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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Noussair, C.N.; Stoop, J.T.R. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Abstract: We report results from three well-known experimental paradigms, where we use time, rather than money, as the salient component of subjects’ incentives. The three experiments, commonly employed to study social preferences, are the dictator game, the ultimatum game and the trust game. All subjects in a session earn the same participation fee, but their choices affect the time at which they are permitted to leave the laboratory, with decisions typically associated with greater own payoff translating into an earlier departure. The modal proposal in both the dictator and ultimatum games is an equal split of the waiting time. In the trust game, there is substantial trust and reciprocity. Overall, social preferences are evident in time allocation decisions. Received laboratory results from dictator, ultimatum, and trust games are robust to the change in reward medium, though there is some suggestive evidence that decisions are even more prosocial with respect to time than money. |
| Keywords: | dictator game;ultimatum game;trust game;time. |
| JEL: | C70 C91 D63 D64 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2012068&r=evo |
| By: | Chen, Chia-Ching; Chiu, I-Ming; Smith, John; Yamada, Tetsuji |
| Abstract: | Although there is an increasing interest in examining the relationship between cognitive ability and economic behavior, less is known about the relationship between cognitive ability and social preferences. We investigate the relationship between consequential measures of cognitive ability and measures of social preferences. We have data on a series of small-stakes dictator-type decisions, known as Social Value Orientation (SVO), in addition to choices in a larger-stakes dictator game. We also have access to the grade point averages (GPA) and SAT (formerly referred to as the Scholastic Aptitude Test) outcomes of our subjects. We find that subjects who perform better on the Math portion of the SAT are more generous in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast we find that subjects with a higher GPA are more selfish in the dictator game and more generous according to the SVO. We also find some evidence that the subjects with higher GPA and higher SAT outcomes offer more consistent responses. Our results involving GPA and social preferences complement previous work which employ measures of cognitive ability which are sensitive to the intrinsic motivation of the subject. Our results involving SAT scores are without precedent in the literature and suggest that measures of cognitive ability, which are less sensitive to the intrinsic motivation of the subject, are positively related to generosity. |
| Keywords: | dictator game; Social Value Orientation; altruism; intelligence |
| JEL: | D64 C91 |
| Date: | 2012–09–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:41078&r=evo |
| By: | Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
| Abstract: | The paper reports from an experiment studying how the aversion to lying is affected by non-economic dimensions of the choice situation. Specifically, we study whether people are more or less likely to lie when the content of the lie is personal, when they base decisions on intuition, and when they are in a market context. We also study how aversion to lying depends on personal characteristics, including age, gender, cognitive ability, personality and social preferences. Our main finding is that non-economic aspects of the choice situation are crucial in understanding aversion to lying. In particular, we find that people are less likely to lie when the content of the message is personal. We also find large effects from priming the participants to rely on intuition, but, interestingly, in this case the effect only applies to males. Finally, we find that people who are highly motivated by social preferences are more averse to lying, but there is no significant relationship between lying behavior and other personal characteristics. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; lying; personal characteristics |
| JEL: | D63 |
| Date: | 2012–08–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2012_017&r=evo |
| By: | Amos Schurr; Ilana Ritov; Yaakov Kareev; Judith Avrahami |
| Abstract: | In two experiments, we explored how the perspective through which individuals view their decisions influences their moral behavior. To do this we employed a computerized “Is that the answer you had in mind?” trivial-pursuit style game. The game challenges individuals’ integrity because cheating during play cannot be detected. Perspective, whether local or global, was manipulated: In Experiment 1 the choice procedure was used to evoke a local or an integrative perspective of one’s choices, whereas in Experiment 2, perspective was manipulated through priming. Across all the experiments, we observed that when given an incentive to cheat, the adoption of a local perspective increased cheating, as evidenced by overall higher reported success rates. These findings have clear implications for explaining and controlling behavior in other situations (e.g., exercising, dieting) in which the perspective one takes is a matter of choice. |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp620&r=evo |
| By: | Einav Hart; Yaakov Kareev; Judith Avrahami |
| Abstract: | In many situations one has to choose between risky alternatives, knowing only one's past experience with those alternatives. Such decisions can be made in more – or less – benevolent settings or 'worlds'. In a 'good world', high payoffs are more frequent than low payoffs, and vice versa in a 'bad world'. In two studies, we explored whether the world influences choice behavior: Whether people behave differently in a 'good' versus a 'bad' world. Subjects made repeated, incentivized choices between two gambles, one riskier than the other, neither offering a sure amount. The gambles were held equivalent in terms of their expected value, differing only in variance. Worlds were manipulated both between- and within-subject: In Study 1, each subject experienced one world – good, bad or mediocre; in Study 2, each subject experienced both a good and a bad world. We examine the aggregate pattern of behavior (average choice frequencies), and the dynamics of behavior across time. We observed significant differences in the aggregate pattern: In a good world, subjects tended to choose the riskier alternative, and vice versa in a bad world. The pattern of the dynamics, i.e., the transitions from round to round, were best explained by a reaction to the counterfactual reward: When the unchosen alternative yielded a better payoff, the tendency to subsequently choose it was higher. We compared these two patterns to the predictions of three types of models: Reinforcement learning, regret-based and disappointment-based models. Behavior was in line only with the predictions of regret-based models. |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp619&r=evo |
