nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2018‒04‒30
three papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York
  1. Conformism, Social Norms and the Dynamics of Assimilation By Olcina, Gonzalo; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Zenou, Yves
  2. Moral Wiggle Room Reverted: Information Avoidance is Myopic By Homayoon Moradi; Alexander Nesterov
  3. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE UNDER EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS OF EMPLOYEE PROFIT SHARING By GILBERTO TADEU LIMA; JAYLSON JAIR DA SILVEIRA
  1. By: Olcina, Gonzalo (Universidad de Valencia); Panebianco, Fabrizio (Bocconi University); Zenou, Yves (Monash University)
    Abstract: We consider a model where each individual (or ethnic minority) is embedded in a network of relation-ships and decides whether or not she wants to be assimilated to the majority norm. Each individual wants her behavior to agree with her personal ideal action or norm but also wants her behavior to be as close as possible to the average assimilation behavior of her peers. We show that there is always convergence to a steady-state and characterize it. We also show that different assimilation norms may emerge in steady state depending on the structure of the network. We then consider the role of cultural and government leaders in the assimilation process of ethnic minorities and an optimal tax/subsidy policy which aim is to reach a certain level of assimilation in the population.
    Keywords: assimilation, networks, social norms, peer pressure, cultural leader
    JEL: D83 D85 J15 Z13
    Date: 2018–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11436&r=evo
  2. By: Homayoon Moradi (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Alexander Nesterov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: We use a range of dictator game experiments to investigate why people avoid information. Dictators in our experiment know their own payoffs and can choose whether to learn the payoffs of the recipient. We vary whether dictators can learn the recipient's payoff before or after they are presented with their self-interested action. We find that dictators are more likely to avoid information when they do not yet know their self-interested action, and consequently act more selfishly in this case. These results go against two popular explanations of information avoidance: self-image and default effects. We study and test alternative explanations such as wishful thinking, cognitive dissonance, and attention and find support for the latter.
    Keywords: Attention, Wishful Thinking, Self-Image, Default Effect, In- formation Avoidance, Moral Wiggle Room
    JEL: C91 D64 D83 D01
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:189/ec/2018&r=evo
  3. By: GILBERTO TADEU LIMA; JAYLSON JAIR DA SILVEIRA
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anp:en2016:87&r=evo
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