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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Romain Duval |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews alternative (national and international) climate change mitigation policy instruments and interactions across them. Carbon taxes, cap-and-trade schemes, standards and technology-support policies (R&D and clean technology deployment) in particular are assessed according to three broad costeffectiveness criteria, their: i) static efficiency, defined to cover not just whether the instrument is costeffective per se but also whether it provides sufficient political incentives for wide adoption; ii) dynamic efficiency, which implies an efficient level of innovation and diffusion of clean technologies in order to lower future abatement costs; iii) ability to cope effectively with climate and economic uncertainties. Multiple market failures and political economy obstacles need to be addressed in order to meet these criteria. In this regard, carbon taxes or cap-and-trade schemes appear to perform better than alternatives. However, their cost-effectivenes can be enhanced through targeted use of other instruments. There is therefore room for climate policy packages. <P>Une taxonomie des instruments de réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre et de leurs interactions <BR>Cet article passe en revue les différents instruments de politique économique (nationaux et internationaux) envisageables dans la lutte contre le changement climatique, ainsi que leurs interactions. Taxes carbone, marchés de permis négociables, standards et politiques de soutien au progrès technique (R&D et déploiement de technologies propres) en particulier sont évalués au regard de trois critères d’efficacité coût, à savoir: i) l'efficience statique, qui recouvre non seulement l’efficacité coût intrinsèque de l’instrument, mais aussi les incitations politiques à son adoption à grande échelle ; ii) l'efficience dynamique, impliquant un niveau efficient d’innovation et de diffusion des technologies propres permettant de réduire les coûts futurs de réduction des émissions ; iii) la capacité à s’adapter aux incertitudes climatiques et économiques. De multiples échecs de marché et obstacles relevant de l’économie politique doivent être surmontés pour vérifier ces critères. De ce point de vue, il apparaît que les taxes carbone et les marchés de permis négociables sont plus performants que les alternatives. Néanmoins, leur efficacité coût peut être améliorée par un usage ciblé des autres instruments. Il y a donc matière à la mise en place d’un éventail de politiques. |
| Keywords: | climate change, changement climatique, global warming, greenhouse gas, mitigation, international climate policy, réchauffement climatique, gaz à effet de serre, réduction des émissions, politique climatique international |
| JEL: | H23 Q54 |
| Date: | 2008–09–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:ecoaaa:636-en&r=env |
| By: | Benno Torgler; María A.García-Valiñas; Alison Macintyre |
| Abstract: | We explore whether environmental motivation affects environmental behavior by focusing on volunteering. The paper first introduces a theoretical model of volunteering in environmental organizations. In a next step, it tests the hypothesis working with a large micro data set covering 32 countries from both Western and Eastern Europe using several different proxies to measure environmental motivation. Our results indicate that environmental motivation has a strong impact on individuals’ voluntary engagement in environmental organizations. A higher level of environmental motivation due to higher environmental moral standards may lead to a stronger voluntary involvement in environmental organizations. |
| Keywords: | environmental participation; environmental motivation; environmental morale; pro-environmental attitudes; social capital |
| JEL: | D11 H41 H26 H73 D64 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cra:wpaper:2008-19&r=env |
| By: | Amihai Glazer; Stef Proost |
| Abstract: | Given the difficulty of monitoring, and even more so of enforcing, International Environmental Agreements, it is surprising that they are signed and implemented. This paper offers a theoretical model, which addresses this issue. The focus is on informational and coordination problems. A country which is unsure about the benefits of environmental policy may find that the benefits are higher the greater the number of other countries which lean towards taking action. Whereas each country may individually take weak environmental action, in equilibrium several countries may take strong action if they expect others to. An International Environmental Agreement can thus be selfenforcing. Such effects can appear even if international environmental spillovers are absent, and even if monitoring and enforcement are infeasible. Our approach can explain additional phenomena: why a country known to care little about the environment may deeply influence other countries if it takes strong environmental action, why lags may appear between the signing of an agreement and its implementation, and how requirements for approval by several bodies within a country can increase support for environmental action. |
| Keywords: | Environmental policy, international agreements, signaling, regulation |
| JEL: | Q58 D82 L51 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0814&r=env |
