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on Contract Theory and Applications |
| By: | Amanda E. Kowalski |
| Abstract: | I aim to shed light on why emergency room (ER) utilization increased following the Oregon Health Insurance Experiment but decreased following a Massachusetts policy. To do so, I unite the literatures on insurance and treatment effects. Under an MTE model that assumes no more than the LATE assumptions, comparisons across always takers, compliers, and never takers can inform the impact of polices that expand and contract coverage. Starting from the Oregon experiment as the "gold standard," I make comparisons within Oregon and extrapolate my findings to Massachusetts. Within Oregon, I find adverse selection and heterogeneous moral hazard. Although previous enrollees increased their ER utilization, evidence suggests that subsequent enrollees will be healthier, and they will decrease their ER utilization. Accordingly, I can reconcile the Oregon and Massachusetts results because the Massachusetts policy expanded coverage from a higher baseline, and new enrollees reported better health. |
| JEL: | C1 H75 I10 I13 |
| Date: | 2018–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24647&r=cta |
| By: | Bagus, Philipp; Howden, David; Huerta de Soto Ballester, Jesús |
| Abstract: | Barnett and Block (forthcoming) claim that Bagus and Howden (2012b) support indirectly the concept of market failure. In this paper we show that maturity mismatching in an unhampered market may imply entrepreneurial error but cannot be considered a market failure. We demonstrate why fractional-reserve banking leads to business cycles even if there is no central bank and why maturity mismatching does not per se lead to clusters of errors in a free market. Finally, we assure that, in contrast to the examples provided by Barnett and Block, maturity mismatching does not imply the creation of two incompatible contracts due to the fungible nature of money. |
| Keywords: | Borrow; lend; deposit; loan; compatible contracts; fungible goods; specific goods; maturity mismatching, fractional-reserve banking, ABCT; banking ethics |
| JEL: | E2 E59 P16 |
| Date: | 2018–05–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:86706&r=cta |
| By: | Lars Vandrei |
| Abstract: | We analyze the extent to which sales prices for residential housing react to rent-price regulation. To this end, we exploit changes in apartment prices across the regulation treatment threshold. We examine a quasi-natural design in the German federal state of Brandenburg using transaction price data provided by the committee of evaluation experts. Brandenburg introduced both a capping limit for existing rental contracts as well as a price ceiling for new contracts for municipalities with tight housing markets in 2014. Whether or not a municipality falls under this classification is based upon a municipality’s housing market characteristics, which are translated into a specific score. This allows us to employ a regression discontinuity design with a sharp cutoff point. We compare sales prices in municipalities that are located marginally above the assignment threshold with the prices in those slightly below. Our results suggest that the regulations reduced sales prices for affected apartments by 20–30 %. |
| Keywords: | Housing rent controls, sales prices |
| JEL: | D04 R31 R52 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ifowps:_262&r=cta |
| By: | Samuel Mutarindwa; Dorothea Schäfer; Andreas Stephan |
| Abstract: | This paper sheds new light on how African countries’ legal systems and institutions influence the governance and stability of their banks. We find that institutional factors, in particular the legal family of origin, political stability, contract enforcement and strength of investor protection promote central corporate governance reforms. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we also reveal that those reforms mediate the impact of institutions on banks. If countries have a corporate governance reform in place their banks show better internal governance and higher stability. |
| Keywords: | African banks, corporate governance, legal systems, institutions, bank stability |
| JEL: | G21 G28 G30 G32 G38 |
| Date: | 2018 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1739&r=cta |