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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Camera, Gabriele; Gioffré, Alessandro |
| Abstract: | Studies of cooperation in infinitely repeated matching games focus on homogeneous economies, where full cooperation is efficient and any defection is collectively sanctioned. Here we study heterogeneous economies where occasional defections are part of efficient play, and show how to support those outcomes through contagious punishments |
| Keywords: | cooperation,repeated games,social dilemmas |
| JEL: | C6 C7 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:162&r=evo |
| By: | Pablo Brañas-Garza; Angelo Antoci; Alexia Delfino; Fabio Paglieri; Fabrizio Panebianco; Fabio Sabatini |
| Abstract: | Evidence is growing that forms of incivility–e.g. aggressive and disrespectful behaviors, harassment, hate speech and outrageous claims–are spreading in the population of social networking sites’ (SNS) users. Online social networks such as Facebook allow users to regularly interact with known and unknown others, who can behave either politely or rudely. This leads individuals not only to learn and adopt successful strategies for using the site, but also to condition their own behavior on that of others. Using a mean field approach, we define anevolutionary game framework to analyse the dynamics of civil and uncivil ways of interaction in online social networks and their consequences for collective welfare. Agents can choose to interact with others–politely or rudely–in SNS, or to opt out from online social networks to protect themselves from incivility. We find that, when the initial share of the population of polite users reaches a critical level, civility becomes generalized if its payoff increases more than that of incivility with the spreading of politeness in online interactions. Otherwise, the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with online incivility can lead the economyto non-socially optimal stationary states |
| JEL: | C61 C73 D85 O33 Z13 |
| Date: | 2016–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:68800&r=evo |
| By: | Harin, Alexander |
| Abstract: | The present article is devoted to discrete random variables that take a limited number of values in finite closed intervals. I prove that if non-zero lower bounds exist for the variances of the variables, then non-zero bounds or forbidden zones exist for their expectations near the boundaries of the intervals. This article is motivated by the need in rigorous theoretical support for the analysis of the influence of scattering and noise on data in behavioral economics and decision sciences. |
| Keywords: | probability; dispersion; variance; noise; economics; utility theory; prospect theory; behavioral economics; decision sciences; |
| JEL: | C02 C1 D8 D81 D84 |
| Date: | 2017–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:76240&r=evo |
| By: | Iris Grant; Iris Kesternich; Carina Steckenleiter; Joachim Winter |
| Abstract: | We analyze the long-term effects of gender imbalances on female labor force participation, in particular in the politician market, exploiting variation in sex ratios across Germany induced by WWII. In the 1990 elections, women were more likely to run for office in constituencies that had relatively fewer men in 1946. |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:565080&r=evo |
| By: | Iyigun, Murat; Nunn, Nathan; Qian, Nancy |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the long-run effects of climate change on conflict by examining cooling from 1400-1900 CE, a period that includes most of the Little Ice Age. We construct a geo-referenced and digitized database of conflicts in Europe, North Africa, and the Near East from 1400-1900, which we merge with historical temperature data. We first show that during this time, cooling is associated with increased conflict. Then, turning to the dynamics of cooling, we allow the effects of cooling over a fifty-year period to depend on the extent of cooling during the preceding fifty-year period. We find that the effect of cooling on conflict is significantly larger if the same location experienced cooling during the preceding period. We interpret this as evidence that the adverse effect of climate change intensifies with its duration. |
| Keywords: | Development; economic history; Environment; political economy |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11760&r=evo |