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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Haishi Li (The University of Hong Kong); Zhi Li (The Chinese University of Hong Kong); Ziho Park (National Taiwan University); Yulin Wang (The University of Hong Kong); Jing Wu (The Chinese University of Hong Kong) |
| Abstract: | We study how firms in neutral countries adjusted supply chains to Western sanctions on Russia. Firms with headquarters in sanctioning countries (sanctioning MNEs) reduced sanctioned product exports to Russia, showing MNEs' global influence. However, domestic firms in neutral countries increased sanctioned exports, weakening sanctions. Firms exporting more to sanctioning countries complied more, while those sourcing more inputs rerouted sanctioned products to Russia. Sanctioning MNEs expanded exports to both sanctioning and Russia-friendly countries, blending compliance and evasion. Financial sanctions led sanctioning MNEs to reduce imports from Russia in risky sectors. To improve sanctions, stronger secondary sanctions and MNE involvement are essential. |
| Keywords: | Global Supply Chains; Geopolitical Risk; International Conflict |
| JEL: | F14 F63 O19 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:2401 |
| By: | Ivan Savchuk (GC (UMR_8504) - Géographie-cités - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UPCité - Université Paris Cité) |
| Abstract: | The question of the impact of positive radical transformations of small ports in large ports due to the war is not well studied in transport geography. An analysis of the theoretical approach to the positive impact of the development of small ports during a war has enabled me to distinguish two variants of these transformations – a rapid increase in goods traffic and the formation a naval base ultraperipheral in a small port. In both cases, there are the preliminary conditions to achieve them: the location on the seafront to escape the adversary's effective blockade, direct access to a sea for have free relations with the world, the existence of rail line for goods traffic. Ukrainian ports on the Danube are a good example, becoming the leading ports in terms of traffic in 2022. Local ports in the ultra-periphery were radically transformed in the big ports. Local ports in the ultra-periphery. Before the Russian invasion of 2022, the Ukrainian Danube ports were as very small ports. After the collapse of the communist system, they lost much of their traffic and were deprived of rail access. The soviet Odessa railway was divided. One part came under the control of the self-proclaimed Republic of Transnistria, other was formed Moldavian national railway company and other part was integrated in Odessa regional railway of Ukrainian national railway company – Ukrzaliznytsya. This has since prevented the transport of goods from these ports. There has also been a drastic reduction in the amount of goods that were transported by river to the Danube countries during the Soviet era. As a result, traffic in Ukrainian Danube ports ranks last among the ports of the independent period. What's more, in 2006 Moldova managed to create a small port on the Danube – Giurgiulești. The Ukrainian Danube ports thus have a competitor that absorbs the majority of Moldovan goods. Before 2022, goods were transported by local roads. Only one road connected the Ukrainian Danube ports to the national network. However, part of this motorway crosses Moldovan territory, which sometimes causes problems with traffic control and the fight against smuggling. Gateways to the world during the blockade. The role of these ports changed radically after the start of the Russian invasion in 2022. They became Ukraine's only window to the world. This was due to their favorable location on the cross-border river linking the Ukrainian ports with the Romanian port of Constanţa. Ukraine and Moldova have signed an agreement to reactivate rail freight traffic on the border line between the two countries (2022), which has been reconstructed by Ukrzaliznytsya. As a result, new terminals and silos have been built or are under construction, and the traffic in the Danube ports increased rapidly. Since 2022, small ports have become the main sea ports of the country as a result of the Russian invasion. More than half of grain exports in 2022 were loaded in the ports of the Great Odessa, and a quarter of in the Danube ports. New war's logistics chains have created in new conditions for port operations in Ukraine. For this reason, the operators must radically change their logistics. A regular 50-container train has been launched between Constanţa (Romania) and Reni (Ukraine) in 2022. Maersk has launched new container barge services from Constanța to Reni in 2023, one via the Danube Canal and the other in Romanian territorial waters. United Global Logistics has launched a container vessel service between Constanţa and Izmail in 2022. During the naval blockade, only Viking Alliance container terminal in the port of Reni continues to operate. The port of Constanța will become very important for Ukraine. The uncertain future. The radical changes in the role of the three Ukrainian Danube ports – Reni, Izmail and Ust-Dunaysk – as a result of the actual situation are a good example of contradictory developments: large-scale negative processes have a positive effect at the local level. But what will happen after the war: will these ports maintain the same level of traffic as during the war, or will it return to the previous state? |
