|
on Evolutionary Economics |
By: | Noussair, Charles; van Soest, Daan; Stoop, Jan |
Abstract: | We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation. |
Keywords: | Field experiment; public goods game; social preferences; punishment; reward |
JEL: | C92 C93 C72 |
Date: | 2011–09–26 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34067&r=evo |
By: | Sandra González-Bailón; Tommy E. Murphy |
Abstract: | We build an agent-based simulation model that incorporates both historical data on population characteristics and spatial information on the geography of France to experimentally study the role of social interactions in fertility decisions. We assess how different behavioural and interdependence assumptions cause variations in macro dynamics and diffusion patterns. The analyses show that incorporating social interactions into the model contribute to mimic empirically observed behaviour. Our findings suggest individual-level mechanisms through which the observed demographic transition was materialised. Keywords fertility decline, demographic transition, diffusion, France, simulation experiments, agent-based models, decision-making, social norms, social interactions. JEL classification N33, J13, C15. |
Date: | 2011 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:419&r=evo |
By: | Birkeland, Sigbjørn (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Cappelen, Alexander W. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Sørensen, Erik Ø. (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration); Tungodden, Bertil (Dept. of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration) |
Abstract: | This paper studies the pro-social preferences of criminals by comparing the behavior of a group of prisoners in a lab experiment with the behavior of a benchmark group recruited from the general population. We find a striking similarity in the importance the two groups attach to pro-social preferences in both in strategic and non-strategic situations. This result also holds when the two groups interact. Data from a large internet experiment,matched with official criminal records, suggest that our main finding from the lab experiment is not influenced by the additional scrutiny experienced by participants in prison. |
Keywords: | Pro-social preferences; Criminals; Lab experiment |
JEL: | C91 D63 K40 |
Date: | 2011–09–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhheco:2011_015&r=evo |
By: | Giocoli, Nicola |
Abstract: | Bayesian rationality is the paradigm of rational behavior in neoclassical economics. A rational agent in an economic model is one who maximizes her subjective expected utility and consistently revises her beliefs according to Bayes’s rule. The paper raises the question of how, when and why this characterization of rationality came to be endorsed by mainstream economists. Though no definitive answer is provided, it is argued that the question is far from trivial and of great historiographic importance. The story begins with Abraham Wald’s behaviorist approach to statistics and culminates with Leonard J. Savage’s elaboration of subjective expected utility theory in his 1954 classic The Foundations of Statistics. It is the latter’s acknowledged fiasco to achieve its planned goal, the reinterpretation of traditional inferential techniques along subjectivist and behaviorist lines, which raises the puzzle of how a failed project in statistics could turn into such a tremendous hit in economics. A couple of tentative answers are also offered, involving the role of the consistency requirement in neoclassical analysis and the impact of the postwar transformation of US business schools. |
Keywords: | Savage; Wald; rational behavior; Bayesian decision theory; subjective probability; minimax rule; statistical decision functions; neoclassical economics |
JEL: | B31 B21 D81 |
Date: | 2011–10–14 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34117&r=evo |
By: | Jens Leth Hougaard; Juan D. Moreno-Ternero; Lars Peter Østerdal (University of Copenhagen) |
Abstract: | We explore in this paper the implications of ethical and operational principles for the evaluation of population health. We formalize those principles as axioms for social preferences over distributions of health for a given population. We single out several focal population health evaluation functions, which represent social preferences, as a result of combinations of those axioms. Our results provide rationale for popular theories in health economics (such as the unweighted aggregation of QALYs or HYEs, and generalizations of the two, aimed to capture concerns for distributive justice) without resorting to controversial assumptions over individual preferences. |
Keywords: | population health, QALYs, HYEs, axioms |
JEL: | D63 I10 |
Date: | 2011–10–11 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1124&r=evo |
By: | Ianni, Antonella |
Abstract: | This paper studies the analytical properties of the reinforcement learning model proposed in Erev and Roth (1998), also termed cumulative reinforcement learning in Laslier et al (2001). This stochastic model of learning in games accounts for two main elements: the law of effect (positive reinforcement of actions that perform well) and the law of practice (the magnitude of the reinforcement effect decreases with players' experience). The main results of the paper show that, if the solution trajectories of the underlying replicator equation converge exponentially fast, then, with probability arbitrarily close to one, all the realizations of the reinforcement learning process will, from some time on, lie within an " band of that solution. The paper improves upon results currently available in the literature by showing that a reinforcement learning process that has been running for some time and is found suffciently close to a strict Nash equilibrium, will reach it with probability one. |
Keywords: | Strict Nash Equilibrium; Reinforcement Learning |
JEL: | C92 D83 C72 |
Date: | 2011–10–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:33936&r=evo |
By: | Gaudeul, Alexia; Giannetti, Caterina |
Abstract: | This paper deals with the role of reciprocation in the formation of individuals' social networks. We follow the activity of a panel of bloggers over more than a year and investigate the extent to which initiating a relation brings about its reciprocation. We adapt a standard capital investment model to study how reciprocation affects the build-up of the individual social capital of bloggers, as measured by their links and interactions with others. This allows us to measure the role of content production and relationship building in the dynamics of online social networks and to distinguish between the social networking and media aspects of blogging. |
Keywords: | Blogs; Friendship; LiveJournal; Reciprocation; Social Capital; Social Networks |
JEL: | L82 Z13 C33 D85 |
Date: | 2011–10–13 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34094&r=evo |
By: | Uwe Jirjahn; Vanessa Lange |
Abstract: | Using unique survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, this study examines the influence of reciprocal inclinations on workers¿ sorting into codetermined firms. Employees with strong negative reciprocal inclinations are more likely to work in firms with a works council while employees with strong positive reciprocal inclinations are less likely to work in such firms. We argue that these findings conform to hypotheses derived from the experimental literature. Moreover, the results show striking gender differences in the relationship between reciprocity and taste for representation. These differences can be partially explained by gender-specific differences in the average degree of labor force attachment. |
Keywords: | Works council, negative reciprocity, positive reciprocity, sorting, gender |
JEL: | J52 J53 M50 |
Date: | 2011 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp402&r=evo |
By: | Antoci, Angelo; Sabatini, Fabio; Sodini, Mauro |
Abstract: | The objective of this paper is to theoretically analyze how human interaction may evolve in a world characterized by the explosion of online networking and other Web-mediated ways of building and nurturing relationships. The analysis shows that online networking yields a storage mechanism through which any individual contribution - e.g. a blog post, a comment, or a photo - is stored within a particular network and ready for virtual access by each member who connects to the network. When someone provides feedback, for example by commenting on a note, or by replying to a message, the interaction is finalized. These interactions are asynchronous, i.e. they allow individuals to relate in different moments, whenever they have time to. When the social environment is poor of participation opportunities and/or the pressure on time increases (for example due to the need to increase the working time), the stock of information and ties stored in the Internet can help individuals to defend their sociability. |
Keywords: | Internet; computer-mediated communication; online networking; Facebook; social networks; social capital |
JEL: | O33 D83 Z13 D85 |
Date: | 2011–10–21 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:34232&r=evo |