|
on Cultural Economics |
Issue of 2014‒06‒14
five papers chosen by Roberto Zanola Universita' del Piemonte Orientale Amedeo Avogadro |
By: | Kathryn Graddy (International Business School, Brandeis University); Jonathan Hamilton (Deppartment of Economics, University of Florida) |
Abstract: | Auction houses use both in-house and third-party guarantees for sellers who are concerned about the risk that not enough bidders will enter the auction for their works. Auction houses are compensated for guarantees by buyers’ commissions and successful sales after attracting important works of art. Sellers compensate third-party guarantors by splitting the excess of the final sale price over the guarantee. The guarantor can bid in the auction, and at Christie's, the third-party guarantor still receives a share of the difference between the winning price and the guarantee price, even if he wins the auction, which means the guarantor has a “toehold”. We explore the effect of guarantees (both in-house and third-party) on prices in art auctions, using a large database of auctions and a smaller database of repeat sales. |
Keywords: | Auctions; economics of art; price guarantees; toeholds in auctions |
JEL: | Z11 Z18 D44 L82 |
Date: | 2014–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:brd:wpaper:71&r=cul |
By: | Gaudin, Germain; White, Alexander |
Abstract: | We show that the rise in ebook prices following Apple's entry into the market can be explained by Amazon's Kindle device losing its essential position. When consumers began accessing Amazon's ebooks using third-party devices, such as the iPad, Amazon's incentive to keep ebook prices low diminished. This explanation contrasts with a recent U.S. court decision claiming that price increases stem from a switch in the form of contracts used by ebook publishers and retailers. We show that, if contracts revert to their prior form, as stipulated by the court decision, this will likely push ebook prices up even further. -- |
Keywords: | Electronic Books,Antitrust in High-Tech Industries,Vertical Contracting,Wholesale vs. Agency Agreements,Media Economics |
JEL: | D21 D40 L23 L4 L42 L51 L82 L86 |
Date: | 2014 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:147&r=cul |
By: | Daniel Arribas-Bel (University of Birmingham); Peter Nijkamp (, VU University Amsterdam); Jacques Poot (University of Waikato) |
Abstract: | Cultural diversity is a complex and multi-faceted concept. Commonly used quantitative measures of the spatial distribution of culturally-defined groups – such as segregation, isolation or concentration indexes – are often only capable of identifying just one aspect of this distribution. The strengths or weaknesses of any measure can only be comprehensively assessed empirically. This paper provides evidence on the empirical properties of various spatial measures of cultural diversity by using Monte Carlo replications of agent-based modeling (MC-ABM) simulations with synthetic data assigned to a realistic and detailed geographical context of the city of Amsterdam. Schelling’s classical segregation model is used as the theoretical engine to generate patterns of spatial clustering. The data inputs include the initial population, the number and shares of various cultural groups, and their preferences with respect to co-location. Our MC-ABM data generating process produces output maps that enable us to assess the performance of various spatial measures of cultural diversity under a range of demographic compositions and preferences. We find that, as our simulated city becomes more diverse, stable residential location equilibria are only possible when people, particularly minorities, become more tolerant. We test whether observed measures can be interpreted as revealing unobserved preferences for co-location of individuals with their own group and find that the segregation and isolation measures of spatial diversity are shown to be non-decreasing in increasing preference for within-group co-location, but the Gini coefficient and concentration measures are not. |
Keywords: | cultural diversity, spatial segregation, agent-based model, Monte Carlo simulation |
JEL: | C63 J15 R23 Z13 |
Date: | 2014–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1422&r=cul |
By: | Daniel Kaimann (University of Paderborn) |
Abstract: | The objective of this study is the analysis of movie success mechanisms in a genre-specific context. Instead of the examination of all time box office champions, we focus on the two film genres of computer animated and comic book based films. By introducing the concept of the motion-picture marketing mix, which represents a set of tactical marketing tools in order to strengthen a company’s strategic customer orientation, we are able to systematically identify key movie success factors. We conduct a cross-sectional empirical analysis across regional distinctions based on dataset that covers a time horizon of more than 30 years. We find empirical evidence that actors with ex ante popularity, award nominations and the production budget represent key movie success mechanisms and significantly influence a movie’s commercial appeal. Additionally, word-of-mouth creates reputation effects that also significantly affects box office gross. |
Keywords: | Film economic, Key success factors, Film genre, Seemingly Unrelated Regression |
JEL: | C31 L10 L82 |
Date: | 2013–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pdn:ciepap:38&r=cul |
By: | Shapreau, Carla |
Keywords: | Arts and Humanities |
Date: | 2014–06–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:bineur:qt0q71b0p2&r=cul |