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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Simon Halliday (SALDRU, School of Economics, University of Cape Town) |
| Abstract: | In attempting to understand cooperation, economists have used the methods of experimental economics to focus on spheres of human behavior in which humans display altruism, reciprocity, or other social preferences through giving and through punishment. Recent work has begun to examine whether allowing allocations in the negative domain, that is, allowing subjects to take (or steal) other subjects' endowments, might affect participants' behavior. If participants' behavior is a affected, then our understanding of experimental results generally, and social preferences specifically, should be affected too (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). In this paper we propose an experimental variation on the Dictator Game with third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b). We examine, first, a basic Dictator Game with third-party punishment, after which we introduce a treatment allowing the dictator to take from the receiver, in the knowledge that the third party could punish them. The results conict. Many dictators choose the most self-interested option, while, when taking is introduced as an option for the dictator, third parties punish the most self-interested option more than in the baseline. |
| Keywords: | Experimental Economics, Social Norms, Punishment, Strong Reciprocity, Social Preferences, Third Party. |
| JEL: | C91 D63 |
| Date: | 2011–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ldr:wpaper:62&r=evo |
| By: | Sung-Ha Hwang (Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul) |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how larger group size can enhance punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence support higher levels of cooperation. This occurs when agents can punish fellow group members who violate cooperative norms. Unlike existing approaches that focus on decentralized punishment, I view punishment to be a collective activity and show that pun- ishers can ?divide and conquer?defectors more e¢´ectively as the size of the group increases. To describe the punishment activities more precisely I develop a con?ict model which gener- alizes Lanchester?s equations - equations which describe the time evolution of the strengths of two competing armies. |
| Keywords: | Collective action, group size, collective punishment, Lanchester?s equation |
| JEL: | H41 D74 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgo:wpaper:1113&r=evo |
| By: | Centorrino, Samuele; Djemaï, Elodie; Hopfensitz, Astrid; Milinski, Manfred; Seabright, Paul |
| Abstract: | We test the hypothesis that "genuine" or "convincing" smiling is a costly signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in situations requiring mutual trust. Potential trustees in a trust game made video clips for viewing by potential trusters before the latter decided whether to send them money. Ratings of the genuineness of smiles vary across clips; it is difficult to make convincing smiles to order. We argue that smiling convincingly is costly, because smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as significantly more convincing, so that rewards appear to induce effort. We show that it induces cooperation: smiles rated as more convincing strongly predict judgments about the trustworthiness of trustees, and willingness to send them money. Finally, we show that it is a honest signal: those smiling convincingly return more money on average to senders. Convincing smiles are to some extent a signal of the intrinsic character of trustees: less honest individuals find smiling convincingly more difficult. They are also informative about the greater amounts that trustees playing for higher stakes have available to share: it is harder to smile convincingly if you have less to offer. |
| Date: | 2011–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:24351&r=evo |
| By: | Sung-Ha Hwang (Department of Economics, Sogang University, Seoul); Samuel Bowles (Santa Fe Institute, U.S.A. and Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Univerity of Siena, Italy) |
| Abstract: | In both experimental and natural settings incentives sometimes under-perform, generating smaller eects on the targeted behaviors than would be predicted for entirely self-regarding agents. A parsimonious explanation is that incentives that appeal to payo maximizing mo- tives may crowd out non-economic motives such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and other social preferences, leading to disappointing and sometimes even counter-productive incentive eects. Evidence from behavioral experiments indicates that crowding may take two forms: categorical (the eect on preferences depends only on the presence or absence of the incentive) or marginal (the eect depends on the extent of the incentive). We extend an earlier contribution to this journal (Bowles and Hwang, 2008) providing a more general framework for the study of optimal incentives when crowding out results from framing and information eects including (with evidence for ) categorical crowding, and as a result, an expanded range of situations for which the sophisticated planner will make greater use of incentives when incentives crowd out social preferences than when motivational crowding is absent. |
| Keywords: | Social preferences, public goods, motivational crowding out, explicit incentives, framing, endogenuous preferences |
| JEL: | D64 H41 D78 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgo:wpaper:1118&r=evo |
| By: | Haucap, Justus; Herr, Annika; Frank, Björn |
| Abstract: | It is a persistent phenomenon in many societies that a large proportion of alcohol consumption takes place in company of other people. While the phenomenon of social or public drinking is well discussed in disciplines as social psychology and anthropology, economists have paid little attention to the social environment of alcohol consumption. This paper tries to close this gap and explains social drinking as a trust facilitating device. Since alcohol consumption tends to make some people (unwillingly) tell the truth, social drinking can eventually serve as a signaling device in social contact games. Empirical support is obtained from a cross-country analysis of trust and a newly developed index of moderate alcohol consumption. -- |
| Keywords: | social and public drinking,alcohol consumption,social contact games,trust,signaling |
| JEL: | C72 D71 L14 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:37&r=evo |
| By: | Orley C. Ashenfelter |