| By: | Büchner Charlotte; Cörvers Frank; Traag Tanja; Velden Rolf van der (METEOR) |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes four different transmission mechanisms, through which father’s earnings affectson’s earnings: the educational attainment, cognitive skills, the cultural capital of the familyand the social capital in the neighborhood. Using a unique data set that combines panel data froma birth cohort with earnings data from a large nationwide income survey and national tax files,our findings show that cognitive skills and schooling of the son account for 50% of the father-sonearnings elasticity. Education by far accounts for the largest part, while cognitive skills mainlywork indirectly through educational attainment. Social capital of the neighborhood and culturalcapital of the parents account for an additional 6% of the intergeneration income persistence.From these two additional mechanisms, social capital appears to play a stronger role than thecultural capital of the parents. This means that 44% of the intergenerational persistence is dueto other unobserved characteristics for example personality traits or spillover effects of familyassets. |
| Keywords: | education, training and the labour market; |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2012028&r=evo |
| By: | Hanan Shteingart; Tal Neiman; Yonatan Loewenstein |
| Abstract: | We quantified the effect of first experience on behavior in operant learning and studied its underlying computational principles. To that goal, we analyzed more than 200,000 choices in a repeated-choice experiment. We found that the outcome of the first experience has a substantial and lasting effect on participants' subsequent behavior, which we term outcome primacy. We found that this outcome primacy can account for much of the underweighting of rare events, where participants apparently underestimate small probabilities. We modeled behavior in this task using a standard, model-free reinforcement learning algorithm. In this model, the values of the different actions are learned over time and are used to determine the next action according to a predefined action-selection rule. We used a novel non-parametric method to characterize this action-selection rule and showed that the substantial effect of first experience on behavior is consistent with the reinforcement learning model if we assume that the outcome of first experience resets the values of the experienced actions, but not if we assume arbitrary initial conditions. Moreover, the predictive power of our resetting model outperforms previously published models regarding the aggregate choice behavior. These findings suggest that first experience has a disproportionately large effect on subsequent actions, similar to primacy effects in other fields of cognitive psychology. The mechanism of resetting of the initial conditions which underlies outcome primacy may thus also account for other forms of primacy. |
| Keywords: | reinforcement learning, operant conditioning, underweighting of rare events, risk aversion, primacy |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:huj:dispap:dp626&r=evo |
| By: | Zacharias Maniadis; Joshua Miller |
| Abstract: | We present an experiment to address the question of whether a piece of information is more influential if it comes from experience, rather than from another source. We employ a novel experimental design which controls for the value of information and other potentially important confounding factors present in related studies. Overall, our results show that an event that is personally experienced has a stronger influence on subsequent behavior than an observed event with equally valuable information content. Importantly, in early rounds when information is more valuable from a rational viewpoint, this overweighting of personal experience is not statistically significant. JEL Classification Numbers: C90; C91; Keywords: Experiments; Learning; Observation; Reinforcement Learning; Belief-Based Learning |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:452&r=evo |
| By: | Cettolin, Elena (Maastricht University) |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ner:maastr:urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-30058&r=evo |
| By: | Mirco Tonin; Michael Vlassopoulos |
| Abstract: | Contributing to a social cause can be an important driver for workers in the public and non-profit sector as well as in firms that engage in Corporate Social Responsibility activities. This paper compares the effectiveness of social incentives to financial incentives using an online real effort experiment. We find that social incentives lead to a 20% rise in productivity, regardless of their form (lump sum or related to performance) or strength. When subjects can choose the mix of incentives half sacrifice some of their private compensation to increase social compensation, with women more likely than men. Furthermore, social incentives do not attract less productive subjects, nor subjects that respond more to exogenously imposed social incentives. Our calculations suggest that a dollar spent on social incentives is equivalent to increasing private compensation by at least half a dollar. |
| Date: | 2012–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ceu:econwp:2012_12&r=evo |
| By: | Tom Broekel |
| Abstract: | Despite the growing number of studies, still little is known about how network structures and proximity relations between linked actors evolve over time. Arguments are put forward for the existence of co-evolution dynamics between different types of proximity configurations within networks. An empirical investigation tests these arguments using information on the development of 280 networks. Amongst others, it is shown that institutional and cognitive proximity configurations coevolve in the short as well as in the long-run. While institutional and social proximity configurations are only related in the long run. Moreover, temporal auto-correlation dynamics characterizes the development of cognitive proximity configurations. |
| Keywords: | proximities, co-evolution, R&D subsidies, knowledge networks, network evolution |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:egu:wpaper:1217&r=evo |