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on Environmental Economics |
| By: | Fernando Brito Soares; Roberto Ronco |
| Abstract: | The evolution of greenhouse gases emissions in the EU-15 countries is accessed. While the absolute level of emissions turns out to be declining in the last thirty years in EU-15 Member States, emissions per output tend to rise. A relationship between the adoption of the Common Agricultural policy and the emissions level can be detected for Spain, Austria, Finland and Sweden. |
| Date: | 2005–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:icr:wpicer:17-2005&r=env |
| By: | Eirik S. Amundsen (Department of Economics, University of Bergen); Fridrik M. Baldursson (Department of Economics, University of Iceland); Jørgen Birk Mortensen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
| Abstract: | There is concern that prices in a market for Green Certificates (GCs) primarily based on volatile wind power will fluctuate excessively, leading to corresponding volatility of electricity prices. Applying a rational expectations simulation model of competitive storage and speculation of GCs the paper shows that the introduction of banking of GCs may reduce price volatility considerably and lead to increased social surplus. Banking lowers average prices and is therefore not necessarily to the benefit of “green producers”. Proposed price bounds on GC-prices will reduce the importance of banking and even of the GC system itself. |
| Keywords: | electricity; environment; commodity speculation; green certificates; marketable permits; uncertainty |
| JEL: | Q28 Q42 Q48 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0508&r=env |
| By: | David I. Stern (Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Troy, NY 12180-3590, USA) |
| Abstract: | Time series models of global climate change have tended to estimate a low climate sensitivity and a fast adjustment rate to equilibrium. These results appear to be biased by omission of a key variable - heat stored in the ocean. I develop a time series model of the ocean atmosphere climate system where atmospheric temperature moves towards a long-run equilibrium with both radiative forcing and ocean heat content, which is distributed between upper ocean and deep ocean components. The time series model utilizes the notion of multicointegration to impose energy balance relations on an autoregressive model. As there are only around fifty years of observations on ocean heat content I use the Kalman filter to estimate heat content as a latent state variable constrained by the available observations. The estimate of the equilibrium climate sensitivity is 8.4K with a confidence interval of 5.0 to 11.7K. Temperature takes centuries to adjust to an increase in radiative forcing. The transient climate sensitivity at the point of carbon dioxide doubling is 1.7K. |
| JEL: | Q53 Q54 |
| Date: | 2005–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rpi:rpiwpe:0510&r=env |
| By: | Minh Ha-Duong (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - http://www.centre-cired.fr - CNRS : UMR8568 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales;Ecole Nationale du Génie Rural des Eaux et des Forêts;Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées); Nicolas Treich (LEERNA - Laboratoire d'Economie de l'Environnement et des Ressources Naturelles - http://w3.toulouse.inra.fr/leerna/index.html - INRA - Université des Sciences Sociales - Toulouse I) |
| Abstract: | The paper investigates a climate-economy model with an iso-elastic welfare function in which one parameter gamma measures relative risk-aversion and a distinct parameter rho measures resistance to intertemporal substitution. We show both theoretically and numerically that climate policy responds differently to variations in the two parameters. In particular, we show that higher gamma but lower rho leads to increase emissions control. We also argue that climate-economy models based on intertemporal expected utility maximization, i.e. models where gamma = rho, may misinterpret the sensitivity of the climate policy to risk-aversion. |
| Keywords: | risk aversion; equity; discounting; climate change |
| Date: | 2005–07–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00000680_v2&r=env |
| By: | Thierry Kirat (IRISECREP - Institut de recherche interdisciplinaire en socio-économie - Centres de Recherches et d'Etudes Politiques - http://www.dauphine.fr/iris - CNRS : UMR7170 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); Nadine Levratto (IDHE-Cachan - Institutions et Dynamiques Historiques de l'Economie - http://www.idhe.ens-cachan.fr/ - CNRS : UMR8533 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I;Université Paris VIII Vincennes-Saint Denis;Université de Nanterre - Paris X - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Cachan) |