| Abstract: | In this essay I review Sylvia Nasar’s long awaited new history of economics, Grand Pursuit. I describe how the book is really an economic history of the period from 1850-1950, with distinguished economists’ stories inserted in appropriate places. Nasar’s goal is to show how economists work, but also to show that they are people too--with more than enough warts and foibles to show they are human! I contrast the general view of the role of economics in Grand Pursuit with Robert Heilbroner’s remarkably different conception in The Worldly Philosophers. I also discuss more generally the question of why economists might be interested in their history at all. |
| JEL: | A11 B20 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17607&r=evo |
| By: | Hokamp, Sascha; Pickhardt, Michael |
| Abstract: | We derive a generalized method for calculating the total number of Paretooptimal allocations (NOPA) in typical linear public goods games. Among other things, the method allows researchers to develop new experimental designs for testing the relevance of Pareto-optimality in experimental settings, for investigating alternative causes of the decline of voluntary contributions, or for analyzing the contribution behavior of the rich and poor in heterogeneous income settings. Further findings include that the NOPA is related to the marginal per capita return (MPCR) of a contribution to the public good and that the maximum number of free-riders tolerated by the Paretooptimality concept is independent from the group size and income distribution. Finally, we apply our findings to a number of published linear public goods games, suggest an agenda for future research and provide a MATLAB code. -- |
| Keywords: | linear public goods games,Pareto-optimality,public goods experiments,behavioral economics,free-rider,heterogeneous incomes,heterogeneous MPCRs |
| JEL: | C70 C90 H41 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cawmdp:45&r=evo |
| By: | Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten |
| Abstract: | This paper presents an overview of recent research in neuroeconomics, in the light of the question how these relate to institutional economics. I present a critique of Glimcher's recent internalist standard model of neuroeconomics and put forward the claim that only an externalist approach can provide a consistent framework for relating neuroscience and economics, which implies a pivotal role for institutions. I discuss the relation between neuroeconomics and institutional economics from three different perspectives. How does neuroeconomics improve our knowledge about the relation between behavior and institutions (rule follwoing)? Can neuroeconomics provide deeper insights into the effects of institutions on behavior? In which way does neuroeconomics change the relation between institutional analysis and welfare analysis? In all these respects, I show that the orginal Hayekian conjectures applies, namely that the analysis of the human brain contributes substantially to our understanding of institutions, and that mental phenomena cannot be isolated from institutional phenomena. -- |
| Keywords: | neuroeconomics,institutions,multiple selves,identity,rule following,distributed cognition,imitation |
| JEL: | B41 B52 D02 D87 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fsfmwp:176&r=evo |
| By: | Shingo Ishiguro (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we present a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate how different contracting modes based on formal and relational enforcements endogenously emerge and are dynamically linked with the process of economic development. Formal contracts are enforced by third party institutions (courts), while relational contracts are self-enforcing agreements without any third party involvement. The novel feature of our model is to demonstrate the co-evolution of these different enforcement modes and market equilibrium conditions, all of which are jointly determined. We then characterize the equilibrium paths of such dynamic processes and show the time structure of relational contracting (self-enforcing agreement) in the endogenous process of economic development. In particular we show that relational contracting fosters the emergence of the market-based economy in low development stages but its role declines as the economy grows and enters high development stages. |
| Keywords: | dynamic general equilibrium, economic development, armfs length contract, relational contract |
| JEL: | D86 E10 O11 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:1131&r=evo |
| By: | Victoria Ateca-Amestoy (University of the Basque Country) |
| Keywords: | cultural economics, demand, cultural heritage, participation in the arts, SPPA2008 |
| JEL: | Z11 D12 |
| Date: | 2011–11–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:201106&r=evo |
| By: | M. Bigoni; M. Casari; A. Skrzypacz; G. Spagnolo |
| Abstract: | When subjects interact in continuous time, their ability to cooperate may dramatically increase. In an experiment, we study the impact of different time horizons on cooperation in (quasi) continuous time prisoner's dilemmas. We find that cooperation levels are similar or higher when the horizon is deterministic rather than stochastic. Moreover, a deterministic duration generates different aggregate patterns and individual strategies than a stochastic one. For instance, under a deterministic horizon subjects show high initial cooperation and a strong end-of-period reversal to defection. Moreover, they do not learn to apply backward induction but to postpone defection closer to the end. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C91 C92 D74 |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp796&r=evo |
| By: | David Canning (Harvard School of Public Health) |
| Abstract: | The causes and consequences of the demographic transition are considered in light of the recent book by Dyson (2010) on demography and development. In the last 50 years the world has seen an exogenous decline in mortality that generated a decline in fertility and an increase in urbanization that has had profound economic, social and political consequences. However, historically, declines in mortality and fertility, and escape from the Malthusian trap, have required countries to have already undergone considerable economic and political development. We therefore argue for two way causality between the demographic transition and economic and political outcomes. |
| Keywords: | demographic transition, fertility, mortality |
| Date: | 2011–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gdm:wpaper:7911&r=evo |