|
on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Ning Sun; Zaifu Yang |
| Abstract: | We study a senior level job matching model with multiple heterogeneous incumbents and entrants. Incumbents can be committed or uncommitted (i.e., free). A committed agent is an incumbent (firm or worker) who has initially had a partner (worker or firm) and is bound by her commitment. A free agent is an entrant or an incumbent whose relation with by her initial partner is not binding. Every agent tries to find her best possible partner with contract. A committed agent cannot unilaterally dissolve her partnership unless her partner agrees to do so. We examine the problem of how to match workers and firms as well as possible and at the same time to set committed agents free as many as possible without violating their commitments to their partners. We show the existence of (strongly) stable and (strict) core matchings through a constructive algorithm and derive several properties of such outcomes. |
| Keywords: | Matching state, core, stability, commitment, procedure. |
| JEL: | C71 C78 J12 |
| Date: | 2018–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:yorken:18/20&r=cta |
| By: | Christopher J. Ellis; Thomas Groll |
| Abstract: | We model which special interest groups lobby which policymakers directly, and which employ for-profit intermediaries. We show that special interests affected by policy issues that frequently receive high political salience lobby policymakers directly, while those that rarely receive high political salience must employ “hired guns.” This follows from the availability of repeated agency contracts between policymakers and special interests. Special interests that lobby on issues that frequently experience high political salience may be incentivized to truthfully reveal private, policy relevant, information to policymakers via the promise of a high probability future political access. For-profit intermediaries are always in the “informational lobbying market” and can be easily incentivized by policymakers to truthfully reveal private information. We also show that “insecure” policymakers, those in vulnerable seats, tend to be lobbied by professional intermediaries. Also, policymakers that are more time constrained tend to rely more on professional intermediaries for policy relevant information. |
| Keywords: | informational lobbying, constrained access, intermediaries, financial contributions |
| JEL: | D72 D78 D83 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7367&r=cta |
| By: | Gersbach, Hans |
| Abstract: | We examine whether the economy can be insured against banking crises with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We study banking competition and show that the private sector insures the banking system through such contracts, and banking crises are avoided, provided that failed banks are not bailed out. When risks are large, banks may shift part of them to depositors. In contrast, when banks are bailed out by the next generation, depositors receive non-contingent contracts with high interest rates, while entrepreneurs obtain loan contracts that demand high repayment in good times and low repayment in bad times. As a result, the present generation overinvests, and banks generate large macroeconomic risks for future generations, even if the underlying productivity risk is small or zero. We conclude that a joint policy package of orderly default procedures and contingent contracts is a promising way to reduce the threat of a fragile banking system. |
| Keywords: | financial intermediation,macroeconomic risks,state-contingent contracts,banking regulation |
| JEL: | D41 E4 G2 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cfswop:612&r=cta |
| By: | Berta, P.;; De Fraja, G.;; Verzillos, S.; |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate the nature of the contracts between a large health-care purchaser and health service providers in a prospective payment system. We model theoretically the interaction between patients choice and cream-skimming by hospitals. We test the model using a very large and detailed administrative dataset for the largest region in Italy. In line with our theoretical results, we show that the state funded purchaser offers providers a system of incentives such that the most efficient providers both treat more patients and also treat more difficult patients, thus receiving a higher average payment per treatment. |
| Keywords: | patients choice; cream skimming; optimal healthcare contracts; hospitals; Lombardy; |
| JEL: | I11 I18 D82 H42 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:hectdg:18/33&r=cta |