|
on Discrete Choice Models |
| By: | Mesfin G. Genie (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari); Antonio Nicolò (Dipartamento di Scienze Economiche “Marco Fanno”, Università degli Studi di Padova; School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester); Giacomo Pasini (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; NETSPAR, Network for Studies on Pensions, Ageing and Retirement, Tilburg) |
| Abstract: | We elicit time and risk preferences for kidney transplantation from the entire population of patients of the largest Italian transplant centre using a discrete choice experiment (DCE). We measure patients’ willingness-to-wait (WTW), expressed in months, for receiving a kidney with one-year longer expected graft survival, or low risk of complication. Using a mixed logit in WTW-space model, we find heterogeneity in patients’ preferences. Our model allows WTW to vary with the patient’s age and duration of dialysis. The results suggest that WTW correlates with age and duration of dialysis. The implication for transplant practice is that including individual preferences in kidney allocation protocols that assign “non-ideal” (expanded donor criteria) organs may not only increase the expected survival rates of patients with transplanted organs but also improve patients’ satisfaction. |
| Keywords: | Stated preferences, Mixed logit, Willingness to wait, Marginal kidney |
| JEL: | I18 I14 C90 D61 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2019:25&r=all |
| By: | Kamat, Vishal |
| Abstract: | In a common experimental format, individuals are randomly assigned to either a treatment group with access to a program or a control group without access. In such experiments, analyzing the average effects of the treatment of program access may be hindered by the problem that some control individuals do not comply with their assigned status and receive program access from outside the experiment. Available tools to account for such a problem typically require the researcher to observe the receipt of program access for every individual. However, in many experiments, this is not the case as data is not collected on where any individual received access. In this paper, I develop a framework to show how data on only each individual's treatment assignment status, program participation decision and outcome can be exploited to learn about the average effects of program access. I propose a nonparametric selection model with latent choice sets to relate where access was received to the treatment assignment status, participation decision and outcome, and a linear programming procedure to compute the identified set for parameters evaluating the average effects of program access in this model. I illustrate the framework by analyzing the average effects of Head Start preschool access using the Head Start Impact Study. I nd that the provision of Head Start access induces parents to enroll their child into Head Start and also positively impacts test scores, and that these effects heterogeneously depend on the availability of access to an alternative preschool. |
| Keywords: | Program evaluation, latent choice sets, unobserved treatment, program access, multiple treatments, average treatment effect, noncompliance, discrete choice, partial identification, social experiments, head start impact study. |
| JEL: | C31 C14 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:123308&r=all |
| By: | McFadden, Jonathan |
| Keywords: | Agricultural and Food Policy |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290890&r=all |
| By: | Yeh, Ching-Hua; Hartmann, Monika |
| Keywords: | Marketing |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290870&r=all |
| By: | Wu, Qianyan; Bi, Xiang |
| Keywords: | Environmental Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290804&r=all |
| By: | Kim, Sanghyo; Heo, Seong-Yoon |
| Keywords: | Institutional and Behavioral Economics |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290755&r=all |
| By: | Rudolf, Katrin |
| Keywords: | Resource/ Energy Economics and Policy |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:291230&r=all |
| By: | Katherine Casey; Abou Bakarr Kamara; Niccoló Meriggi |
| Abstract: | Are ordinary citizens or political party leaders better positioned to select candidates? While the direct vote primary system in the United States lets citizens choose, it is exceptional, as the vast majority of democracies rely instead on party officials to appoint or nominate candidates. Theoretically, the consequences of these distinct design choices on the selectivity of the overall electoral system are unclear: while party leaders may be better informed about candidate qualifications, they may value traits—like party loyalty or willingness to pay for the nomination—at odds with identifying the best performer. To make progress on this question, we partnered with both major political parties in Sierra Leone to experimentally vary how much say ordinary voters, as opposed to party officials, have in selecting Parliamentary candidates. We find evidence that more democratic selection procedures increase the likelihood that parties select the candidate most preferred by voters, favor candidates with stronger records of local public goods provision, and alter the allocation of payments from potential candidates to party officials. |
| JEL: | D72 H1 P16 |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26160&r=all |
| By: | Korting, Christina; Otto, Steven G. |
| Keywords: | Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies |
| Date: | 2019–06–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaea19:290841&r=all |
| By: | Granlund, David (Department of Economics, Umeå University) |
| Abstract: | This article shows how state dependence effects can be estimated for many markets and with few assumptions by using data on how the shares buying specific products differ between those who bought the same product on their latest purchase occasion and other consumers. Using as instrument information regarding which product was cheapest when consumers made their last purchase, I estimate that state dependence increases the probability that consumers will buy the product they bought the last time by 8 percentage points. This effect is larger for women and the elderly than for men and younger consumers. The state dependence effect is also larger for brand-names than for generic products, but not significantly related to number of previous purchases. |
| Keywords: | Brand choice; Consumer dynamics; Drugs; Quasi-experiment econometrics; State dependence |
| JEL: | D12 D90 I11 L65 |
| Date: | 2019–08–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:umnees:0960&r=all |
| By: | George Ainslie; Glenn W. Harrison; Morten I. Lau; Don Ross; Alexander Schuhr; J. Todd Swarthout |
| Abstract: | Economists and psychologists have sought to model and explain both impulsive behavior and the costly but often successful mechanisms by which people control it. Ainslie [1975][1992][2001] suggests that self-control is often achieved on account of a phenomenon he calls "choice bundling." This refers to re-framing of series of discrete choices as single choices over whole series. Whereas other core elements of Ainslie's account of self-regulation, such as hyperbolic discounting and intrapersonal bargaining among temporally distinguished selves have been subject to extensive modeling by economists, choice bundling has been absent from the economic literature because it has never been empirically isolated in a controlled setting that meets the methodological requirements of the discipline. We report a laboratory experiment that fills this gap. Subjects made choices between smaller, sooner and larger, later real monetary rewards under experimental treatments that allowed us to discriminate between choice bundling, reliance on pre-commitment, and possible magnitude effects on intertemporal discounting. Risk preference measures were used to obtain accurate discounting estimates, based on estimation of mixture models that incorporate exponential, hyperbolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting functions. We use structural econometric procedures which are well established in the literature on binary choice and find strong support for the hypothesis that subjects bundled choices when conditions allowed them to do so, and consequently exhibited different discounting behavior in these conditions. |
| JEL: | D03 D83 D90 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2018-07&r=all |