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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Simon Gachter, Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefon (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | We compare social preference and social norm based explanations for peer effects in a three-person gift-exchange game experiment. In the experiment a principal pays a wage to each of two agents, who then make effort choices sequentially. In our baseline treatment we observe that the second agent's effort is influenced by the effort choice of the first agent, even though there are no material spillovers between agents. This peer effect is predicted by a model of distributional social preferences (Fehr-Schmidt, 1999). As we show from a norms-elicitation experiment, it is also consistent with social norms compliance. A conditional logit investigation of the explanatory power of payoff inequality and elicited norms finds that the second agent's effort can be best explained by the social preferences model. In further treatments with modified games we find that the presence/strength of peer effects changes as predicted by the social preferences model. As with the baseline treatment, a conditional logit analysis favors an explanation based on social preferences, rather than social norms following for these treatments. Our results suggest that, in our context, the social preferences model provides a parsimonious explanation for the observed peer effect. |
| Keywords: | peer effects, social influence, gift-exchange, experiment, social preferences, inequity aversion, measuring social norms. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-01&r=evo |
| By: | Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred |
| Abstract: | Innovation economics is usually neglecting the psychological tradition of creativity research. Our study is an attempt to experimentally collect behavioral data revealing in how far personality characteristics like creativity, analytical skills and personality traits on the one hand and innovative capability, the topic of innovation economics, on the other hand are interrelated. We find that participants' performance in innovation games is related to their creativity, risk tolerance and self-control. Other personality traits such as participants' anxiety, independence, tough-mindedness, analytical skills and extraversion at best play a minor role. -- |
| Keywords: | Creativity,Personality traits,Innovation games,Experiments |
| JEL: | C91 L13 O31 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuewef:44&r=evo |
| By: | Ulrike Vollstädt (Jena Graduate School "Human Behaviour in Social and Economic Change", University of Jena); Robert Böhm (Center for Empirical Research in Economics and Behavioral Scienes (CEREB), University of Erfurt) |
| Abstract: | In reality, it is often groups rather than individuals that make decisions. In previous experiments, groups have frequently been shown to act differently from individuals in several ways. It has been claimed that inter-group interactions may be (1) more competitive, (2) more rational, or (3) more prosocial than inter-individual interactions. While some of these observed differences may be due to differences in the experimental designs, it is still not clear which of the three motivations is prevailing as they have often been behaviorally confounded in previous experiments. We use Rubinstein's alternating offers bargaining game to compare inter-individual with inter-group behavior since it allows separating the predictions of competitive, rational and prosocial behavior. We find that groups are, on average, more rational bargainers than individuals. |
| Keywords: | alternating offers bargaining experiment, inter-group behavior, inter-individual behavior |
| JEL: | C78 D70 |
| Date: | 2012–08–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-048&r=evo |
| By: | Christoph Engel (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn); Lilia Zhurakhovska (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Both in the field and in the lab, participants frequently cooperate, despite the fact that the situation can be modelled as a simultaneous, symmetric prisoner’s dilemma. This experiment manipulates the payoff in case both players defect, and explains the degree of cooperation by a combination of five motives: the size of gains from cooperation, expectations about cooperativeness in the population in question, the degree of risk and loss aversion, and the degree by which a participant is tempted to inflict harm on another participant if this gives her a chance for an even higher payoff. Information about these motivational forces stems from additional within subjects tests. All five factors are significant only if one controls for all the other motives, which suggests that a prisoner’s dilemma is a game jointly characterised by these five motives. The need to control for the remaining explanations seems to be the reason why earlier attempts at explaining choices in the prisoner’s dilemma with personality have not been |
| Keywords: | efficiency, Risk aversion, Conditional Cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma, Belief, Loss Aversion, Risky Dictator Game |
| JEL: | H41 C72 C91 D03 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_16&r=evo |
| By: | Costa-Gomes, Miguel A.; Huck, Steffen; Weizsäcker, Georg |