| Abstract: | Deux facteurs peuvent avoir une influence positive sur le développement des petits ports pendant une guerre, l'augmentation rapide du trafic des marchandises et la formation d'une base navale. Dans les deux cas, des conditions préliminaires sont nécessaires : une localisation ultrapériphérique sur la façade maritime, un accès direct à mer libre, la présence d'un accès ferroviaire. Les ports ukrainiens du Danube avaient, avant l'invasion russe de 2022, une fonction de ports locaux. En raison de la chute de système soviétique ils avaient perdu une grande partie de leur trafic et de ports moyens ils se sont transformés en petits ports. En effet, la fragmentation du chemin de fer soviétique de la région d'Odessa pénalise le transport des marchandises envoyées précédemment vers ces ports. Jusqu'en 2022, les marchandises étaient acheminées en général par la route. Un seul axe routier reliait les ports ukrainiens du Danube au réseau national, avec un tronçon de cette route traversant le territoire moldave, ce qui crée de temps en temps des problèmes de contrôle de circulation et de lutte contre la contrebande. Le rôle de ces ports a été radicalement bouleversé après l'introduction du blocus de la façade maritime de l'Ukraine en 2022. Ils sont devenus les portes d'accès au monde du pays grâce à leur localisation sur le fleuve transfrontalier. L'Ukraine et la Moldavie ont signé le 25.03.2022 un accord de réactivation de la circulation en Transdanubie sur la ligne ferroviaire transfrontalière qui, de plus, a été reconstruite en 2022. Ceci a entraîné une augmentation rapide du trafic et de nouveaux terminaux ont été construits ou sont en chantier dans les ports du Danube. Autre particularité à noter : le port d'Ust-Dunaysk a été privatisé, et c'est le premier cas en Ukraine. Les changements radicaux du rôle des trois ports ukrainiens du Danube (Reni, Izmail, Ust-Dunaysk) à cause de la guerre, sont un bon exemple de transformations contradictoires : les processus négatifs au niveau national provoquent au niveau local un impact positif. La question est néanmoins posée de l'après-guerre : ces ports conserveront-ils des trafics aussi élevés ou retourneront-ils à la situation antérieure ? Tous dépendent de l'activité militaire et de l'efficacité de la défense pour garantir la libre circulation des navires de commerce dans les eaux territoriales de l'Ukraine en mer Noire |
| Keywords: | Ust-Dunaysk, small port, war, Russian invasion, Ukraine, geopolitics, Transdanubia, Reni, Izmail, Petit port, guerre, invasion russe, géopolitique, Transdanubie |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04680042 |
| By: | Aluykov, Maxim (King's College London); Gilev, Aleksei; Nadporozhskii, Ilia (University of Wisconsin-Madison); Vyrskaia, Marina; Rumiantseva, Aleksandra; Zavadskaya, Margarita (University of Helsinki) |
| Abstract: | The Panel Study of Russian Public Opinion and Attitudes (PROPA) report, based on surveys conducted in Summer 2024, examines the evolving views of Russian citizens amidst the ongoing war in Ukraine, economic challenges, and ongoing political repression. This wave of research, conducted both online and via telephone, gathers insights from a wide demographic cross-section of Russian society, with 4, 470 participants in the online survey (June 28 - July 25, 2024) and 1, 603 respondents in the telephone interviews (June 13 - 24, 2024). The study explores economic perceptions, political attitudes, religious beliefs, and historical memories shaping public opinion. Key findings include: 1. Economic Satisfaction and Support for the Regime: A significant portion of respondents express satisfaction with their economic situation, which correlates with support for the war in Ukraine and President Putin’s leadership. The data suggest that those with higher economic satisfaction tend to favor strong presidential power without checks and balances. 2. Political Attitudes: Public support for the ongoing war in Ukraine remains polarized, with 42.6% of online respondents supporting the war, while opposition is more pronounced in the online format than in telephone surveys. The report also highlights declining trust in key political institutions, though a substantial portion of the population still supports authoritarian governance structures. 3. Religious Influence: Religious beliefs, particularly among those with higher religiosity, play a notable role in shaping political opinions. Religious individuals are more likely to support conservative political stances, which align with the regime’s narrative. 4. Memory of the Past: Historical events, including family experiences with World War II, the war in Afghanistan, and Stalinist repressions, influence public attitudes toward the war in Ukraine. Those with personal or familial ties to these events are more likely to support current military actions. Overall, the findings reflect a society under strain, with significant pockets of dis- content, especially among younger and less affluent citizens, but with ongoing support for the regime among economically secure and religious segments of the population. The research offers a nuanced view of how historical memory, economic well-being, and political repression interact in the wartime Russia. |
