nep-dcm New Economics Papers
on Discrete Choice Models
Issue of 2020‒05‒04
five papers chosen by
Edoardo Marcucci
Università degli studi Roma Tre

  1. Procedural Preferences, Self-Interest, and Communication. Evidence from a Laboratory Experiment By Philipp Harms; Claudia Landwehr; Maximilian Lutz; Markus Tepe
  2. Estimating the Demand Factors and Willingness to Pay for Agricultural Insurance By Osman Gulseven
  3. Micromobility evolution and expansion: Understanding how docked and dockless bikesharing models complement and compete – A case study of San Francisco By Lazarus, Jessica; Pourquier, Jean Carpentier; Feng, Frank; Hammel, Henry; Shaheen, Susan
  4. Scheduling personnel for the build-up of unit load devices at an air cargo terminal with limited space. By Emde, Simon; Abedinnia, Hamid; Lange, Anne; Glock, C. H.
  5. Data and the regulation of e-commerce: data sharing vs.dismantling By Borsenberger, Claire; Cremer, Helmuth; Joram, Denis; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Malavolti, Estelle

  1. By: Philipp Harms (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany); Claudia Landwehr (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany); Maximilian Lutz (University of Oldenburg); Markus Tepe (University of Oldenburg)
    Abstract: What determines individuals’ preferences over alternative decision-making procedures – the potential gain from these procedures or the intrinsic value assigned to them? This study tests an income redistribution game, in which subjects can endogenously determine whether to decide upon redistribution by majority voting or to delegate the decision to a randomly selected member of the group (a “random decider”). Subjects are assigned to groups of three and receive an initial endowment, the sum of endowments being common knowledge. After a choice of the decision procedure to be applied, they can choose to either redistribute endowments equally or to maintain the original allocation. We find that the share of rational egoistic procedural choices increases when the distribution of endowments is common knowledge, compared to a situation in which subjects only know their own endowment. However, a substantive share of subjects reveals a persistent preference for majority voting, regardless of their distributional interest. Support for majority voting is strongest when common knowledge of initial endowments is combined with a chat option. These findings not only suggest that majority voting is a normative default when the rational egoistic procedural choice is limited by a lack of information, but also that support for majority voting, even where it is costly to the individual, is promoted through communication.
    Keywords: procedural preferences, endogenous institutional choice, majority voting, delegation, laboratory experiment
    Date: 2020–04–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2011&r=all
  2. By: Osman Gulseven
    Abstract: This article investigates the effect of prices and socio-demographic variables on the farmers decision to purchase agricultural insurance. A survey has been conducted to 200 farmers most of whom are engaged in diversified income-generating activities. The logistic estimation results suggest that education and household income from farming activities positively affect the likelihood of purchasing insurance. The demand for insurance is negatively correlated with the premium paid per insured value, suggesting that insurance is a normal good. Farmers are willing to pay (WTP) increasingly higher premiums for contracts with a higher coverage ratio. According to the valuation model, the WTP declines sharply for coverage ratios under 70%.
    Date: 2020–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2004.11279&r=all
  3. By: Lazarus, Jessica; Pourquier, Jean Carpentier; Feng, Frank; Hammel, Henry; Shaheen, Susan
    Abstract: Shared micromobility – the shared use of bicycles, scooters, or other low-speed modes – is an innovative transportation strategy growing across the United States that includes various service models such as docked, dockless, and e-bike service models. This research focuses on understanding how docked bikesharing and dockless e-bikesharing models complement and compete with respect to user travel behaviors. To inform our analysis, we used two datasets from February 2018 of Ford GoBike (docked) and JUMP (dockless electric) bikesharing trips in San Francisco. We employed three methodological approaches: 1) travel behavior analysis, 2) discrete choice analysis with a destination choice model, and 3) geospatial suitability analysis based on the Spatial Temporal Economic Physiological Social (STEPS) to Transportation Equity framework. We found that dockless e-bikesharing trips were longer in distance and duration than docked trips. The average JUMP trip was about a third longer in distance and about twice as long in duration than the average GoBike trip. JUMP users were far less sensitive to estimated total elevation gain than were GoBike users, making trips with total elevation gain about three times larger than those of GoBike users, on average. The JUMP system achieved greater usage rates than GoBike, with 0.8 more daily trips per bike and 2.3 more miles traveled on each bike per day, on average. The destination choice model results suggest that JUMP users traveled to lower-density destinations, and GoBike users were largely traveling to dense employment areas. Bike rack density was a significant positive factor for JUMP users. The location of GoBike docking stations may attract users and/or be well-placed to the destination preferences of users. The STEPS-based bikeability analysis revealed opportunities for the expansion of both bikesharing systems in areas of the city where high-job density and bike facility availability converge with older resident populations.
    Keywords: Engineering, Micromobility, Bikesharing, E-bike, Dockless, Destination choice, Transportation equity
    Date: 2020–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:itsrrp:qt96g9c9nd&r=all
  4. By: Emde, Simon; Abedinnia, Hamid; Lange, Anne; Glock, C. H.
    Date: 2020–03–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:119468&r=all
  5. By: Borsenberger, Claire; Cremer, Helmuth; Joram, Denis; Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie; Malavolti, Estelle
    Abstract: This paper considers an e-commerce market wherein a vertically integrated marketplace competes downstream with a single retailer and upstream with an independent parcel delivery operator. Because of the information collected by the marketplace on customersíhabits and preferences, the integrated parcel delivery operator has lower delivery costs than its competitor. Products are di§erentiated according to the retailer and the parcel operator who delivers them. The representation of product di§erentiation is inspired by the Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (2002) discrete choice model. We study several scenarios each representing a speciÖc policy implemented to regulate the marketplace. The Örst one is a data sharing policy. The integrated marketplace has to share its information with the other delivery operator which in turn will lower this operatorís cost of delivering the marketplaceís product. The second one is vertical separation under which the parcel delivery operator previously owned and managed by the marketplace becomes independent. Finally we consider a full dismantlement scenario under which there is both vertical and horizontal separation. We show that the optimal policy is either complete dismantlement or data sharing. The relative impacts on consumer surplus and total welfare of these two options involve a tradeo§ between the increased competition implied by complete dismantling and the data related delivery cost advantage achieved under data sharing. When this cost advantage is small, completely dismantling dominates, while data sharing is the best policy when the cost advantage is large.
    Keywords: E-commerce, delivery operators, vertical integration, platform regulation, data sharing, dismantling
    JEL: L42 L81 L87
    Date: 2020–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:124217&r=all

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