| Abstract: | In many economic contexts, an elusive variable of interest is the agent's belief about relevant events, e.g. about other agents' behavior. A growing number of surveys and experiments ask participants to state beliefs explicitly but little is known about the causal relation between beliefs and other behavioral variables. This paper discusses the possibility of creating exogenous instrumental variables for belief statements, by informing the agent about exogenous manipulations of the relevant events. We conduct trust game experiments where the amount sent back by the second player (trustee) is exogenously varied. The procedure allows detecting causal links from beliefs to actions under plausible assumptions. The IV-estimated effect is significant, confirming the causal role of beliefs. It is only slightly and insignificantly smaller than in estimations without instrumentation, consistent with a mild effect of social norms or other omitted variables. -- In vielen ökonomischen Zusammenhängen sind die Erwartungen der Spieler bezüglich relevanter Ereignisse, z. B. über das Verhalten anderer Spieler, eine schwer zu fassende Variable von Interesse. Zwar werden in einer wachsenden Zahl von Untersuchungen und Experimenten Teilnehmer gebeten, ihre Erwartungen ausdrücklich zu nennen, jedoch ist noch wenig bekannt über die Kausalbeziehung zwischen Erwartungen und anderen Verhaltensvariablen. In diesem Paper wird die Möglichkeit diskutiert, Instrumente zur Erhebung von Erwartungen zu kreieren, bei denen der Spieler über exogene Manipulationen der relevanten Ereignisse informiert wird. Wir führen Experimente zu einem Vertrauensspiel durch, bei denen der Betrag, der durch den zweiten Spieler zurückgesendet wird (trustee), exogen variiert wird. Dieses Vorgehen erlaubt die Entdeckung kausaler Wirkungsketten von Erwartungen auf Entscheidungen unter plausiblen Annahmen. Der IV-geschätzte Effekt ist signifikant und bestätigt die kausale Rolle von Erwartungen. Er ist nur wenig kleiner als in Schätzungen ohne Instrumentation und konsistent mit einem leichten Effekt sozialer Normen oder anderen vernachlässigter Variablen. |
| Keywords: | Social Capital,trust game,instrumental variables,belief elicitation |
| JEL: | C72 C81 C91 D84 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012302&r=evo |
| By: | Friedman, Daniel; Huck, Steffen; Oprea, Ryan; Weidenholzer, Simon |
| Abstract: | We study long-run learning in an experimental Cournot game with no explicit information about the payoff function. Subjects see only the quantities and payoffs of each oligopolist after every period. In line with theoretical predictions and previous experimental findings, duopolies and triopolies both reach highly competitive levels, with price approaching marginal cost within 50 periods. Using the new ConG software, we extend the horizon to 1,200 periods, far beyond that previously investigated. Already after 100 periods we observe a qualitative change in behavior, and quantity choices start to drop. Without pausing at the Cournot-Nash level quantities continue to drop, eventually reaching almost fully collusive levels in duopolies and often reaching deep into collusive territory for triopolies. Fitted models of individual adjustment suggest that subjects switch from imitation of the most profitable rival to other behavior that, intentionally or otherwise, facilitates collusion via effective punishment and forgiveness. Remarkably, subjects never learn the best-reply correspondence of the one-shot game. Our results suggest a new explanation for the emergence of cooperation. -- Wir untersuchen langfristiges Lernverhalten in experimentellen Cournot-Oligopolen, in denen die Teilnehmer keine direkten Informationen über die Gewinnfunktion haben. Im Einklang mit theoretischen Vorhersagen werden sowohl Duopole als auch Triopole extrem kompetitiv (mit Preisen nahe bei den Grenzkosten) binnen 50 Perioden. Der Einsatz der neuen ConG Software erlaubt uns die Zahl der Perioden auf 1.200 auszudehnen, weit mehr als jemals zuvor untersucht. Bereits nach 100 Perioden beobachten wir deutliche Verhaltensänderungen und niedrigere Produktionsmengen, die stetig weiter fallen, ohne am Cournot-Nash-Gleichgewicht zu verharren, sondern stattdessen nahezu voll kollusive Levels im Duopol erreichen und im Triopol tief in kollusives Terrain vordringen. Unsere Datenanalyse demonstriert, wie die Teilnehmer imitierendes Verhalten zugunsten anderer Regeln aufgeben, die - ob beabsichtigt oder nicht - Kooperation durch effektive Bestrafung und Vergebung unterstützen. Bemerkenswerterweise gelingt es den Teilnehmern auch bis zum Ende des Experiments nicht, die Beste-Antwort-Korrespondenz des (Einmal-)Spiels zu erlernen. Unsere Ergebnisse legen eine neue Erklärung für die Emergenz kooperativen Verhaltens nahe. |
| Keywords: | Cournot oligopoly,imitation,learning dynamics,cooperation |
| JEL: | C73 C91 D43 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbeoc:spii2012301&r=evo |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Martin Sefton (School of Economics, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Recent work in experimental economics on the effectiveness of rewards and punishments for promoting cooperation mainly examines decentralized incentive systems where all group members can reward and/or punish one another. Many self-organizing groups and societies, however, concentrate the power to reward or punish in the hands of a subset of group members (‘central monitors’). We review the literature on the relative merits of punishment and rewards when the distribution of incentive power is diffused across group members, as in most of the extant literature, and compare this with more recent work and new evidence showing how concentrating reward/punishment power in one group member affects cooperation. |
| Keywords: | rewards,punishment, discretionary incentives, decentralized incentives, peer-to-peer incentives, centralized incentives, experiment |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2012-08&r=evo |
| By: | Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob; Potipiti, Tanapong |