| Abstract: | Cet article s'intéresse à la question de l'équité et à différentes formes sociales et territoriales face à l'exposition aux nuisances liées aux aménagements et ouvrages d'intérêt public. La perspective suivie met en parallèle les termes du calcul économique public mobilisé et les différents dispositifs juridiques mis en œuvre dans de tels projets. L'article montre comment l'analyse des conflits permet d'aborder la question des politiques publiques d'aménagement et des conflits afférents. On montre que la compensation des externalités non prévue dans la décision d'Etat ne peut trouver une expression que dans le « voice » et ses avatars (conflits, recours en justice…). |
| Keywords: | conflits d'aménagement - environnement - calcul économique - droit - équité |
| Date: | 2005–07–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00004222_v1&r=env |
| By: | Thierry Kirat (IRISECREP - Institut de recherche interdisciplinaire en socio-économie - Centres de Recherches et d'Etudes Politiques - http://www.dauphine.fr/iris - CNRS : UMR7170 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); André Torre (INRA - INRA - UMR SAD-APT (Institut national d'agronomie de Paris-Grignon) - http://www.inapg.fr); Armelle Caron (ENGREF - ENGREF Clermont-Ferrand - http://www.engref.fr/clermont.htm); Anastasia Aviles (INRA - INRA - UMR SAD-APT (Institut national d'agronomie de Paris-Grignon) - http://www.inapg.fr); Christine Lefranc (INRA - INRA - UMR SAD-APT (Institut national d'agronomie de Paris-Grignon) - http://www.inapg.fr); Marina Galman (ENSAR (RENNES) - ENSAR (Rennes)); Romain Melot (INRA - INRA - UMR SAD-APT (Institut national d'agronomie de Paris-Grignon) - http://www.inapg.fr); Cécile Rialland (GEDEP, UNIVERSITÉ DE TOURS-FRANÇOIS RABELAIS - GEDEP, Université de Tours-François Rabelais); Maria-Isabel Salazar (INRA - INRA - UMR SAD-APT (Institut national d'agronomie de Paris-Grignon) - http://www.inapg.fr) |
| Abstract: | rapport de recherche au programme Environnement, vie, sociétés du CNRS - appel d'offres "la gouvernance en question" |
| Keywords: | conflits d'usage - aménagements - environnement - urbanisme |
| Date: | 2005–07–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00004202_v1&r=env |
| By: | Thierry Kirat (IRISECREP - Institut de recherche interdisciplinaire en socio-économie - Centres de Recherches et d'Etudes Politiques - http://www.dauphine.fr/iris - CNRS : UMR7170 - Université Paris Dauphine - Paris IX); Philippe Jeanneaux (ENITAC - Ecole Nationale d'Ingénieurs des Travaux Agricoles de Clermont-Ferrand - http://www.enitac.fr) |
| Abstract: | Le développement des territoires est un processus multidimensionnel qui met en jeu la confrontation de préférences individuelles ou collectives quant à l'allocation des ressources territoriales (sols, espaces naturels, ressources naturelles) à des usages alternatifs. Nous analysons les apports de l'étude du contentieux devant les juridictions judiciaires et, surtout, administratives à la compréhension des conflits d'usage liés au développement des territoires. L'accent est mis sur les départements de l'Isère et du Puy de Dôme, mais des éléments sur d'autres territoires sont présentés. La section 1 présente la méthodologie et les sources utilisées. La section 2 dégage des enseignements sur le plan théorique, à partir des principaux apports de l'analyse empirique. |
| Keywords: | conflits - droit – contentieux – espaces - environnement – industrie - aménagements |
| Date: | 2005–07–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:papers:halshs-00004237_v1&r=env |
| By: | Thomas Gaube (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper deals with second-best pollution taxation by investigating allocations instead of the corresponding tax rates. Assuming certain restrictions on utility and that the marginal revenue from environmental taxation is positive, it is shown that environmental quality is higher in second best where only distortionary taxes are used to finance public expenditures than in the first-best optimum where lump-sum taxes are available. |
| Keywords: | environmental taxation, public goods |
| JEL: | H21 H41 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_9&r=env |
| By: | Frank P. Maier-Rigaud (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany); Jose Apesteguia |
| Abstract: | Despite a large theoretical and empirical literature on public goods and common-pool resources, a systematic comparison of these two types of social dilemmas is lacking. In fact, there is considerable confusion about these two types of dilemma situations. As a result, they are often treated alike. In this paper we argue that the degree of rivalry is the fundamental difference between the two games. We show that rivalry implies that both games cannot be represented by the same game theoretic structure. Fur-thermore, we experimentally study behavior in a quadratic public good and a quadratic common-pool resource game with identical Pareto opti-mum but divergent interior Nash equilibria. The results show that partici-pants clearly perceive the differences in rivalry. Aggregate behavior in both games starts relatively close to Pareto efficiency and converges to the respective Nash equilibrium. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_2&r=env |