| By: | Timilsina, Govinda R.; Shrestha, Ashish |
| Abstract: | This study examines the factors responsible for the growth of transport sector carbon dioxide emissions in 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries during 1980-2005 by decomposing the emissions growth into components associated with changes in fuel mix, modal shift, and economic growth, as well as changes in emission coefficients and transportation energy intensity. The key finding of the study is that economic growth and the changes in transportation energy intensity are the main factors driving transport sector carbon dioxide emissions growth in the countries considered. The results imply that fiscal policy instruments - such as subsidies to clean fuels and clean vehicles - would be more effective in reducing emissions in countries where the economic activity effect is the primary driver for transport sector carbon dioxide emissions growth. By contrast, regulatory policy instruments - such as vehicle efficiency standards and vehicle occupancy standards - would be more effective in countries where the transportation energy intensity effect is the main driver of carbon dioxide emissions growth. Both fiscal and regulatory policy instruments would be useful in countries where both economic activity and transportation energy intensity effects are responsible for driving transport sector carbon dioxide emissions growth. |
| Keywords: | Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Energy Production and Transportation,Oil Refining&Gas Industry,Environment and Energy Efficiency,Energy and Environment |
| Date: | 2008–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4734&r=env |
| By: | Gilbert E. Metcalf |
| Abstract: | This article describes a revenue and distributionally neutral approach to reducing U.S. greenhouse gas emissions that uses a carbon tax. The revenue from the carbon tax is used to finance an environmental earned income tax credit designed to be distributionally neutral. The credit is linked to earned income and helps offset the regressivity of the carbon tax. The carbon tax reform proposal is also revenue neutral and avoids conflating carbon policy with debates over the appropriate size of the federal budget. The article provides a distributional analysis of the proposal and also makes a number of political, economic and administrative arguments in favor of a carbon tax and responds to the arguments that have commonly been made against using a tax-based approach to reducing U.S. emissions. |
| JEL: | H23 Q54 |
| Date: | 2008–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14375&r=env |
| By: | Murray, Brian C.; Newell, Richard G.; Pizer, William A. |
| Abstract: | On efficiency grounds, the economics community has to date tended to emphasize price-based policies to address climate change -- such as taxes or a “safety-valve” price ceiling for cap-and-trade -— while environmental advocates have sought a more clear quantitative limit on emissions. This paper presents a simple modification to the idea of a safety valve -- a quantitative limit that we call the allowance reserve. Importantly, this idea may bridge the gap between competing interests and potentially improve efficiency relative to tax or other price-based policies. The last point highlights the deficiencies in several previous studies of price and quantity controls for climate change that do not adequately capture the dynamic opportunities within a cap-and-trade system for allowance banking, borrowing, and intertemporal arbitrage in response to unfolding information. |
| Keywords: | climate change, regulation, uncertainty, welfare, prices, quantities |
| JEL: | Q54 Q58 L51 D8 |
| Date: | 2008–07–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-24&r=env |
| By: | Tol, Richard S. J. (Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI)); Berntsen, Terje K. (CICERO – Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo, P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, N-0318 Oslo, NORWAY); O’Neill, Brian C. (Institute for the Study of Society and Environment, National Center for Atmospheric Research P.O. Box 3000 Boulder, CO 80307 USA); Fuglestvedt, Jan S. (CICERO – Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo, P.O. Box 1129 Blindern, N-0318 Oslo, NORWAY); Shine, Keith P. (Department of Meteorology, University of Reading, Earley Gate, Reading RG6 6BB, UK); Balkanski, Yves (LSCE/IPSL, Laboratoire CEA-CNRS-UVSQ, 91191 Gif-sur-Yvette, France); Makra, Laszlo (SZTE, University of Szeged, Hungary, 6722 Szeged, Hungary) |
| Abstract: | Multi-gas approaches to climate change policies require a metric establishing “equivalences” among emissions of various species. Climate scientists and economists have proposed four classes of such metrics and debated their relative merits. We present a unifying framework that clarifies the relationships among them. We show that the Global Warming Potential, used in international law to compare greenhouse gases, is a special case of the Global Damage Potential, assuming (1) a finite time horizon, (2) a zero discount rate, (3) constant atmospheric concentrations, and (4) impacts that are proportional to radiactive forcing. We show that the Global Temperature change Potential is a special case of the Global Cost Potential, assuming (1) no induced technological change, and (2) a short-lived capital stock. We also show that the Global Cost Potential is a special case of the Global Damage Potential, assuming (1) zero damages below a threshold and (2) infinite damage after a threshold. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change uses the Global Warming Potential, a simplified cost-benefit concept, even though the UNFCCC frames climate policy as a cost-effectiveness problem and should therefore use the Global Cost Potential or its simplification, the Global Temperature Potential. |
