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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | William Barnett (Department of Economics, The University of Kansas; Center for Financial Stability, New York City; IC2 Institute, University of Texas at Austin); Qing Han (Department of Economics, University of Kansas); Jianbo Zhang (Department of Economics, University of Kansas) |
| Abstract: | A central tenet of behavioral economics is that the axioms producing expected utility maximization by consumers are too strong to be descriptive of rational behavior. The existing theory of monetary services aggregation under risk assume expected utility maximization. We extend those results to uncertainty under weaker axiomatic assumptions by using Choquet expectations. Choquet integration reduces to Riemann integration as a special case under the stronger assumption of additive probability measure, not accepted in the literature on behavioral economics. Our theoretical results on monetary services aggregation are generalizations of prior results, nested as special cases of our results under stronger behavioral assumptions. |
| Keywords: | Uncertainty Aversion, User Cost, Choquet Expectation, Monetary Aggregation. |
| JEL: | E41 G12 C43 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kan:wpaper:201806&r=evo |
| By: | Chaudhary, L.; Rubin, J.; Iyer, S.; Shrivastava, A. |
| Abstract: | We conduct a public goods game in three small towns in the Indian state of Rajasthan. Due to historical military conquest, until 1947 these towns were on opposite sides of a colonial border separating British India from the Princely States. Our research design offers a treatment comparison between the towns of (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar, and a control comparison between Princely Sarwar and Shahpura. We find that participants from (British) Kekri are more co-operative in mixed-town groups. The differences are driven by individuals with family ties to the towns, highlighting the enduring effects of colonial rule on co-operation norms. |
| Keywords: | cultural transmission, colonialism, public goods game, natural experiment, lab-in-the- eld experiment, India |
| JEL: | C91 C93 C71 H41 H73 N35 N45 O17 Z1 |
| Date: | 2018–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1855&r=evo |
| By: | Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jörgen W. |
| Abstract: | The literature on the evolution of preferences of individuals in strategic interactions is vast and diverse. We organize the discussion around the following question: Supposing that material outcomes drive evolutionary success, under what circumstances does evolution promote Homo oeconomicus, defined as material self-interest, and when does it instead lead to other preferences? The literature suggests that Homo oeconomicus is favored by evolution only when individuals' preferences are their private information and the population is large and well-mixed so that individuals with rare mutant preferences almost never get to interact with each other. If rare mutants instead interact more often (say, due to local dispersion), evolution instead favors a certain generalization of Homo oeconomicus including a Kantian concern. If individuals interact under complete information about preferences, evolution destabilizes Homo oeconomicus in virtually all games. |
| JEL: | C73 D01 D03 |
| Date: | 2018–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:iastwp:32951&r=evo |
| By: | Baranov, Victoria; de Haas, Ralph (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Grosjean, Pauline |
| Abstract: | Recent research has uncovered the historical roots of gender norms about women and the persistent effect of such norms on economic development. We find similar long-term effects of masculinity norms: beliefs about the proper conduct of men. We exploit a natural historical experiment in which convict transportation in the 18th and 19th century created a variegated spatial pattern of sex ratios across Australia. We show that in areas that were heavily male-biased in the past (though not the present) more Australians recently voted against same-sex marriage, an institution at odds with traditional masculinity norms. Survey data show that this voting pattern is mostly driven by men. Further evidence indicates that these historically male-biased areas also remain characterized by more violence, excessive alcohol consumption, and occupational gender segregation. We interpret these behaviors as manifestations of masculinity norms that emerged due to intense local male-male competition and that persisted over time. |
| Keywords: | masculinity; sex ratio; natural experiment; cultural persistence; same-sex marriage |
| JEL: | I31 J12 J16 N37 Z13 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:6fa57f55-71bb-42c4-8cc4-dc5c97da241d&r=evo |