|
on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Lucie Vaskova (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - [CNRS : UMR5593] - [Université Lumière - Lyon II] - [Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat]) |
| Abstract: | This paper tries to set out a potential of application of some evolutionary biology concepts to the issue of regional development. The objective is to show that employment of these concepts or at least inspiration by them may enrich some theories of regional development and enhance the explanatory framework of regional evolution.<br />First, the views of institutional economics and geography on evolutionary biology contribution are summarised, then some evolutionary concepts are applied to the path dependence concept e. g., in effort to find a possible way of classification of this phenomenon. However, we discuss some other evolutionary concepts, as coevolution, adaptation, preadaption, general approach to comprehension of evolution, etc. in connexion with some chosen theories and problems of regional development. |
| Keywords: | Regional development ; evolutionary biology ; path dependence ; theories of regional development |
| Date: | 2006–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00114801_v1&r=evo |
| By: | Ron A. Boschma; Koen Frenken |
| Abstract: | This paper is written as the first chapter of an edited volume on evolutionary economics and economic geography (Frenken, K., editor, Applied Evolutionary Economics and Economic Geography, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, expected publication date February 2007). The paper reviews empirical applications of evolutionary economics in the field of economic geography. The review is divided in four parts: the micro-level of the firm, the meso-levels of industry and network, and the macro-level of spatial system. Some remarks on evolutionary policy in regional development are added as well as a short discussion of empirical problems that remain. |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:06-26&r=evo |
| By: | Jim Engle-Warnick†; Ed Hopkins |
| Abstract: | We report experiments designed to test the theoretical possibility, first discovered by Shapley (1964), that in some games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 × 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We ran each game in high and low payoff treatments. We find that, in all treatments, average play is close to equilibrium even though there are strong cycles present in the data. |
| Keywords: | : Games, Learning, Experiments, Stochastic Fictitious Play, Mixed Strategy Equilibria. |
| JEL: | C72 C73 C92 D83 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:edn:esedps:153&r=evo |