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on Central and Western Asia |
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Issue of 2024‒07‒15
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Adar, Sinem; Aydın, Yaşar; Günay, Cengiz; Seufert, Günter |
| Abstract: | The AKP leadership's diaspora policy has created tensions between Turkey and European countries. Turkey's gradual slide into authoritarianism, Islam's steady expansion into public life and the increasing divergence between the foreign and security policies of Turkey and the EU have deepened the mistrust in relations between that country and the Union. Concerns abound about Ankara's "long-arm" influence and the loyalties of Turkish migrants and their foreign-born children to their countries of residence. Meanwhile, the mainstreaming of anti-migration and anti-Islam sentiments in European countries has led to a conflation between Ankara's ambitions and the diaspora's attitudes and demands in the public discourse. While it is crucial not to overstate the AKP's ability to mobilise the diaspora, the genuine grievances of individuals with a migration background should be taken seriously. At the same time, European governments should continue to advocate the greater independence of mosque communities from Turkey's influence in order to maintain a balanced diaspora landscape. |
| Keywords: | Diaspora policy, Justice and Development Party, AKP, Turkish migrants, Kılıçdaroğlu, Diyanet, DITIB, assimilation, new subjectivity, islamophobia, Gülenist network |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swpcom:297228&r= |
| By: | Zareei, Afsaneh (Stockholm University); Falahi, Mohammad Ali (Ferdowsi University of Mashhad); Wadensjö, Eskil (Stockholm University); Sadati, Saeed Malek (Ferdowsi University of Mashhad) |
| Abstract: | Sanctions have severe adverse effects on societies. Even though sanctions are used against governments, the population is punished for its government's behavior. Sanctions can create problems due to international migration. Iran is an unique case study because it faced the most and hardest sanctions in the world until February 2022. Many negative effects on the economy have been observed such as losing the Rial's value against the US Dollar by 80 percent, increasing poverty, and reducing exports and imports. At the same time, Iran had a very fast growth of emigration with an increase of 141 percent. Sanctions have been imposed on Iran's economy in different ways, but so far, it has not been determined how each type of sanctions will affect emigration. The aim of this study is to study the relationship between different kinds of economic sanctions and labor emigration using the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model. Different types of sanctions as oil and nonoil exports and three different import sanctions on consumer, capital, and intermediate goods are considered. The results show that sanctions on nonoil exports are most influencing emigration. Sanctions on the imports of intermediate and consumer goods, as well as sanctions on oil exports, are in the next steps, but not as much as the non-oil exports. It can be noticed that out of approximately 24 million people working in Iran, up to 4 percent of the working force have a desire to leave the country as migrant workers due to the sanctions. |
| Keywords: | international sanctions, labor emigration, DSGE Models, Iran |
| JEL: | B22 C02 C11 C68 F22 P00 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17062&r= |
| By: | Maryna Tverdostup (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw) |
| Abstract: | Over the past few decades, immigration has become the primary factor contributing to population growth in the European Union (EU) due to rapid population ageing and declining fertility rates. However, the traditional migration source countries – namely, the EU countries in Central and East Europe (EU-CEE) and the EU neighbourhood countries – have limited potential to supply much-needed labour to Western Europe due to own their grim population prospects. Immigration from non-EU, non-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) or non-EU candidate countries as of 2015 (i.e. Georgia, Moldova, Turkey and Ukraine) appears to be the only factor that can prevent population decline in the long run, as third-country nationals are, on average, younger than natives or immigrants from the EU neighbourhood. However, current evidence suggests that higher immigration has only a limited capacity to stabilise population decline and offset labour shortages in the EU countries most affected by negative demographic trends, as they receive fewer immigrants relative to other EU countries. Moreover, the labour market integration of immigrants from non-traditional source countries, including Middle Eastern and African countries, has proved challenging for both legal and infrastructural reasons. This has resulted in an immense pool of untapped talent and skills, which will require the appropriate policy steps to be fully identified and effectively employed in the labour market. These policies, like the ones proposed in this report, will become increasingly important as the EU moves steadily towards new immigration source regions. |
| Keywords: | demographic trends, labour shortages, migration, refugees, integration policies |
| JEL: | J11 J15 O15 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:pnotes:pn:78&r= |
