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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Christian Thöni (University of St. Gallen); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Erik Wengström (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | We show that the standard trust question routinely used in social capital research is importantly related to cooperation behavior and we provide a microfoundation for this relation. We run a large-scale public goods experiment over the internet in Denmark and find that the trust question is a proxy for cooperation preferences rather than beliefs about others’ cooperation. To disentangle the preference and belief channels, we run a (standard) public goods game in which beliefs matter for cooperation choices and one (using the strategy method) in which they do not matter. We show that the “fairness question”, a recently proposed alternative to the “trust question”, is also related to cooperation behavior but operates through beliefs rather than preferences. |
| Keywords: | Social capital; Trust; Fairness; Public goods; Cooperation; Experiment |
| JEL: | H41 C91 C72 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0924&r=evo |
| By: | Novarese, Marco; Castellani, Marco; Di Giovinazzo, Viviana |
| Abstract: | The Economics of Happiness already recognizes how procedures affect the evaluation of outcomes, although this has only been looked at within the standard framework of substantial rationality. This paper aims to go beyond that kind of approach by linking happiness and procedural rationality, focusing on ‘happiness for choice’ (the individual’s perceived satisfaction after the decision making process). Simon’s model shows the need for defining aspirations whose values are adapted to the past experience in a given environment. Some remarks proposed by Scitovsky’s allow to extend this idea considering the role of creative representation of the world as a way for trying to go beyond the past. These ideas are tested using data on aspirations and satisfaction expressed by students attending an economic course. |
| Keywords: | Procedural rationality; satisfaction; students; happiness; aspirations |
| JEL: | D83 |
| Date: | 2009–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:18290&r=evo |
| By: | Robert S. Gazzale (Williams College) |
| Abstract: | I experimentally investigate the effects of the ability to imitate successful others on convergence to the one-shot Nash equilibrium. I study a two-player game (Potters and Suetens Forthcoming) in which a single parameter determines the existence of strategic complementarities. I generally confirm previous findings when learning from others is not possible: games with strategic complementarities converge more robustly to the Nash equilibrium than those without. However, I find the reverse with the ability to learn from successful others as this information significantly improves convergence in games without strategic complementarities but has no effect and possibly a negative effect on games with complementarities. |
| JEL: | C90 D70 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wil:wileco:2009-03&r=evo |
| By: | Antoci, Angelo; Sabatini, Fabio; Sodini, Mauro |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses two hot topics of the contemporary debate, social capital and economic growth. Our theoretical analysis sheds light on decisive but so far neglected issues: how does social capital accumulate over time? Which is the relationship between social capital, technical progress and economic growth in the long run? The analysis shows that the economy may be attracted by alternative steady states, depending on the initial social capital endowments and cultural exogenous parameters representing the relevance of social interaction and trust in well-being and production. When material consumption and relational goods are substitutable, the choice to devote more and more time to private activities may lead the economy to a “social poverty trap”, where the cooling of human relations causes a progressive destruction of the entire stock of social capital. In this case, the relationship of social capital with technical progress is described by an inverted U-shaped curve. However, the possibility exists for the economy to follow a virtuous trajectory where the stock of social capital endogenously and unboundedly grows. Such result may follow from a range of particular conditions, under which the economy behaves as if there was no substitutability between relational activities and material consumption. |
| Keywords: | Social capital; relational goods; happyness; economic growth. |
| JEL: | Z13 O4 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:18229&r=evo |