| Keywords: | Climate change; multi-gas climate policy; Global Warming Potential; equivalences between greenhouse gases |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esr:wpaper:wp257&r=env |
| By: | Alireza Naghavi |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the impact of a WTO withdrawal of trade concessions against countries that fail to respect globally recognized environmental standards. We show that a punishing tariff can be effective when environmental and trade policies are endogenous. When required standards lie within a reasonable range, compliance along with free trade as a reward is the unique equilibrium outcome. A positive optimal tariff in the case of non-compliance prevents pollution-motivated delocation, but only works as a successful credible threat and does not emerge in equilibrium. Results are consistent with broad empirical evidence that disputes the pollution haven hypothesis and suggests capital movements to be non-pollution related. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Policy, WTO, Delocation, Tariffs, Credible Threat |
| JEL: | F13 F18 F23 H23 Q56 R38 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mod:recent:011&r=env |
| By: | Philippe Barla; Stef Proost |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we explore automobile fuel efficiency policies in the presence of two externalities i) a global environmental problem and ii) international innovation spillovers. Using a simple model with two regions, we show that both a fuel tax and a tax on vehicles based on their fuel economy rating are needed to decentralize the first best. We also show that if policies are not coordinated between regions, the resulting gas taxes will be set too low and each region will use the tax on fuel rating, to reduce the damage caused by foreign drivers. If standards are used instead of taxes, we find that spillovers may alleviate free-riding. Under some conditions, a strict standard in one region may favour the adoption of a strict standard in the other one. |
| Keywords: | Environmental policy, automobile, fuel efficiency standard, gasoline tax, innovation spillovers |
| JEL: | O38 Q48 Q54 Q58 R48 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0817&r=env |
| By: | Valeria Sodano |
| Abstract: | The food system negatively affects the environment, human health and the total well being of the society in many ways, causing: soil and water depletion, pollution due to the waste treatments, acid rains, desertification, climate change, ozone depletion and biodiversity loss. The paper endeavors to compare the needs of a sustainable food system with strategies actually carried out at private and public level. It is shown that while the process of trade liberalization is pushing towards market deregulation and decreasing state intervention, corporate social responsibility is very low and unable to tackle the huge environmental problems faced by the food system. The main conclusion of the paper is that the current competitive games played by leading firms are not in any way able to promote the sustainability of the new global food system and that more state intervention is requested in order to reach the goal. |
| Keywords: | innovation, sustainability, local food systems, fresh produce, participatory democracy. |
| JEL: | Q13 L81 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:depfid:1108&r=env |
| By: | Burtraw, Dallas (Resources for the Future); Sweeney, Richard; Walls, Margaret |
| Abstract: | Federal policies aimed to slow global warming would impose potentially significant costs on households that vary depending on the policy approach that is used. This paper evaluates the effects of a carbon dioxide cap-and-trade program on households in each of 11 regions of the country and sorted into annual income deciles. We find tremendous variation in the incidence (the distribution of cost) of the policy. The most important feature that affects households is how the policy distributes the value created by placing a price on CO2 emissions. We evaluate 10 policy alternatives that yield results that range from moderately progressive (expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, investments in efficiency and capand- dividend) to severely regressive (reduce income taxes, free distribution to incumbent emitters and reduction of the payroll tax). To varying degrees the allocation of the value of emissions allowances amplifies or potentially resolves the tradeoff between equity and efficiency. |
| Keywords: | cap-and-trade, allocation, distributional effects, cost burden, equity |
| JEL: | H22 H23 Q52 Q54 |
| Date: | 2008–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-28&r=env |
| By: | Bui Trinh (I-O research Consultant, General Statistics Office, Vietnam); Francisco T. Secretario (I-O Research Consultant, Philippines); Kim Kwangmun (Toyohashi University of Technology, Japan); Le Ha Thanh (Hanoi National Economic University, Vietnam); Pham Huong Giang (Hanoi National Economic University, Vietnam) |