| By: | Alkuin Kölliker (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This article tries to explain national incentives for protecting environmental goods either autonomously or collectively; it explores how globalisation has affected those incentives; and it suggests how national environmental policy might respond so as to ensure its effectiveness. The central argument is that national incentives for environmental protection may to a considerable extent be explained by a combination of the type of environmental good to be protected (in terms of public goods theory) and the effects of environmental protection measures on international competitiveness. Arrangements for protecting environmental goods can be ranked according to their centripetal effects on non-participating countries. Centripetal effects are strongest in the case of club goods (1), followed by private goods (2), public goods (3), and common pool resources (4). The centripetal effects resulting from the type of environmental good can be further reinforced by competitive advantages resulting from environmental protection measures; they can be weakened by competitive disadvantages; or they can remain unchanged due to competitive neutrality. The combination of four types of environmental goods and three types of competitive effects (positive, negative, neutral) results in twelve possible cases, with differing national incentives for autonomous and collective environmental protection. Given specific assumptions, these twelve cases can be ranked with regard to the severity of collective action problems they involve. The article includes a short empirical illustration for each case. It also analyses how globalisation (in the form of increasing trade) and some of its driving forces (in the form of free trade agreements) influence national incentives and legal possibilities for environmental protection. This article concludes with a brief discussion of four options for (re-)expanding the action space for national environmental policies under the condition of economic globalisation. |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_3&r=env |
| By: | JAVIER CARRILLO (Instituto de Empresa) |
| Abstract: | (WP 02/04 Clave pdf) The results of our model show that it would be advisable to undertake policies expressly aimed at the process of sustainable technological change in a way that is complementary to the conventional equilibrium oriented environmental policies. In short, the main objectives of this paper are to understand more fully the dynamics of the process of technological change, its role in sustainable development, and to assess the implications of this dynamic approach to techno-environmental policy. To achieve these goals we have developed an agent based model, using distributed artificial intelligence concepts drawn from the general methodology of social simulation. |
| Keywords: | Agent-based models, Evolutionary models, Lock-in , Standardization, Technology difussion, Sustainability |
| Date: | 2004–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emp:wpaper:wp04-02&r=env |
| By: | JAVIER CARRILLO (Instituto de Empresa) |
| Abstract: | The paper looks for co-evolutionary policy responses to carbon lock-in - a persistent state that creates systemic market and policy barriers to carbon low technological alternatives. We address the coordination role for authorities rather than the corrective optimisation and analyse experiences from environmental voluntary agreements and foresight activities. The paper argues that combining the virtues of these tools into a new policy tool, named Prospective Voluntary Agreement (PVA), can help facilitate an escape from carbon lock-in and provide policy resources for addressing lock-in related issues. |
| Keywords: | Lock-in , Carbon, Policy responses, Agreements |
| Date: | 2004–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emp:wpaper:wp04-23&r=env |
| By: | JUAN SANTALO (Instituto de Empresa); CARL KOCK (Instituto de Empresa) |
| Abstract: | From a reactive, antagonistic stance towards environmental regulations, many firms have evolved to act in a pro-active fashion to integrate environmental issues into their core strategies. Using measures of different corporate governance instruments that proxy for the ability of managers or shareholders to implement their strategic preferences we demonstrate empirically that shareholders are indeed laggards because they lower firm environmental performance while the latter actually has positive effects on firm financial performance. Managers, however, push for better environmental and hence financial performance and thus act against shareholders preferences, but in their interest. |
| Keywords: | Corporate governance, Environmental performance, Financial performance |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:emp:wpaper:wp05-05&r=env |