nep-evo New Economics Papers
on Evolutionary Economics
Issue of 2014‒07‒13
four papers chosen by
Matthew Baker
City University of New York

  1. Parenting with style: altruism and paternalism in intergenerational preference transmission By Matthias Doepke; Fabrizio Zilibotti
  2. The Effect of Conflict History on Cooperation Within and Between Groups: Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment By Beekman, Gonne; Cheung, Stephen L.; Levely, Ian
  3. Culture values and economic growth By Jellal, Mohamed
  4. Behavioural Labour Economics: Advances and Future Directions By Dohmen, Thomas

  1. By: Matthias Doepke; Fabrizio Zilibotti
    Abstract: We develop a theory of intergenerational transmission of preferences that rationalizes the choice between alternative parenting styles (as set out in Baumrind 1967). Parents maximize an objective function that combines Beckerian altruism and paternalism towards children. They can affect their children’s choices via two channels: either by influencing children’s preferences or by imposing direct restrictions on their choice sets. Different parenting styles (authoritarian, authoritative, and permissive) emerge as equilibrium outcomes, and are affected both by parental preferences and by the socioeconomic environment. Parenting style, in turn, feeds back into the children’s welfare and economic success. The theory is consistent with the decline of authoritarian parenting observed in industrialized countries, and with the greater prevalence of more permissive parenting in countries characterized by low inequality.
    Keywords: Intergenerational preference transmission, altruism, paternalism, entrepreneurship, innovation
    JEL: D10 J10 O10 O40
    Date: 2014–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:uceswp:008&r=evo
  2. By: Beekman, Gonne (Wageningen University); Cheung, Stephen L. (University of Sydney); Levely, Ian (Charles University, Prague)
    Abstract: We study cooperation within and between groups in the laboratory, comparing treatments in which two groups have previously been (i) in conflict with one another, (ii) in conflict with a different group, or (iii) not previously exposed to conflict. We model conflict using an inter-group Tullock contest, and measure its effects upon cooperation using a multi-level public good game. We demonstrate that conflict increases cooperation within groups, while decreasing cooperation between groups. Moreover, we find that cooperation between groups increases in response to an increase in the efficiency gains from cooperation only when the two groups have not previously interacted.
    Keywords: within- and between-group cooperation, inter-group conflict, group identity, multi-level public good experiment, Tullock contest, other-regarding preferences
    JEL: C92 D64 D74 H41
    Date: 2014–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8287&r=evo
  3. By: Jellal, Mohamed
    Abstract: We integrate a general social norm function which associates status to accumulation of capital and consumption into a very simple model of endogenous growth. We show that societies which place a greater cultural weight on capital as opposed to consumption preferences will experience fast growth. Our results are consistent with those obtained by Baumol(1990) in the context of entrepreneurship and by Fershtman and Weiss (1991).
    Keywords: Cultural incentives, social status, endogenous growth
    JEL: A13 O1 O43 Z13
    Date: 2014–07–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:57178&r=evo
  4. By: Dohmen, Thomas (University of Bonn)
    Abstract: In the past decades, behavioural economics has become an influential and important field of economics. Interest in behavioural economics derives from unease with standard economic models that are based on restrictive assumptions, which confine the nature of human motivation. Although Adam Smith, the founding father of modern economics, had highlighted the multitude of psychological motives that drive human behaviour, and despite the fact that many influential economists thereafter believed in tenets of modern behavioural economics, the homo economicus assumption became prevalent, until this construct was challenged by compelling evidence on social, cognitive and emotional factors that drive decision-making and social interaction. Since human interaction is germane to labour markets, one would expect behavioural economics to be highly relevant for labour economics. This paper gauges whether and how behavioural economics has left its mark on labour economics, considers the timing and structure of this development, and contemplates its future impact on labour economics.
    Keywords: behavioural economics, labour economics, behavioural labour economics
    JEL: J00 J01 D03
    Date: 2014–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8263&r=evo

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