| Abstract: | <p>From time to time, Input - Output model systems have been applied in estimating economic - environment linkages. Further, the economic interregional input output model system can be applied in analysis impacts on residuals generated by interregional economic activities.</p><p>In this paper will processed with case study of HoChiMinh City and Rest of Vietnam based on inter-regional input - output approach.</p><p>The first part of this paper presents the conceptual and accounting framework of the IRIO model in inter-regional economic impact analysis. In this paper, special attention is paid of the Miyazawa system in the decomposition of the economic multiplier effects. For the purpose of this study, the IO model is being extended to be able to measure economic-environmental linkages.</p><p>The second part is a case study for HoChiMinh City based on the 2000 IRIO table. The objective of this study is to measure the inter-regional, inter-industrial interdependencies as well as the consequent environmental effects of pollution emissions due to economic activities. An analysis of the empirical results on the economic-environmental multipliers is shown in the last part of this case study.</p> |
| Keywords: | Input-Output; Multi-interregional; Vietnam |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpc:wpaper:2808&r=env |
| By: | Semenova, Natalia (Åbo Akademi University); Hassel, Lars (Åbo Akademi University and Umeå School of Business) |
| Abstract: | This study extends previous research on the relation between different measures of environmental and financial performance by introducing moderating effects of inherent environmental industry risk. We provide empirical evidence from the MSCI World Index U.S. companies by using the GES Investment Services® risk rating for the period 2003-2006. The inherent environmental industry risk has a significant moderating effect on the form of the relation between environmental preparedness/performance and operating performance of the companies. In high risk or polluting industries, environmental management is costly and reduces the operating performance of companies. In low risk sectors, such as banking and insurance, leading companies on environmental management are also more profitable. The paper makes a distinction between the reputational benefits of environmental preparedness and the operational gains of environmental performance when studying the effects on market value. A significant direct effect of environmental preparedness on the market value of the companies is present, while the relation between environmental performance and market value is stronger in low risk industries than in high risk industries. In low risk industries, the market value of the companies is also on average higher and more attuned to benefits to environmental performance than in high risk industries. |
| Keywords: | Environmental risk and opportunity; financial performance; return on assets; Tobin’s Q; panel data analysis |
| Date: | 2008–09–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhb:sicgwp:2008_002&r=env |
| By: | Larry Karp (University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation) |
| Abstract: | Disagreement over the form of regulation of greenhouse gasses motivates a comparison of market based and command and control policies. More efficient policies can increase aggregate marginal abatement cost, resulting in higher emissions. Multiple investment equilibria and "regulatory uncertainty" arise when firms anticipate command and control policies. Market based policies eliminate this uncertainty. Command and control policies cause firms to imitate other firms' investment decisions, leading to similar costs and small potential efficiency gains from trade. Market based policies induce firms to make different investment decisions, leading to different costs and large gains from trade. We imbed the regulatory problem in a "global game" and show that the unique equilibrium to that game is constrained socially optimal. |
| Keywords: | tradable permits, coordination games, multiple equilibria, global games, regulatory uncertainty, climate change policies, California AB32, |
| Date: | 2008–08–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:1063&r=env |
| By: | Larry Karp (University of California, Berkeley and Giannini Foundation); Jiangfeng Zhang (Asian Development Bank) |
| Abstract: | Non-strategic firms with rational expectations make investment and emissions decisions. The investment rule depends on firms' beliefs about future emissions policies. We compare emissions taxes and quotas when the (strategic) regulator and (nonstrategic) firms have asymmetric information about abatement costs, and all agents use Markov Perfect decision rules. Emissions taxes create a secondary distortion at the investment stage, unless a particular condition holds; emissions quotas do not create a secondary distortion. We solve a linear-quadratic model calibrated to represent the problem of controlling greenhouse gasses. The endogeneity of abatement capital favors taxes, and it increases abatement. |
| Keywords: | Pollution control; Investment, asymmetric information, rational expectations, choice of instruments, |
| Date: | 2008–07–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:1064&r=env |
