attitudes are also negatively related to the intensity of the slave trade, and that the underlying link between trust and the slave trade is cofirmed. Alternative factors- conflict, kinship, and witchcraft beliefs|that, through trust, may ffect attitudes toward citizenship, are not generating the same distinctive pattern of linkages emerging from the slave trade. |
| Keywords: | Citizenship, Trust, Slave Trade, Migration, Ethnicity, Conflict, Kinship, Witchcraft. |
| JEL: | J15 K37 N57 O15 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:152&r= |
| By: | Mei-Ling Cai; Zhang-HangJian Chen; Sai-Ping Li; Xiong Xiong; Wei Zhang; Ming-Yuan Yang; Fei Ren |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we propose a new dynamical model to study the two-stage volatility evolution of stock market index after extreme events, and find that the volatility after extreme events follows a stretched exponential decay in the initial stage and becomes a power law decay at later times by using high frequency minute data. Empirical study of the evolutionary behaviors of volatility after endogenous and exogenous events further demonstrates the descriptive power of our new model. To further explore the underlying mechanisms of volatility evolution, we introduce the sequential arrival of information hypothesis (SAIH) and the mixture of distribution hypothesis (MDH) to test the two-stage assumption, and find that investors transform from the uninformed state to the informed state in the first stage and informed investors subsequently dominate in the second stage. The testing results offer a supporting explanation for the validity of our new model and the fitted values of relevant parameters. |
| Date: | 2022–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2201.03213&r= |
| By: | Ellis, Andrew; Masatlioglu, Yusufcan |
| Abstract: | We propose and axiomatize the categorical thinking model (CTM) in which the framing of the decision problem affects how agents categorize alternatives, that in turn affects their evaluation of it. Prominent models of salience, status quo bias, loss-aversion, inequality aversion, and present bias all fit under the umbrella of CTM. This suggests categorization is an underlying mechanism of key departures from the neoclassical model of choice. We specialize CTM to provide a behavioural foundation for the salient thinking model of Bordalo et al. (2013, Journal of Political Economy, 121, 803–843) that highlights its strong predictions and distinctions from other models. |
| Keywords: | choice; categorization; salience; SES-1628883; OUP deal |
| JEL: | D01 D11 D80 D90 |
| Date: | 2022–01–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:109787&r= |
| By: | Moe Skjølsvold, Tomas (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Berge, Erling (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Bjørnstad, Sverre (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences); Wiig, Henrik (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences) |
| Abstract: | This paper originates from a series of “trust games” performed in Malawi during the summer of 2007. The results from the games are interpreted as pure stylized cases of a social dilemma. Some dilemmas, such as the prisoner’s dilemma, are more difficult to resolve than others. These are also called social traps. A group encountering a social trap can resolve it to the advantage of the group only by cooperation. The experiments were conducted in 18 villages, 6 from each of the 3 regions North, Centre, and South. Fifteen households from each village participated in the study. These were first interviewed, and later one person from each household was selected to play a trust game against another representative from the village. We lost a total of 3 players resulting in game results from 267 trust games. The interviews were analysed separately and provided the material for the construction of indexes by factor analysis (Berge et al. 2020a). The paper discusses the problems encountered in using this type of experiments. Economists specializing in experiments like this will often presume that results from a trust game are a good measure of general trust. The analysis of our data suggests that the game results measure actions. Actions that can be interpreted as demonstrating trust, but not trust as such. The trust games played are constructed as a social trap. The analysis of the data suggests that there is correlation between living in a village imbued by a culture of cooperation and the ability to avoid stepping into the trap in the game. All villages seem to be characterized by a culture of cooperation. Hence all players on average earn by participating in the game. But we also see that just as the theory predicts, the ego-centred players in a village with a high level of cooperation are the players who earn the most. By constructing indexes that characterize the context of each player we see that the ego-centred player earns most in villages located closer to an urban centre and where trust in relatives and family members are strongest. The winnings are somewhat less where trust in traditional authorities is stronger. The outcomes for these general relations are modified by the fact that the impact of the indexes is different in the different regions South, Centre, and North. |
