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on Industrial Competition |
| By: | Fageda, X. (Universitat de Barcelona) |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates a model airline competition for the Spanish air transport market. I test the explanatory power of alternative oligopoly models with capacity constraints. In addition, I analyse the degree of density economies. Results show that Spanish airlines conduct follows a price-leadership scheme so that it is less competitive than the Cournot solution. I also fin the evidence that thin routes can be cosidered as natural monopolies |
| JEL: | D43 L13 L93 C30 |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bar:bedcje:2004125&r=com |
| By: | Ruslan Lukach; Peter M. Kort; Joseph Plasmans |
| Abstract: | This paper studies R&D investment decisions of a firm facing the threat of new technology entry and subject to technical uncertainty. We distinguish four scenarios: inevitable entry, entry deterrence, entry blockade, and non-credible entry threat. The entry threat stimulates the incumbent to innovate in case entry prevention is possible, but discourages R&D if entry is inevitable. In the case of entry deterrence the incumbent successfully prevents entry by innovating. Greater technical uncertainty stimulates starting R&D and can result in implementation of more expensive research projects. The welfare analysis shows that the relation between welfare and entry cost and between welfare and uncertainty is non-monotonic. |
| Keywords: | investment under uncertainty, real options, R&D, competition |
| JEL: | C72 D21 O31 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1385&r=com |
| By: | Paula Soruco Michel |
| Abstract: | El principal objetivo del presente trabajo es determinar la presencia de asimetrías, tanto en el nivel como en la velocidad de ajuste, de los precios de la gasolina a los cambios en los costos de producción en el mercado chileno. Para lograr este objetivo, se considera y complementa la metodología utilizada por Duffy-Deno (1996), para medir estos dos tipos de asimetría en función de un modelo de rezagos distribuidos finitos particionado. El análisis se realiza para dos estructuras de series de datos, una serie promedio para el periodo comprendido entre enero de 2001 a diciembre de 2003 y otra serie desagregada a nivel de distribuidor minorista, para el periodo entre marzo de 2001 y noviembre de 2002. La serie desagregada permite estudiar no sólo la posible presencia de asimetrías en los cambios de precios, sino que facilita también la comparación del comportamiento entre los diferentes agentes participantes del mercado, lo que hace del mercado chileno un caso de estudio interesante. Los resultados encontrados, establecen que en general el mercado de la gasolina en Chile presenta un ajuste en proporción igual tanto para aumentos como para bajas en los precios aguas arriba, evidenciándose únicamente un cierto patrón de asimetría determinado por la diferencia en la velocidad de ajuste. |
| Keywords: | Asimetrías en Precios, Poder de Mercado, Gasolinas |
| JEL: | L11 L71 Q40 |
| Date: | 2004–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ila:ilades:inv156&r=com |
| By: | Alain Egli |
| Abstract: | We combine Hotelling’s model of product differentiation with tie-in sales. Tie-in sales condition the sale of one good upon the purchase of another good. In equilibrium firms choose zero product differentiation. Due to the tying structure no firm can gain the whole market by a small price reduction. Then we address the following questions: Can a firm with monopoly power in one market leverage this power into another market where it faces competition. What is the effect from tying on the profits of the monopolist’s rival. In our model this effect is ambiguous |
| Keywords: | Horizontal product differentiation; tie-in sales; leverage theory of tying; foreclosure |
| JEL: | D43 L11 L12 L13 |
| Date: | 2005–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0501&r=com |