| Abstract: | This study experimentally tests the performance in predicting decisions of a reciprocity model that was proposed by Dufwenberg et al. (2004). By applying a new approach, the study directly and individually predicts a subject's future decision from his past decision. The prediction performance is measured by the rate of correct predictions (accuracy) and the gain in the rate of the correct predictions (informativeness). Six scenarios of trust game are used to test the model's performance. Further, we compare the performance of the model with two other prediction methods; one method uses a decision in a dictator game to predict a decision in a trust game; the other uses personal information including IQ-test scores, personal attitudes and socio-economic factors. Seventy-nine undergraduate students participated in this hand-run experimental study. The results show that the reciprocity model has the best performance when compared with other prediction methods. |
| Keywords: | Reciprocity; Model performance; Trust game |
| JEL: | C91 |
| Date: | 2012–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40954&r=evo |
| By: | karina Acosta; Adolfo Meisel |
| Abstract: | Using data from the 2010 Colombia Demographic and Health Survey and of the National Survey of the Nutritional Situation in Colombia (ENDS-ENSIN), we analyzed the evolution of the height for the Colombian birth cohorts in the period 1946-1992 by ethnic groups defined through self-classification. We find that there are statistically significant differences in height between the ethnic groups considered. Those who identified themselves as Afrocolombians have greater average height than the indigenous group and are also taller than those who don’t identify themselves as belonging to either of these two groups. This latter category was denominated in the survey as others. We also find that the height gap between afros and others became smaller during the time period under study. Moreover, the results suggest that the Colombian indigenous group has a higher potential for growth in ‘biological well-being’ if their socioeconomic status improves. |
| Date: | 2012–08–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000094:009913&r=evo |
| By: | Moritz Bonn |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how the existence of a minority culture infl uences the well-being of the native population and its attitude towards immigrants. In this context, I assume that multicultural interaction can be advantageous for immigrants and natives if intercultural obstacles and communication problems are abolished. It is found that certain shares of the immigrant as well as of the native population have incentives to acquire knowledge of the respective other culture since it enables them to interact with each other. I find that immigrants are more likely to acquire knowledge of the domestic culture than vice versa what I attribute to differences in the respective population size, assortative matching behavior and potentially asymmetric learning costs. The model further predicts that natives who have sufficiently low costs of learning the foreign culture are willing to vote for free migration whereas those who have higher learning costs will be in favor of immigration restrictions |
| Keywords: | Immigration, Cultural Interaction, Political Economy |
| JEL: | F22 J15 Z1 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sie:siegen:154-12&r=evo |
| By: | Daishin Yasui (Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops an overlapping generations model in which agents make educational and fertility decisions under life-cycle considerations, and retirement from work is distinguished from death. This model sheds light on a novel mechanism that links life expectancy, retirement, education, fertility, and growth. Gains in adult longevity induce agents to save more for retirement, reduce fertility, invest in education, and achieve sustained growth. Even if the length of working life is shortened by early retirement, this mechanism works as long as adult longevity increases sufficiently. Our model replicates the stylized facts of the transition from stagnation to growth in terms of longevity, time in retirement, fertility, education, and income, as well as reconciles the theory that gains in life expectancy trigger a growth takeoff by increasing education with the observation that the length of working life is not substantially prolonged because of retirement. This study provides a framework for considering the joint determination of education, fertility, and retirement. |
| Keywords: | Fertility; Growth; Human capital; Life expectancy; Retirement |
| JEL: | J13 O11 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:koe:wpaper:1218&r=evo |
| By: | Cinnirella, Francesco; Klemp, Marc P B; Weisdorf, Jacob |
| Abstract: | We question the received wisdom that birth limitation was absent among historical populations before the fertility transition of the late nineteenth-century. Using duration and panel models on individual data, we find a causal negative effect of living standards on birth spacing in the three centuries preceding England's fertility transition. While the effect could be driven by biology in the case of the poor, a significant effect among the rich suggests that spacing worked as a control mechanism in pre-modern England. Our findings support the Malthusian preventive check hypothesis and rationalize England's historical leadership as a low population-pressure, high-wage economy. |
| Keywords: | Birth intervals; Fertility limitation; Natural fertility; Preventive check; Spacing |
| JEL: | J11 J13 N33 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9116&r=evo |