| Keywords: | Malawi; trust game; villages; factor indexes |
| JEL: | C72 C93 Z13 |
| Date: | 2022–01–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2022_001&r= |
| By: | Joseph J. Capuno (School of Economics, University of the Philippines Diliman) |
| Abstract: | Does identification with dominant ethnic groups lead individuals to diverge in their preferences for redistribution? This paper contributes to the comparative analysis of the role of ethnic background in shaping attitudes towards government's role in reducing income inequalities in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, where nearly half-abillion people live and belong to more than sixty ethnic groups. Using a pool of nationallyrepresentative survey data from the five Southeast Asian countries, we first classified the respondents by population dominance of the ethnic groups they claim to belong, and then examine for differences across members of dominant ethnic groups in their preferences for government redistribution. Relative to the biggest ethnic group, the second biggest ethnic group is found to have less preference for redistribution, after controlling for other factors. No systematic differences in their redistributive preferences are found, however, between the biggest ethnic group and other smaller groups. The results are fairly robust even after accounting for the possible moderating effects of income status, trust in government and in people, subjective social mobility, concerns about social fairness, and views on the importance of fate in one's life. Moreover, the results hold out even in the sub-sample of low-income people for whom economic considerations more than ethnicity are expected to determine their redistributive preferences. Notwithstanding the importance of shared norms or beliefs in aligning he social choices of people with same ethnic or racial background, our results suggest their population sizes, which possibly reflect their relative influence over domestic policies, also matter. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution; ethnic dominance; income inequality; social mobility; trust; Southeast Asia |
| JEL: | H20 H53 I39 Z10 |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:phs:dpaper:202103&r= |
| By: | Andersson, Lina (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University) |
| Abstract: | Fear is an important factor in decision-making under risk and uncertainty. Psychology research suggests that fear influences one’s risk attitude and fear may have important consequences for decisions concerning for example investments, crime, conflicts, and politics. I model strategic interactions between players who can be in either a neutral or a fearful state of mind. A player’s state of mind determines his or her utility function. The two main assumptions are that (i) fear is triggered by an increase in the probability or cost of negative outcomes and (ii) a player in the fearful state is more risk averse. A player’s beliefs over the probability and cost of negative outcomes determine how the player transitions between the states of mind. I use psychological game theory to analyze the role of fear in three applications, a robbery game, a bank run game, and a public health intervention. |
| Keywords: | emotions; fear; risk aversion; psychological game theory |
| JEL: | C72 D01 D91 |
| Date: | 2022–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0819&r= |
| By: | Cristian Dan (Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University of Bucharest, Romania) |
| Abstract: | In the early stages of the evolution of the human species, feelings and sensations played a particularly important role in adapting and sustaining existential activities and how to integrate man in relation to the surrounding nature. Of all the feelings, the predominant psychological characteristic was the feeling of anger, coming from the need to preserve, to defend life and things acquired, in front of the attackers who could be both fierce animals and other fellows of the same species. For millions of years, these mechanisms have contributed to the intrinsic and external development of society, being present in human interactions within tribes, cities, villages and cities. Being a sentimental trait developed over such a long period of time, the feeling of anger, inscribed in human DNA, is nowadays a dangerous factor, generating antisocial behaviors and actions that are subject to Criminal Law, which we often learn to control it. The article aims to analyze this mechanism, from a historical, psychological and cultural point of view in relation to Criminal Law and the facts determined by this feeling, highlighting, on the one hand, the crimes that can be committed under its rule, and on the other part, the methods of preventing and combating them identified in today’s society. |
| Keywords: | anger, morality, genetics, criminal law, crime, psychology, embezzlement, theft, violence, history, legal system, conduct, prevention, combat, rape |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:smo:lpaper:0090&r= |