nep-cis New Economics Papers
on Confederation of Independent States
Issue of 2009‒01‒31
two papers chosen by
Anna Y. Borodina
Perm State University
  1. Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia: Evidence from Syndicated Loans By Zuzana Fungacova; Christophe J. Godlewski; Laurent Weill
  2. Does Deposit Insurance Improve Financial Intermediation? Evidence from the Russian Experiment By Chernykh, Lucy; Rebel, Cole
  1. By: Zuzana Fungacova; Christophe J. Godlewski (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg); Laurent Weill (Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie, Université de Strasbourg)
    Abstract: The objective of this paper is to investigate whether the participation of local banks exerts an impact on the spreads of syndicated loans in Russia. Following Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001), we aim to test whether local banks possess a superior ability to solve information asymmetries. In this aim, we use a sample of 528 syndicated loans to Russian borrowers. We perform regressions of the spread on a set of variables including information on the participation of local banks, loan and borrower characteristics. Unlike former papers, we consider separately foreign banks with and without a local presence, as this presence may influence their monitoring ability and their information. We observe no significant impact of the participation of local banks in syndicated loans on the spread. We also do not find any significant influence of the presence of domestic-owned banks or foreign-owned banks on the spread. Additional estimations considering subsamples for which information asymmetries are exacerbated provide similar results. Therefore our conclusion is that local banks do not benefit from an advantage in monitoring ability and in information in Russia.
    Keywords: Bank, Information asymmetry, Loan, Syndication, Russia.
    JEL: G21 P34
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lar:wpaper:2009-01&r=cis
  2. By: Chernykh, Lucy; Rebel, Cole
    Abstract: This study examines how the introduction of deposit insurance affects a banking system, using the deposit-insurance scheme introduced into the Russian banking system as a natural experiment. The fundamental research question is whether the introduction of deposit insurance leads to a more effective banking system as evidenced by increased deposit-taking and decreased reliance upon State-owned banks as custodians of retail deposits. We find that banks entering the new deposit-insurance system increased both their level of retail deposits and their ratios of retail deposits to total assets relative to banks that did not enter the new deposit insurance system. We also find that these results hold up in a multivariate panel-data analysis that controls for bank and time random effects. The longer a bank was entered into the deposit insurance system, the greater was its level of deposits and its ratio of deposits to assets. Moreover, this effect was stronger for regional banks and for smaller banks. Finally, we find that implementation of the new deposit-insurance system had the effect of “leveling the playing field” between State-owned banks and privately owned banks.
    Keywords: bank; deposit insurance; moral hazard; Russia; State-owned bank
    JEL: E58 G28 G21
    Date: 2009–01–15
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:12987&r=cis
This nep-cis issue is ©2009 by Anna Y. Borodina. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 13:31.