| By: | Vasily Astrov (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw); Lisa Scheckenhofer; Camille Semelet; Feodora Teti |
| Abstract: | Nearly two years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the report gives an overview of the current state of the Russian economy, with a focus on the fiscal situation, external balances, and the effects of Western sanctions on Russia’s trade with the EU and selected third countries. Increased scrutiny of companies from third countries violating the energy sanctions led to a renewed widening of the price discount on Russian oil during the last few months of 2023. However, despite this and heavy military spending, last year’s fiscal deficit was kept under control and primarily covered from the sovereign National Welfare Fund. EU exports to Russia of sanctioned economically critical (EC) goods and common high-priority (CHP) items have virtually stalled, indicating that the sanctions are effectively preventing direct exports. However, third countries, notably China, Hong Kong, Türkiye and the CIS countries, have increased their market shares and become Russia’s most important suppliers of missing EC goods and CHP items. Our findings suggest a particularly high likelihood of sanctions evasion via such CIS countries as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent via Türkiye and China. |
| Keywords: | sovereign fund, energy sanctions, economically critically goods, common high priority items, trade sanctions, sanctions evasion |
| JEL: | F14 F51 H6 |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wii:rusmon:4&r= |
| By: | Sylvain Bellefontaine |
| Abstract: | A diversified and industrialized economy, a NATO member since 1952, a founding member of the OECD in 1961 and a member of the G20, Turkey[1] enjoys an enviable geostrategic position. Its development and human capital indicators are also satisfactory, which can largely be put down to the first decade of the Erdoğan-AKP era (2002-2012). They have, however, deteriorated in recent years. The key issues for socioeconomic development for the coming years include 1/ political and geopolitical stability within a troubled region; 2/ the achievement of high-income status and a prosperity benefiting the entire population; 3/ a decisive step forward in policies for climate change adaptation and energy transition, effectiveness and independence.The first decade following the accession to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002 was marked by the success of the restoration of macroeconomic stability in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis, and was coupled with rather remarkable socioeconomic development. During the second decade, the government’s action focused more on societal and moral issues, to the detriment of macroeconomic fundamentals and structural reforms. The third decade, which is beginning at the same time as the second centenary of the Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923, needs to place the economy, prosperity and national cohesion at the heart of the priorities. To ensure the posterity of his action, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan could now devote what should be his final term as the country’s leader to this task (2023-2028). |
| Keywords: | Turquie |
| JEL: | E |
| Date: | 2024–06–20 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:avg:wpaper:en16849&r= |
| By: | International Monetary Fund |
| Abstract: | Georgia’s economic performance remains robust. Growth has moderated from double digits but remains high, inflation is low, and fiscal and financial buffers are healthy. EU candidate status has boosted sentiment, but the global environment remains highly uncertain due to ongoing conflicts and shifting geo-economic patterns. Georgia should continue to strengthen its resilience to adverse shocks by maintaining prudent macroeconomic policies and boost its growth potential by addressing long-standing structural challenges, capitalizing on new economic opportunities, and making decisive progress towards EU accession. |
| Date: | 2024–05–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfscr:2024/135&r= |
| By: | Dang, Hai-Anh H.; Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad; Do, Minh N. N. |
| Abstract: | While female labor force participation (LFP) in Iran is among the lowest in the world, there is hardly any study on the COVID-19 pandemic effects on the country's female LFP. We find that female LFP decreased during the pandemic years by around 1 percentage point in 2021 and 2022. When controlling for excess mortality rates, the declines could increase to between 3.9 and 8.7 percentage points, with the larger impacts occurring in late 2021 and early 2022. Compared to modest, pre-pandemic female LFP rates, these figures translate into 5 percent and 18-40 percent decreases, respectively. Heterogeneity exists, with more educated individuals being more likely to work. Compared to married individuals, divorcees were more likely to work while those that were divorced or never married were less likely to work. Our results offer relevant inputs for labor policy, particularly those aimed at reducing gender inequalities. |
| Keywords: | COVID-19, employment, women's labor force participation, differences-in-differences, triple differences, labor force survey, Iran |
| JEL: | E24 I30 J21 O12 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:glodps:1440&r= |