|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Ryosuke Ishii (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University) |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:671&r=evo |
| By: | Ingela Alger (Carleton University - Department of Economics); Jörgen Weibull (SSE - Department of Economics - Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between a pair of mutually altruistic siblings. Each sibling exerts effort to produce output under uncertainty and the siblings may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism and depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary robustness of degrees of sibling altruism, and show that this degree is less than one half, the kinship relatedness factor. By way of numerical simulations we show that family ties are weaker in harsher environments. |
| Keywords: | altruism, family ties, Hamilton's rule, free-riding, evolutionary robustness |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00354241_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Ryosuke Ishii (Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University) |
| Abstract: | We consider the dynamic trading strategies that minimize the expected cost of trading a large block of securities over a fixed finite number of periods. We obtain the result in which the institutional investor sells more stocks in early stages when we introduce the conjectures about the others' actions o¤ the equilibrium path that is identical to the ones on the equilibrium path, compared to the outcome in the normal setting. |
| Date: | 2009–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kyo:wpaper:670&r=evo |
| By: | Stefano Demichelis (University of Pavia - Department of Mathematics); Jörgen Weibull (SSE - Department of Economics - Stockholm School of Economics, Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X) |
| Abstract: | Language is arguably a powerful coordination device in real-life interactions. We here develop a game-theoretic model of pre-play communication that generalizes the cheap-talk approach by way of introducing a meaning correspondence between messages and actions, and postulating two axioms met by natural languages. Deviations from this correspondence are called dishonest and players have a lexicographic preference for honesty, second to material payoffs. The model is first applied to two-sided preplay communication in finite and symmetric two-player games and we establish that, in generic and symmetric n × n - coordination games, a Nash equilibrium component in such a lexicographic communication game is evolutionarily stable if and only if it results in the unique Pareto efficient outcome of the underlying game. We extend the approach to one-sided communication in finite, not necessarily symmetric, two-player games. |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00354224_v1&r=evo |