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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Heinrich H. Nax; Alexandros Rigos |
| Abstract: | Assortative mechanisms can overcome tragedies of the commons that otherwise result in dilemma situations. Assortativity criteria include genetics (e.g. kin selection), preferences (e.g. homophily), locations (e.g. spatial interaction) and actions (e.g. meritocracy), usually presuming an exogenously fixed matching mechanism. Here, we endogenize the matching process with the aim of investigating how assortativity itself, jointly with cooperation, is driven by evolution. Our main finding is that only full-or-null assortativities turn out to be long-run stable, their relative stabilities depending on the exact incentive structure of the underlying social dilemma. The resulting social loss is evaluated for general classes of dilemma games, thus quantifying to what extent tragedy of the commons may be endogenously overcome. |
| Keywords: | cooperation; (co)-evolution; assortativity; democratic consensus |
| JEL: | C62 C72 Z0 |
| Date: | 2015–12–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:65447&r=evo |
| By: | Robert E. Kopp; Rachael Shwom; Gernot Wagner; Jiacan Yuan |
| Abstract: | The literature on the costs of climate change often draws a link between climatic 'tipping points' and economic catastrophes. The use of the phrase 'tipping point' in this context is less restrictive than in popular and social scientific discourse. Whereas 'tipping points' generally involve abrupt changes, for some climatic ones, the commitment to a change may occur abruptly, but the change itself may take centuries or longer to realize. Additionally, the connection between climatic 'tipping points' and economic losses is tenuous, though emerging empirical and process-model-based tools provide pathways for investigating it. We propose terminology to distinguish 'tipping points' in the sense popularized by Gladwell from climatic 'tipping elements' (in the sense introduced by Lenton and colleagues), as well as from economic catastrophes. We illustrate our proposed distinction by surveying the literature on climatic tipping elements, climatically-sensitive social tipping points, and economic catastrophes, and we propose a research agenda for investigating all three. |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1603.00850&r=evo |
| By: | Heinrich H. Nax; Bary S. R. Pradelski |
| Abstract: | We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost. The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a subset of the core of the game with a natural equity interpretation. This happens even though agents have no knowledge of other agents’ strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game, and there is no central authority with such knowledge either. In our model, agents randomly encounter other agents, make bids and offers for potential partnerships and match if the partnerships are profitable. Equity is favored by our dynamics because it is more stable, not because of any ex ante fairness criterion. |
| Keywords: | assignment games; cooperative games; core; equity; evolutionary game theory; learning; matching markets; stochastic stability |
| JEL: | C71 C73 C78 D8 D83 |
| Date: | 2015–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:65428&r=evo |
| By: | Akira Okada (Kyoto University); Ryoji Sawa (University of Aizu) |
| Abstract: | This paper considers a dynamic process of n-person social choice problems under q-majority where a status-quo policy is challenged by an opposing policy drawn randomly in each period. The opposing policy becomes the next status-quo if it receives at least q votes. We characterize stochastically stable policies under a boundedly rational choice rule of voters. Under the best response rule with mutations, a Condorcet winner is stochastically stable for all q-quota rules, and uniquely so if q is greater than the minmax quota. Under the logit choice rule, the Borda winner is stochastically stable under the unanimity rule. Our evolutionary approach provides a dynamic foundation of the mini-max policies in multidimensional choice problems with Euclidean preferences. |
| Keywords: | Stochastic stability; Social choice; Voting; Condorcet winner. |
| JEL: | C71 C73 D71 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:936&r=evo |