| By: | Thi Kim Cuong Pham (BETA, Université de Strasbourg); Phu Nguyen-Van (THEMA-CNRS, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, France) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes endogenous ï¬scal policy and public decision in an endogenous growth model where agents care about social status and environmental quality. The quest for a higher status is assimilated to a preference for capital wealth. The government uses income tax to ï¬nance infrastructure and environmental protection, and maximizes individual welfare. We ï¬nd that accounting for preferences for social status and environmental quality may lead to an allocation of tax revenue in favor of cleanup effort to the detriment of infrastructure. It does not necessary have a negative impact on growth. Status seeking can however harm economic growth and environmental quality when its motive is important enough. Finally, we show that economic growth is consistent with environmental preservation but is not necessarily welfare-improving as in the case of absence of status-seeking behavior. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous policy; endogenous growth; environmental quality; status-seeking; public expenditure; Wagner’s law |
| JEL: | H31 O41 Q58 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpc:wpaper:2908&r=env |
| By: | Fell, Harrison (Resources for the Future); MacKenzie, Ian A.; Pizer, William A. |
| Abstract: | Welfare comparisons of regulatory instruments under uncertainty, even in dynamic analyses, have typically focused on price versus quantity controls despite the presence of banking and borrowing provisions in existing emissions trading programs. This is true even in the presence of banking and borrowing provisions in existing emissions trading programs. Nonetheless, many have argued that such provisions can reduce price volatility and lower costs in the face of uncertainty, despite any theoretical or empirical evidence. This paper develops a model and solves for optimal banking and borrowing behavior with uncertain cost shocks that are serially correlated. We show that while banking does reduce price volatility and lowers costs, the degree of these reductions depends on the persistence of shocks. For plausible parameter values related to U.S. climate change policy, we find that bankable quantities eliminate about 20 percent of the cost difference between price and nonbankable quantities. |
| Keywords: | welfare, prices, quantities, climate change |
| JEL: | Q55 |
| Date: | 2008–07–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-32&r=env |
| By: | Burtraw, Dallas (Resources for the Future); Goeree, Jacob; Holt, Charles A.; Myers, Erica; Palmer, Karen; Shobe, William |
| Abstract: | Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and which have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms -– uniform and discriminatory price sealed bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both without and with explicit communication. The clock appears to be more subject to successful collusion because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity). |
| Keywords: | auctions, collusion, experiments, carbon dioxide, greenhouse gases |
| JEL: | C92 D43 D44 |
| Date: | 2008–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-36&r=env |
| By: | Bandza, Alexander J.; Vajjhala, Shalini P. (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | Recent policy debates suggest that geologic carbon sequestration (GS) will play an important role in any carbon-constrained future. As GS evolves from its current role as an end-stage process within enhanced oil recovery (EOR) operations to a long-term, dedicated emissions mitigation option, regulations must simultaneously evolve to address the risks of potential carbon dioxide (CO2) migration underground and leakage to the surface. Because CO2 injection practices are currently based on petroleum industry extraction techniques, risk assessment and regulatory frameworks are also derived from these experiences, and EOR serves as a critical point of departure for GS. In this paper, we develop a basic engineering–economic model of four strategies associated with key deployment pathways in the portfolio of EOR and GS projects -- (a) an indifferent strategy, where EOR is the priority without any consideration for long-term sequestration, (b) an afterthought strategy, where EOR is the primary goal, and a site is later secured for sequestration, (c) a planned strategy, where oil extraction and CO2 injection are co-optimized from the start, and (d) a dedicated strategy, where GS is the sole priority. We evaluate these strategies based on scenarios of oil and CO2 prices; leakage estimates; and transportation, injection, and monitoring costs from the literature and practice. Major results reveal that the afterthought strategy is the dominant strategy (i.e. the strategy with the greatest revenues) under a range of scenarios. This finding suggests that GS regulatory design needs to anticipate the use of the potentially leakiest or “worst” sites first. |
| Keywords: | carbon sequestration, enhanced oil recovery, leakage, regulatory design, risk management |
| JEL: | Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2008–09–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-29&r=env |
| By: | Fell, Harrison (Resources for the Future) |