| Date: | 2024–09–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:g4an5 |
| By: | Mikael Elinder; Oscar Erixson; Olle Hammar |
| Abstract: | Using individual-level data from Gallup World Poll and the Levada Center, we provide an in-depth analysis of how Russia's invasion of Ukraine has affected sentiments in the Russian population. Our results show that after the invasion, a larger share of Russians expressed support for President Putin, optimism about the future, anti-West attitudes, and lower migration aspirations. The 2022 mobilization and the 2023 Wagner rebellion had only short-lived and no effects on sentiments, respectively. Regions with low pre-war support for Putin displayed stronger rally effects, higher casualty rates, and increased incomes, suggesting a recruitment strategy that maximizes political support. Taken together, our results suggest strong public support for the war, except among Russians abroad who became more critical of Putin in line with global views. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2410.00663 |
| By: | Byran Fanning (School of Social Policy, Social Work and Social Justice, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland) |
| Abstract: | Responses to refugees and international protection applicants in the Republic of Ireland have, in recent years, mostly been reactive attempts at crisis management. Since the invasion of the Ukraine by Russia in 2022, Ireland has admitted exponentially larger numbers of refugees than previously (under the European Temporary Protection Directive) alongside hugely increased numbers of asylum seekers (International Protection applicants). In the absence of state capacity to provide adequate accommodation for the increased number of refugees and asylum seekers and to provide supports for host communities, this has led to an ongoing wave of anti-refugee protests and anti-social behaviour promoted and exploited by far-right groups in both deprived urban areas and in rural areas. The focus of this paper is on a number of interconnected challenges. There is a need to develop services, accommodation and infrastructure to meet the needs of future projected arrivals, as well as those who have arrived in recent years. There is also a need to proactively address anxieties within host communities by improving engagement with and supports to these communities. Zero-sum perceptions that host communities suffer from the arrival of refugees need to be addressed. This cannot be done without a wider social policy focus on social cohesion, community development and the strategic development of State capacity to provide proactive supports to host communities. |
| Keywords: | Asylum seekers, community engagement, far-right, politics, hostile environments, International protection applicants, localism, protests, refugees, social cohesion, state capacity, Ukrainians |
| JEL: | P0 |
| Date: | 2024–03–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucd:wpaper:202405 |
| By: | Yan-Hong Yang; Ying-Hui Shao; Wei-Xing Zhou |
| Abstract: | This study examines the quantile connectedness among grain futures markets in BRICS and international markets, with a particular focus on the ongoing and escalating impacts of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The findings reveal significant heterogeneity in spillover effects across different quantiles and market conditions. Specifically, the time-varying total connectedness index (TCI) consistently fluctuated around 95\% under both extreme bearish and bullish market conditions, markedly higher than in normal market conditions. Moreover, across all quantile levels, the TCI was higher during the pre-outbreak period than in the post-outbreak period. This systemic risk has notably decreased following the onset of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the subsequent changes to the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Apart from rice, U.S. grain futures maintained a dominant position as benchmarks for international grain prices, exerting substantial influence over the grain futures markets in BRICS throughout most of the period. Finally, the study highlights that the influence of grain type and regional proximity strengthens pairwise connectedness among futures markets, with short-term spillovers being dominant and the spillover effect generally symmetric across quantiles. |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2409.19307 |
