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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Muñoz, Félix-Fernando (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.); Encinar, María-Isabel (Departamento de Análisis Económico (Teoría e Historia Económica). Universidad Autónoma de Madrid.) |
| Abstract: | An important challenge to evolutionary economics consists of how to tackle with the dramatic tension between purposeful human action and the ‘blindness’ of evolutionary processes. On the one hand, economic action, if rational, has to be planned (which implies purposeful ordering of the means used to achieve objectives). On the other hand, an evolutionary process involves both the emergence of novelties (both intended innovations and unintended consequences of actions) and properties that manifest at meso and macro levels. Some recent papers have insisted on these issues. However, few analytical tools are yet available to cope with both, the analysis of intended dynamic action and ‘blind’ evolution. In this paper we propose the so-called ‘action plan approach’, a theoretical framework which could be useful for this task. The development of tools that permit us to analyze how individuals construct their plans, the projective (conjectural) and interactive nature of action, and the learning processes involved in ‘planning and acting’, may help us identifying and understanding new sources of complexity of economic processes. The close relationship of the ‘action plan approach’ with other systemic conceptual approaches is also highlighted. |
| Keywords: | connections, action plans, novelty, intentionality, evolutionary economic process |
| JEL: | B41 B52 D89 O10 O31 |
| Date: | 2007–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uam:wpaper:200707&r=evo |
| By: | Floris Heukelom (Universiteit van Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | The most important financial source for behavioral economics is the Russell Sage Foundation (RSF). The most prominent behavioral economists among the RSF’s twenty-six member Behavioral Economics Roundtable (BER) are Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, Camerer, Loewenstein, Rabin, and Laibson. The theoretical core of behavioral economics made up of the work of these seven researchers is positioned in opposition to Adam Smith/Hayek type of economics, as exemplified by experimental economists Vernon Smith and Plott; and what is referred to as ‘mainstream’ or ‘traditional’ economics, meaning the neoclassical economics that roughly builds on Samuelson. On the basis of an overview of the work of these seven behavioral economists, a theoretical division can be observed within behavioral economics. The first branch considers human decision-making to be a problem of exogenous uncertainty, which can be analyzed with decision theory. It employs traditional economics as a nor! mative benchmark and favors a normative-descriptive(-prescriptive) distinction for economics. The second branch considers human decision-making to be a problem of strategic interaction, in which the uncertainty is endogenous. Its main tool is game theory. It rejects traditional economics both positively and normatively. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics; Russell Sage Foundation; experimental economics; Kahneman; Tversky; Thaler; Laibson; Loewenstein; Rabin; Camerer |
| JEL: | A12 B21 B31 D0 |
| Date: | 2007–02–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20070020&r=evo |