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on Evolutionary Economics |
| By: | Viossat, Yannick (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In (Viossat, 2006, "The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria", forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the single-population replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies in the support of at least one correlated equilibrium, and this from an open set of initial conditions. Here, we generalize this result by showing that it holds on an open set of games, and for many other dynamics, including the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly-sign preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. It is also shown that, for the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibria is robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies. |
| Keywords: | Correlated equilibrium; evolutionary dynamics |
| JEL: | C72 C73 |
| Date: | 2006–05–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hastef:0629&r=evo |
| By: | Richard R. Nelson |
| Abstract: | The purpose of the article is to discuss the differences between the evolutionary economic theory and the neoclassical theory from the appreciative viewpoint that aims to capture the basics of what actually is going on, leaving aside formal mathematical modeling in the two theories. As the result, evolutionary theory sees the economy as always in the process of change that involves economic actors taking actions that break from previous behavior, and an environment in continuing flux because of the innovation. While neoclassical theory sees the economy as at rest, or undergoing well anticipated change it has nothing to say about these kinds of conditions. Therefore the author believes the processes of economic catch-up have to proceed under the implicit or explicit guidance of an evolutionary economic theory. |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:02&r=evo |
| By: | Erik S. Reinert |
| Abstract: | The author argues that in order to create a qualitative understanding of the factors polarizing the world in growing wealth and growing poverty there is a need to create economics by inclusion, a system where all relevant factors, some of which have been part of the economic discourse for centuries, but also elements (like the different effects of process and product innovations) that are part of evolutionary economics itself, are considered simultaneously. According to the author, this historical/institutional approach to economics would benefit especially the Third World. Moreover, the economics by inclusion should also open the way for policies of inclusion, a system that will put the accent on the wellbeing of the majority and not on the growth of the export sector. |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:01&r=evo |
| By: | Isabelle Brocas; Juan D. Carillo |
| Abstract: | We model the brain as a multi-agent organization. Based on recent neuroscience evidence, we assume that different systems of the brain have different time-horizons and different access to information. Introducing asymmetric information as a restriction on optimal choices generates endogenous constraints in decision-making. In this game played between brain systems, we show the optimality of a self-disciplining rule of the type “work more today if you want to consume more today” and discuss its behavioral implications for the distribution of consumption over the life-cycle. We also argue that our dual-system theory provides “micro-microfoundations” for discounting and offer testable implications that depart from traditional models with no conflict and exogenous discounting. Last, we analyze a variant in which the agent has salient incentives or biased motivations. The previous rule is then replaced by a simple, non-intrusive precept of the type “consume what you want, just don’t abuse”. |
| Date: | 2006–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:scp:wpaper:06-48&r=evo |
| By: | Oded Galor; Stelios Michalopoulos |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2006-12&r=evo |
| By: | Sophus A. Reinert |
| Abstract: | A long tradition of thought in Western political philosophy compares the body of man to the political body. This traditional cosmological frame of reference was, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, overcome by the emergence of evolutionary social systems. Albert Schäffle [1831-1903] can fruitfully be considered the last major representative of the old trajectory of thought, and Thorstein Veblen [1853-1929] the first of the new. By comparing and contrasting their uses of biological metaphors and the places these occupied in their larger visions of society and the economy, the author explores some of the tensions generated in late nineteenth century political philosophy by the dramatic change in biological paradigm—in other words by Darwin’s first encounter with the body politic. |
| Date: | 2006–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tth:wpaper:08&r=evo |