| By: | Mathias Juust; Urmas Varblane |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the resources and capabilities that determine firm-level adjustments after a sudden unexpected closure of a major export market. We focus on the effects of the 2014 Russian embargo on Western food exporters using the example of Estonian firms. The paper applies a novel multimethod approach consisting of Study I quantifying the embargo effect on the exports of all embargoed firms, and Study II conducting a multiple case study into three dairy exporters highly affected by the embargo. Study I employs a difference-in-difference model with matched embargoed firms as treatment. Study II builds on extensive document analysis that serves as input for interviews with the CEOs of the sample dairy firms. We find that pre-shock productivity is on average a good predictor of post-shock firm resilience (Study I), however, we specify that the key firm-level resources and capabilities necessary for successful post-shock adjustments might not be reflected in the standard quantitative productivity level measures (Study II). We conclude that key firm-level resources and capabilities for embargo-resilience are the quality of exporting experience, competitive product-market matching, absorptive capacity, and managerial vision and empowerment. |
| Keywords: | negative export shock, embargo, firm-level capabilities, trade barriers, trade diversion, trade policy |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mtk:febawb:145 |
| By: | Lassana Toure (Université de Ségou); Cheick Kader M'Baye (Université des sciences sociales et de gestion de Bamako - USSGB - Université des sciences sociales et de gestion de Bamako) |
| Abstract: | In this article, we analyze the effects of COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine war on producer prices for services in Mali. More specifically, we use the tools of descriptive and inferential statistics (coefficients of variation, comparison tests, and principal component analysis (PCA)) to infer the impact of these two shocks, in particular by analyzing the relationship between services output price variables on the one hand, and secondly, between these variables and a number of macroeconomic and health indicators (inflation rate, interest rate, exchange rate, number of confirmed cases of COVID-19) on monthly data extending from 2017 to 2022. The results show that, in addition to the effects of COVID-19, the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on producer prices for services are mainly channeled through the inflation rate and the exchange rate. These effects of the Russia-Ukraine war mainly affect producer prices for education, information and communication services, as well as support and office services. Interest rates, on the other hand, are a medium- to long-term transmission channel for the pandemic. |
| Abstract: | Dans cet article, nous analysons les effets de la COVID-19 et de la guerre Russie-Ukraine sur les prix à la production des services au Mali. Plus précisément, nous utilisons les outils des statistiques descriptive et inférentielle (coefficients de variation, tests de comparaison, et analyse en composantes principales (ACP)) afin d'inférer l'impact de ces deux chocs, notamment en analysant la relation entre les variables de prix à la production des services d'une part, et d'autre part, entre ces variables et un certain nombre d'indicateurs macroéconomiques et sanitaires (taux d'inflation, taux d'intérêt, taux de change, nombre de cas avérés de COVID-19) sur des données mensuelles s'étendant de 2017 à 2022. Les résultats montrent qu'outre les effets de la COVID-19, ceux de la guerre Russie-Ukraine sur les prix à la production des services passent essentiellement par le canal du taux d'inflation et du taux de change. Ces effets de la guerre Russie-Ukraine touchent principalement les prix à la production des services d'enseignement, d'informations et communication, ainsi que des services de soutien et bureau. Par contre, le taux d'intérêt est un canal de transmission de la pandémie mais sur le moyen et long terme. |
| Keywords: | Russia-Ukraine war, COVID-19, producer prices, services sector, PCA method. |
| Date: | 2024–06–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04219261 |
| By: | Feinstein, Yuval; David, Geffen Ben |
| Abstract: | Interest in the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon of public opinion has increased in studies on reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war. In the same period, a separate research line has focused on political polarization and the strengthening of radical right parties in many countries. This study brings these two lines together by asking how public opinion in deeply polarized countries responds to violent international conflicts, which, under lesser polarization, would have likely led most citizens to close ranks behind the government and its war policy. To answer this question, we analyzed original panel data collected in Israel before and after the October 7 massacre and during Israel’s retaliation in Gaza. The findings reveal mixed patterns that we label “segmented rally:” The vast majority supported the war and trusted the security forces, but only a minority trusted the government and the prime minister. The analysis identified distinct sets of mechanisms of opinion formation. Rallying behind the war and security forces was motivated by feelings of threat, humiliation, and rage. In contrast, trust or mistrust of the government and the PM depended on whether respondents blamed the government or anti-government protests for the security crisis, an assessment driven by respondents’ preexisting views about the government’s “judicial reform” initiative. The paper concludes by discussing the mutual impacts of polarization and public reactions to crises. |
