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on Cultural Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒06‒18
five papers chosen by Roberto Zanola Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | In Kyung Kim (Department of Economics, Nazarbayev University) |
| Abstract: | This paper empirically investigates the effect of the entry of new theaters on the number of movies playing in incumbent theaters and in the market as a whole, as well as its effect on consumer welfare via the change in product variety and availability. Estimation results suggest that whereas the entry of competitors to a market does not affect the number of movies playing in a theater, the total number of movies playing in the market increases after the entry of new theaters. These findings imply that a theater offers a movie lineup different from those of rivals in order to ease competition, which leads to an increase in market-wide movie variety. We also find robust evidence that the net effect of increased movie variety in the market after the entry of new theaters on consumer welfare is non-monotonic; it is positive only for the first few entrants to a monopoly market. |
| Keywords: | product variety, consumer welfare, movie theater industry |
| JEL: | L13 L22 L82 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:naz:wpaper:1704&r=cul |
| By: | Batabyal, Amitrajeet; Beladi, Hamid |
| Abstract: | We study aspects of economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. Members of the creative class fall into one of two possible groups. This grouping stems from the manner in which creative capital is acquired by the individual members. In this setting, we accomplish five tasks. First, we derive the wage of members in each of the two creative class groups. Second, we show that the average wage increases with the physical capital per creative class member ratio. Third, we derive an expression for the steady state physical capital per creative class member ratio. Fourth, we show that in a particular circumstance, the distribution of income does not affect the steady state physical capital per creative class member ratio. Finally, we ascertain the optimal income redistribution rule that maximizes the average steady state income of the creative class in the region under study. |
| Keywords: | Creative Capital, Creative Class, Economic Growth, Income Redistribution, Region |
| JEL: | D90 R11 |
| Date: | 2017–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79573&r=cul |
| By: | Batabyal, Amitrajeet |
| Abstract: | We study optimal income redistribution in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida and thereby extend aspects of the recent analysis in Batabyal and Beladi (2017). Using the terminology of these researchers, members of the creative class are either artists or engineers. This bipartite grouping stems from the manner in which creative capital is acquired by the artists and the engineers. Specifically, we show that when the savings rates of the artists and the engineers comprising the creative class satisfy a particular inequality, it is possible for a regional authority (RA) to uniquely redistribute income between these two groups in a way that achieves the so called “golden rule” stock of physical capital. |
| Keywords: | Creative Capital, Creative Class, Golden Rule, Income Redistribution, Region |
| JEL: | D31 R11 |
| Date: | 2017–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79676&r=cul |
| By: | Benjamin Enke |
| Abstract: | Cultural psychologists and anthropologists argue that societies have developed heterogeneous systems of social organization to cope with social dilemmas, and that an entire bundle of cultural characteristics has coevolved to enforce cooperation within these different systems. This paper develops a measure of the historical tightness of kinship structures to provide empirical evidence for this large body of theories. In the data, societies with loose ancestral kinship ties cooperate and trust broadly, which is apparently sustained through a belief in moralizing gods, universally applicable moral principles, feelings of guilt, and large-scale institutions. Societies with a historically tightly knit kinship structure, on the other hand, exhibit strong in-group favoritism: they cheat on and are distrusting of out-group members, but readily support in-group members in need. This cooperation scheme is enforced by moral values of in-group loyalty, conformity to tight social norms, emotions of shame, and strong local institutions. These relationships hold across historical ethnicities, contemporary countries, ethnicities within countries, and migrants. The results suggest that religious beliefs, language, emotions, morality, and social norms all coevolved to support specific social cooperation systems. |
| JEL: | D0 O0 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23499&r=cul |
| By: | Batabyal, Amitrajeet; Nijkamp, Peter |
| Abstract: | We study aspects of economic growth in a region that is creative in the sense of Richard Florida. We model creativity by supposing that the region under study has two sectors. The first sector uses physical capital {K(t)} and trained workers {A(t)W(t)} to produce creative capital {R(t)}. The second sector uses physical and creative capital to produce a final consumption good {Q(t)}. In this setting, we accomplish four tasks. First, we derive the equations of motion for physical capital per trained worker (k) and creative capital per trained worker (r). Second, we find combinations of k and r for which k ̇=r ̇=0. Third, we investigate whether the economy of our creative region has a balanced growth path (BGP). Finally, assuming that our region is initially on a BGP, we study the impact of a permanent increase in the savings rate (s) on the trajectory of output per worker. |
| Keywords: | Balanced Growth Path, Consumption Good, Creative Capital, Creative Region, Economic Growth |
| JEL: | O41 R11 |
| Date: | 2017–05–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79572&r=cul |