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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Jon D. Wisman |
| Abstract: | Many notable heterodox economists have viewed workplace democracy as essential for the realization of the Enlightenment ideals of liberty, equality, and community. Yet the economics profession has never given their ideal more than a passing and dismissive glance. The reasons for this have been well-covered in the literature. But one reason that has been all but ignored is that the theory of human behavior that is credited to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and that has dominated economic thinking ever since is not supportive of workplace democracy. However, Smith developed a far richer theory of human behavior in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. His fuller theory depicted humans as fully social beings, in need of community. This article outlines the “social approbation” theory of human behavior that Smith developed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and demonstrates how it is in accord with the findings of contemporary evolutionary psychology. It then examines the manner in which this theory suggests workplace democracy as the appropriate organizational form of control for society's sphere of production. |
| Keywords: | Adam Smith, Self-interest, Altruism, Approbation, Cooperation, Workplace democracy |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-15&r=evo |
| By: | Ralph-C Bayer (School of Economics, University of Adelaide); Elke Renner (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Rupert Sausgruber (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay of contributions in standard public goods games cannot be fully explained by reinforcement learning. According to our estimates, learning only accounts for 41 percent of the decay in contributions in standard public goods games. The contribution dynamics of subjects, who are identi?ed as conditional cooperators, di®er strongly from the learning dynamics, while a learning model estimated from the limited information treatment tracks behavior for subjects, who cannot be classi?ed as conditional cooperators, reasonably well. |
| Keywords: | public goods experiments, learning, limited information, confusion, conditional cooperation |
| JEL: | C90 D83 H41 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-18&r=evo |
| By: | James W. Bono; David H. Wolpert |
| Abstract: | Conventionally, game theory predicts that the mixed strategy profile of players in a noncooperative game will satisfy some equilibrium concept. Relative probabil- ities of the strategy profiles satisfying the concept are unspecified, and all strategies not satisfying it are implicitly assigned probability zero. As an alternative, we re- cast the prediction problem of game theory as statistically estimating the strategy profile, from "data" that consists of the game specification. This replaces the focus of game theory, on specifying a set of "equilibrium" mixed strategies, with a new focus, on specifying a probability density over all mixed strategies. We explore a Bayesian version of such a Predictive Game Theory (PGT). We show that for some games the peaks of the posterior over strategy profiles approximate quantal response equilibria. We also show how PGT provides a best single prediction for any noncooperative game, i.e., a universal refinement. We also show how regula- tors can use PGT to make optimal decisions in situations where conventional game theory cannot provide advice. |
| Keywords: | Quantal Response Equilibrium, Bayesian Statistics, Entropic prior, Maximum entropy |
| JEL: | C02 C11 C70 C72 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-20&r=evo |
| By: | Elaina Rose (with Yoram Bauman) |
| Abstract: | A substantial body of research suggests that economists are less generous than other professionals and that economics students are less generous than other students. We address this question using administrative data on donations to social programs by students at the University of Washington. Our data set allows us to track student donations and economics training over time in order to distinguish selection effects from indoctrination effects. We find that economics majors are less likely to donate than other students and that there is an indoctrination effect for non-majors but not for majors. Women majors and non-majors are less likely to contribute than comparable men. |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udb:wpaper:uwec-2009-20&r=evo |
| By: | De Martí, Joan; Zenou, Yves |
| Abstract: | We analyze a model of network formation with agents that belong to different communities and an endogenous cost structure. Both individual benefits and costs depend on direct as well as indirect connections. Benefits of an indirect connection decrease with distance in the network, while the cost of a link depends on the type of agents involved in it as well as the rest of linkage decisions of both of them. Two individuals from the same community always face a low linking cost. The cost of forming a relationship for two individuals belonging to different communities diminishes with the rate of exposure of each of them to the other community. As a result, our model introduces endogenous social distances that rely on individual positions in the network. We derive a number of results with regard to equilibrium networks: (i) socialization among the same type of agents might be weak even if the within-type link cost is very low; (ii) oppositional identity patterns can arise for a wide range of parameters; (iii) integrated networks can be socially preferable to segregated networks. |
| Keywords: | bridges; ethnic minorities; identity; Network formation; social norms; structural holes |
| JEL: | A14 D85 J15 |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7566&r=evo |