| Abstract: | A cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) model is estimated to determine the dynamic relationship between Nordic wholesale electricity prices and EU emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) CO2 allowance prices. An impulse response analysis reveals that electricity prices have large short-term responses to CO2 price shocks, but that this response dampens over time. Using hourly Nordic electricity spot market prices, I find that the value of short-term response of electricity prices to a shock in CO2 prices in off-peak hours is consistent with expected values for near complete pass-through of CO2 emission costs when coal-generated power is at the margin. Likewise, the estimates reveal that peak hour electricity price responses to CO2 price shocks are as expected for a market that has near complete passthrough of CO2 emission costs when natural gas-generated power is at the margin. These results further suggest the Nordic electricity market is pricing as a competitive market. |
| Keywords: | cointegrated vector autoregression, impulse response, electricity markets, CO2 cost pass-through, EU-ETS |
| JEL: | Q40 Q48 Q52 C32 |
| Date: | 2008–08–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-08-31&r=env |
| By: | Juan Pablo Montero (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.); Matti Liski |
| Abstract: | We analyze oligopolistic exhaustible-resource depletion when firms can trade forward contracts on deliveries, a market structure prevalent in many resource commodity markets. We find that this organization of trade has substantial implications for resource depletion. As firms’ interactions become infinitely frequent, resource stocks become fully contracted and the symmetric oligopolistic equilibrium converges to the perfectly competitive Hotelling (1931) outcome. Asymmetries in stock holdings allow firms to partially escape the procompetitive effect of contracting: a large stock provides commitment to leave a fraction of the stock uncontracted. In contrast, a small stock provides commitment to sell early, during the most profitable part of the equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Forward Trading, Exhaustible Resources, Oligopoly Pricing. |
| JEL: | G13 L13 Q30 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:341&r=env |
| By: | Charles Raux (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - CNRS : UMR5593 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'Etat) |
| Abstract: | Parmi les mesures identifiées si l’on veut atteindre des objectifs ambitieux de maîtrise de la croissance des émissions du transport, les taxes sur le carbone et les carburants ont le meilleur rapport coût-efficacité, constate Charles Raux. Cependant, la « révolte fiscale » de septembre 2000 dans plusieurs pays européens montre que l’opinion est très réticente à l’augmentation de la fiscalité sur les carburants. C’est pourquoi l’auteur propose un autre instrument de régulation environnementale, les marchés de permis. |
| Keywords: | droits d’émission ; permis d’émission ; réduction des émissions de transport ; analyse coût-efficacité |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00323092_v1&r=env |
| By: | Kimiko Terai (Hosei University) |
| Abstract: | We examine how international coordination between countries generates a trend to establish an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating movement to international agreement are a politician's opportunistic motive for re-election, and his optimistic expectation of unanimous consent on agreement between countries. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizens by participating in the agreement, he also decides to participate in the agreement, which then brings benefit spillovers to his country. Furthermore it is shown that, by dividing political authorities for coordination between the executive and politicians, observed over-compliance in the agreement by participating countries can be explained. |
| Keywords: | International environmental agreements; Global public goods; Re-election pressure; Division of authorities |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D82 H87 Q58 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irv:wpaper:080907&r=env |
| By: | Robert Deacon (University of California, Santa Barbara); Dominic Parker |
| Abstract: | We adapt the concept of a conservation easement to a marine environment and explore its use to achieve conservation goals. Although marine environments generally are not owned, those who use them for commercial fishing often are regulated. These regulations grant harvesters rights to use marine environments in specified ways, and the possibility of encumbering these rights to achieve conservation goals creates a potential role for marine easements. We examine this potential under alternative fishery management regimes and find, generally, that marine easements tend to be most effective when harvest rights are delineated most fully. Our analysis suggests ways the marine easements can have flexibility and transactions cost advantages over other approaches to achieving marine conservation goals. We also propose ways in which the design of laws allowing marine easements should follow, or depart from the design of laws authorizing conservation easements on land. |
| Keywords: | by catch, marine habitat protection, conservation easement, |
| Date: | 2008–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:03-08&r=env |
