nep-evo 2019-04-29 papers

on Evolutionary Economics

Issue of 2019‒04‒29
two papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

Norm Compliance,Enforcement,and the Survival of Redistributive Institutions By Gürdal, Mehmet Y.; Torul, Orhan; Vostroknutov, Alexander
Learning cooperation from the commons By Berge, Erling

Norm Compliance,Enforcement,and the Survival of Redistributive Institutions

By:	Gürdal, Mehmet Y. (bogazici university, istanbul); Torul, Orhan (bogazici university, istanbul); Vostroknutov, Alexander (General Economics 1 (Micro))
Abstract:	We study the incentives that drive behavior in redistributive institutions with various levels of enforcement. We are interested in how the opportunistic incentive to use a redistributive institution for personal gain and the desire to follow the rules of a regulated community, populated by similarly obedient individuals, interact and determine the success or failure of an institution. In the experiment, subjects can repeatedly join one of three groups, which are defined by explicitly stated injunctive norms that require to put all, half, or any amount of income to a common pool for redistribution. The treatments differ in the level of enforcement of these norms. We find that contributions are sustained only in the case of full enforcement. However, a sizeable number of subjects persist in following the norms of redistribution even after experiencing many periods of losses due to free riding. We find that subjects with strong propensity to follow norms perceive the same level of income inequality as fairer, when it was achieved without breaking the norm, and favor redistributive mechanisms with more stringent rules. This suggests that well-defined redistributive norms can create a powerful incentive for cooperation as many individuals seem to prefer stable regulated egalitarian institutions to unregulated libertarian ones. Some form of enforcement is, nevertheless, required to protect egalitarian institutions from exploitation by free riders.
Keywords:	social norms, taxation, redistribution, egalitarianism, libertarianism, limited enforcement
JEL:	C91 C92 H26 H41
Date:	2019–04–16
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:unm:umagsb:2019011&r=all

Learning cooperation from the commons

By:	Berge, Erling (Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences)
Abstract:	The paper discusses the link between commons as they might have been used in prehistoric Norway and the rules concerning the exploitation of the commons as found in the oldest known legislation for regions of Norway, Gulating Law and Frostating Law. One clear social dilemma has been identified: the setting of a common date for moving animals from the home fields up to the summer farms and home again in the fall. The problem was obvious and the solution not particularly difficult to institute. Many more problems were of course present, but they did not rise to the level of a social dilemma. All such problems were managed by the rules enacted by the bygdeting along with other problems of a community. In particular the process of inheritance, the problems of fencing, how to change borders between neighbours and between individually owned fields and the commons, were treated by extensive rules. The bygdeting managed such issues from prehistory until the 16th and 17th centuries when reforms initiated by the Danish-Norwegian kings started to take effect, making the rule-of-law more uniquely a task for the central authorities and of less concern for the local communities. Maybe the basic legacy of the long history of local rule was a strong belief in the court system, that it would secure the old saying: "By law the land shall be built, not with unlaw wasted".
Keywords:	Commons; prehistory; Norway; social dilemmas; legislation
JEL:	K11 P48 Q15 Q20 Z13
Date:	2019–04–12
URL:	http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nlsclt:2019_002&r=all

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