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on Economic Design |
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Issue of 2019‒07‒29
three papers chosen by Guillaume Haeringer, Baruch College and Alex Teytelboym, University of Oxford |
| By: | Salvador Barberà; Walter Bossert; Kataro Suzumura |
| Abstract: | Pierre Daunou, a contemporary of Borda and Condorcet during the era of the French Revolution and active debates on alternative voting rules, proposed a method that chooses the strong Condorcet winner if there is one, otherwise eliminates Condorcet losers and uses plurality voting on the remaining alternatives. We axiomatically characterize his method which combines potentially conflicting criteria of majoritarianism by ordering them lexicographically. This contribution serves not just to remind ourselves that a 19th-century vintage may still retain excellent aroma and taste, but also to open up a novel way of applying potentially conflicting desiderata by accommodating them lexicographically. |
| Keywords: | voting rules, Daunou's method, Condorcet criterion |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1107&r=all |
| By: | Boaz Zik |
| Abstract: | A seller of an item faces a potential buyer whose valuation depends on multiple private signals. When there are informational externalities and the buyer's private signals arrive all at once efficient implementation is impossible. We show that if the buyer's private signals arrive over time in a particular order then the seller can implement efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities. |
| Keywords: | Efficient mechanisms; Sequential screening; Interdependent valuations; Multidimensional information; Informational externalities |
| JEL: | D61 D62 D82 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_104&r=all |
| By: | Francesco De Sinopoli (Department of Economics (University of Verona)); Claudia Meroni (Department of Economics (University of Verona)) |
| Abstract: | We analyze strategic voting under pure proportional rule and two candidates, embedding the basic spatial model into the Poisson framework of population uncertainty. We prove that the Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. We show that it is characterized by a cutpoint in the policy space that is always located between the mean of the two candidates’ positions and the median of the distribution of voters’ types. We also show that, as the expected number of voters goes to infinity, the equilibrium converges to that of the complete information case. |
| Keywords: | Poisson games, strategic voting, proportional rule |
| JEL: | C72 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:11/2019&r=all |