| By: | Gordon Rausser (University of California, Berkeley); Stephen Hamilton (Cal Poly State University, San Luis Obispo); Marty Kovach (OnPoint Analytics); Ryan Stifter (OnPoint Analytics) |
| Abstract: | The closure of the Hawaiian longline swordfish fishery over the period 2001-2004, which was motivated by the protection of endangered sea turtles, created the elements of a natural experiment that allows identification of the market transfer of catch (and sea turtle by-catch) to other regions. This paper exploits the fact that the vessels in the Hawaiian longline fishery sell their catch in the US fresh swordfish market to analyze the pattern of changes in US fresh and frozen swordfish consumption both before and after the closure regulation was imposed. The mechanisms by which any unintended consequences on endangered sea turtles in other fishery locations in the world are shown to take place through the US swordfish market. At the estimated annual market transfer, a bootstrap analysis of the probability distribution of by-catch rates indicates that the regulation led to an additional 2,882 sea turtle interactions at the sample means. |
| Keywords: | Common property, fishery bycatch, market transfer, |
| Date: | 2008–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:1053&r=env |
| By: | Blanca Llorente |
| Abstract: | A medida que la actividad humana aumenta y es modificada por la tecnología, sus efectos trascienden el ámbito local. Esta es una realidad cuyas unas consecuencias particulares en el medio ambiente han sido abordadas desde diversas ramas de la ciencia. La evidencia científica plantea entonces la cuestión de las “amenazas ambientales globales”; un término que agrupa un conjunto de variables necesarias para sostener la vida en nuestro planeta cuyo comportamiento indica un entorno cada vez menos favorable para los organismos vivos. Estas amenazas para la vida son calificadas como globales porque sus efectos desbordan las fronteras de los países y los continentes. De algún modo podríamos decir que los impactos ambientales no escapan al fenómeno de la globalización, entendido éste en su sentido más amplio. La evidencia en torno a estos temas ha generado un consenso gradual en la comunidad científica sobre su existencia, aunque no se ha dado un acuerdo en torno a las consecuencias que se anticipan a partir de estas observaciones. Lo cierto es que ya existe amplia documentación sobre lo que se conoce como las causas antropogénicas de los cambios ambientales globales. |
| Date: | 2008–08–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:col:000183:004997&r=env |
| By: | Juan Pablo Montero (Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.) |
| Abstract: | Una de las dificultades que enfrentan las autoridades regulatorias en el diseño de políticas eficientes para la protección y preservación de recursos comunes (v.gr., calidad del aire, calidad del agua, cuerpos de agua, pesquerías) es que gran parte de la información relevante para el diseño está en manos privadas. En efecto, los mejor informados respecto de los costos y beneficios asociados al uso de estos recursos son los agentes que los perciben. Este trabajo presenta un mecanismo regulatorio relativamente simple que induce a los agentes involucrados a revelar información privada en forma fidedigna, logrando así, un diseño regulatorio económicamente eficiente. Se trata de una subasta de precio uniforme y sobre cerrado por licencias de uso del recurso (v.gr., permisos de contaminación, derechos de agua, cuotas de pesca) con parte de los ingresos de la subasta devueltos a los agentes participantes. Junto con la discusión teórica-conceptual de las propiedades y funcionamiento del mecanismo de subasta, se presenta una aplicación ilustrativa del mecanismo usando para ello el problema de contaminación de descargas de demanda bioquímica de oxígeno (DBO) en una sección alta del río Bío Bío, ubicado en la zona centro-sur de Chile. |
| Keywords: | Externalidades, Recursos Comunes, Subasta de Primer Precio, Información Asimétrica |
| JEL: | D44 D62 D82 Q28 |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ioe:doctra:340&r=env |
| By: | Mariana Conte Grand |
| Abstract: | Este trabajo repasa las dos principales ramas principales de la literatura empírica sobre cuantificación del impacto de la responsabilidad ambiental corporativa. La primera de éstas comprende varios estudios de eventos ambientales. Lo que se cuantifica son los retornos “anormales” que pueden atribuirse a noticias referidas a la manera en que las empresas cuidan el medio ambiente. Los resultados difieren según que el estudio sea para países en desarrollo o desarrollados, según que las noticias sean positivas o negativas, la empresa sea de un sector u otro, etc. La segunda rama de la literatura revisada es la que mide la contribución que el cuidado del medio ambiente hace al valor de una empresa, y en especial, el aporte que hace la reputación ambiental al valor intangible de una empresa. En ambos casos, se ahonda en las metodologías empleadas, no solamente en los resultados obtenidos. Este estudio pretende ser una contribución a que no especialistas puedan acceder a esta literatura específica y puedan vislumbrar cómo concretamente se pueden cuantificar las ganancias/pérdidas de una mejor/peor performance ambiental empresaria. |
| Keywords: | reputación ambiental, estudio de eventos, q de Tobin |
| JEL: | G14 G34 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cem:doctra:381&r=env |