|
on Entrepreneurship |
Issue of 2005‒10‒08
six papers chosen by Marcus Dejardin Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix |
By: | Volker Nocke (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) |
Abstract: | We present a theory of entrepreneurial entry and exit decisions. Knowing their own managerial talent, entrepreneurs decide which market to enter, where markets differ in size. We obtain a striking sorting result: each entrant in a large market is more efficient than any entrepreneur in a smaller market since competition is endogenously more intense in larger markets. This result continues to hold when entrepreneurs can export their output to other markets, thereby incurring a unit transport cost or tariff. The sorting and price competition effects imply that the number of entrants (and hence product variety) may actually be smaller in larger markets. In the stochastic dynamic extension of the model, we show that the churning rate of entrepreneurs is higher in larger markets. |
Keywords: | entrepreneurship, entry, exit, firm turnover, industry dynamics |
JEL: | L11 L13 M13 |
Date: | 2003–06–30 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:05-026&r=ent |
By: | Naomi R. Lamoreaux; Kenneth L. Sokoloff |
Abstract: | Joseph Schumpeter argued in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy that the rise of large firms’ investments in in-house R&D spelled the doom of the entrepreneurial innovator. We explore this idea by analyzing the career patterns of successive cohorts of highly productive inventors from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. We find that over time highly productive inventors were increasingly likely to form long-term attachments with firms. In the Northeast, these attachments seem to have taken the form of employment positions within large firms, but in the Midwest inventors were more likely to become principals in firms bearing their names. Entrepreneurship, therefore, was by no means dead, but the increasing capital requirements—both financial and human—for effective invention and the need for inventors to establish a reputation before they could attract support made it more difficult for creative people to pursue careers as inventors. The relative numbers of highly productive inventors in the population correspondingly decreased, as did rates of patenting per capita. |
JEL: | N O |
Date: | 2005–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11654&r=ent |
By: | Francisco Covas |
Abstract: | The author analyzes a general-equilibrium model of a heterogeneous agents economy in which the agents are subject to borrowing constraints and uninsurable idiosyncratic production risk. In particular, he addresses the impact of these frictions on entrepreneurial investment and illustrates the trade-off between production risk and precautionary savings faced by the entrepreneur. In contrast to other studies, the author's results suggest that, when entrepreneurs' earnings are poorly diversified and production risk mainly affects the total output produced, the underaccumulation of capital in the entrepreneurial sector of the model economy is less likely to hold, because of a strong precautionary savings motive. Furthermore, the presence of these frictions on entrepreneurial investment exacerbates the overaccumulation of capital in the corporate sector of the economy that is reported in Bewley models with uninsurable labour income risk. |
Keywords: | Economic models; Financial institutions; Financial markets |
JEL: | E22 G11 M13 |
Date: | 2005 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:05-26&r=ent |
By: | Dennis W. Carlton |
Abstract: | This paper analyzes the concept of barriers to entry. It explains that the concept is a static one and explores the inadequacy of the concept in a world with sunk costs, adjustment costs and uncertainty. The static concept addresses the question of whether profits are excessive. The more interesting and relevant question is how fast entry or exit will erode profits or losses and how do the bounds that entry and exit place on price vary with uncertainty and sunk cost. Intuition based on the static concept of barrier to entry can be misleading in many industries. |
JEL: | L1 L4 |
Date: | 2005–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11645&r=ent |
By: | Jean M. Abraham; Martin S. Gaynor; William B. Vogt |
Abstract: | There has been considerable consolidation in the hospital industry in recent years. Over 900 deals occurred from 1994-2000, and many local markets, even in large urban areas, have been reduced to monopolies, duopolies, or triopolies. This surge in consolidation has led to concern about competition in local markets for hospital services. We examine the effect of market structure on competition in local hospital markets -- specifically, does the hardness of competition increase with the number of firms? We extend the entry model developed by Bresnahan and Reiss to make use of quantity information, and apply it to data on the U.S. hospital industry. In the hospital markets we examine, entry leads to a quick convergence to competitive conduct. Entry reduces variable profits and increases quantity. Most of the effects of entry come from having a second and a third firm enter the market. The fourth entrant has little estimated effect. The use of quantity information allows us to infer that entry is consumer-surplus-increasing. |
JEL: | I1 L1 L8 |
Date: | 2005–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11649&r=ent |
By: | Adriana Kugler; Giovanni Pica |
Abstract: | This paper uses the Italian Social Security employer-employee panel to study the effects of the Italian reform of 1990 on worker and job flows. We exploit the fact that this reform increased unjust dismissal costs for firms below 15 employees, while leaving dismissal costs unchanged for bigger firms, to set up a natural experiment research design. We find that the increase in dismissal costs decreased accessions and separations for workers in small relative to big firms, especially in sectors with higher employment volatility. Moreover, we find that the reform reduced firms' employment adjustments on the internal margin as well as entry rates while increasing exit rates. |
JEL: | E24 J63 J65 |
Date: | 2005–10 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11658&r=ent |