| Date: | 2024–09–28 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:wpjbz |
| By: | Viktor Zinchenko (Institute of Higher Education of the National Academy of Educational Sciences of Ukraine, Kyiv-city, Ukraine); Mykhailo Boichenko (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv) |
| Abstract: | Ecological approach gives new meaning to the original concept of economic rationality that was created by representatives of the Ukrainian school of physical economy – Serhii Podolinskyi (1850-1891), Volodymyr Vernadskyi (1863-1945) and Mykola Rudenko (1920-2004). It propose a theory of the sustainable development of mankind, which included an original version of thermodynamics, in which labor energy is the result of the transformation of solar energy. Humanity is gradually taking control of the changes in the balance of energy exchange between humanity and the rest of nature, and physical economics is a tool for discovering the limits of such control. The cycles of global energy transformation include cosmic, biological, social and spiritual stages, and the economy acts as the material basis and the place of concentration of these transformations. The threat of technogenic self-destruction of humanity actualizes the need to establish a dynamic and harmonious self-reproduction by humanity of these cycles. |
| Keywords: | Ukrainian philosophy of physical economy, Ecological approach, Global energy transformation, Energy balance in the economy, Economic rationality |
| Date: | 2024–09–16 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04698733 |
| By: | Hung Tran |
| Abstract: | The Global South features prominently in the context of geopolitical rivalry and efforts by developing countries to change the current international economic and financial architecture. While there are questions about whether some countries—such as China or Russia—should be considered parts of the Global South (GS), it is obvious that Africa is at the center of the group. Different aspects of Africa—its potential, its reality, and its efforts to realize its potential—embody the challenges and the prospects of the GS in general. More specifically, the difficulties Africa faces, how it will deal with them, its progress or lack of progress, and the changes it would like to see in the current international economic and financial system to help it overcome the obstacles to development, help make clear what the GS is all about. Africa’s desirable action plan constitutes a comprehensive agenda GS countries can rally around. On the other hand, the various fault lines inherent in Africa typify the lack of cohesiveness that has kept the GS from speaking with one voice, able to pull its weight in international fora. Instead, Africa, and similarly the GS, have been viewed by major powers as arenas of competition for influence. As such, how Africa deals with these problems will offer benchmarks to judge how the GS has progressed. In other words, Africa embodies the agenda of the GS; its progress drives that of the GS. |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:ppaper:pb32-24 |
| By: | Henri-Louis Vedie |
| Abstract: | Avec un chiffre d’Affaires en hausse de 50 % par rapport à 2022, l’industrie pharmaceutique au Maroc a connu une année record en 2023. Cette étude est consacrée à l’une des trois composantes de ce secteur :la composante industrielle. Elle regroupe 50 Établissements pharmaceutiques industriels (EPI). (Source : la Direction des médicaments et de la pharmacie (DMP). L’analyse de chacun de ces EPI met en évidence un écosystème, amorcé dès 1933 avec la création de Pharma-Cooper. Écosystème constitué, en 2024, d’EPI, en synergie, dont les effectifs vont de quelques dizaines à plusieurs milliers. Écosystème très ouvert aussi à l’international, où 21 EPI sont des filiales marocaines de multinationales étrangères, leaders mondiaux dans leur domaine. En 2024, cet écosystème est particulièrement dynamique, avec un fort potentiel de développement à partir d’un double moteur de croissance : interne et externe. Pôle d’excellence, spécialisédanslaproductiondegénériquesdemoinsenmoinschers, quigénère deséconomies importantes, indispensables à la préservation des équilibres financiers de l’assurance maladie, mais aussi à l’amélioration de la balance commerciale. Pôle confronté de nos jours à un autre défi mis en évidence par la pandémie de la Covid-19 et les conséquences de la guerre Russo- Ukrainienne : la souveraineté sanitaire. En priorisant l’usage des génériques et en diversifiant son offre, ce pôle est-il prêt à relever le défi de la souveraineté sanitaire du Maroc ? |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:ppaper:pb37-24 |