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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Duffy, John ; Fehr, Dietmar |
| Abstract: | We report on an experiment examining behavior and equilibrium selection in two similar, infinitely repeated games, Stag Hunt and Prisoner's Dilemma under anonymous random matching. We are interested in the role that precedents may play for equilibrium selection between these two stage game forms. We find that a precedent for efficient play in the repeated Stag Hunt game does not carry over to the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game despite the possibility of efficient play in the latter game. Similarly, a precedent of inefficient play in the Prisoner's Dilemma game does not extend to the repeated Stag Hunt game. We conclude that equilibrium selection between similar repeated games has little to do with historical precedents and is mainly determined by strategic considerations associated with the different payouts of these similar repeated games. |
| Keywords: | Equilibrium Selection,Precedent,Beliefs,Stag Hunt,Prisoner's Dilemma,Repeated Games,Experimental Economics |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D83 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2015202&r=evo |
| By: | Lavecchia, Adam M. (University of Toronto ); Liu, Heidi (Harvard University ); Oreopoulos, Philip (University of Toronto ) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral economics attempts to integrate insights from psychology, neuroscience, and sociology in order to better predict individual outcomes and develop more effective policy. While the field has been successfully applied to many areas, education has, so far, received less attention – a surprising oversight, given the field's key interest in long-run decision-making and the propensity of youth to make poor long-run decisions. In this chapter, we review the emerging literature on the behavioral economics of education. We first develop a general framework for thinking about why youth and their parents might not always take full advantage of education opportunities. We then discuss how these behavioral barriers may be preventing some students from improving their long-run welfare. We evaluate the recent but rapidly growing efforts to develop policies that mitigate these barriers, many of which have been examined in experimental settings. Finally, we discuss future prospects for research in this emerging field. |
| Keywords: | behavioral economics of education, present-bias, student motivation |
| JEL: | D03 D87 I2 J24 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8853&r=evo |
| By: | Bary S.R. Pradelski |
| Abstract: | Individual behaviors such as smoking, fashion, and the adoption of new products is influenced by taking account of others' actions in one's decisions. We study social influence in a heterogeneous population and analyze the long-run behavior of the dynamics. We distinguish between cases in which social influence arises from responding to the number of current adopters, and cases in which social influence arises from responding to the cumulative usage. We identify the equilibria of the dynamics and show which equilibrium is observed in the long-run. We find that the models exhibit different behaviour and hence this differentiation is of importance. We also provide an intuition for the different outcomes. |
| Keywords: | social influence, imitation, equilibrium selection |
| JEL: | C62 C70 D70 G00 |
| Date: | 2015–02–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:742&r=evo |
| By: | Mathieu Coutenier (HEC-University of Lausanne ); Marc Sangnier (Aix-Marseille Univ. (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS & EHESS ) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides empirical evidence that mineral resources abundance is associated to preferences for redistribution in the United States. We show that individuals living in states with large mineral resources endowment are more opposed to redistribution than others. We take advantage of both the spatial and the temporal distributions of mineral resources discoveries since 1800 to uncover two mechanisms through which mineral resources can foster ones’ opposition to redistribution: either by transmission of values formed in the past, or by the exposure to mineral discoveries during individuals’ life-time. We show that both mechanisms matter to explain respondents’ preferences. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution, Mineral Resources, Persistence. |
| JEL: | Z10 Q32 O10 |
| Date: | 2015–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1503&r=evo |