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on Confederation of Independent States |
| By: | Evgeny Yakovlev; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (CEFIR / New Economic School) |
| Abstract: | In this short paper we attempt to assess the results of Putin’s centralization and anti-corruption measures on the overall level of state capture in the Russian regions as well as on the balance of power between different interest groups. We proceed by, first, describing the results of previous research on state capture in the Russia’s regions during Yeltsin in section 1 and, then, analyzing the changes in the nature and the level of state capture during Putin’s administration in section 2. Section 3 concludes. |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0094&r=cis |
| By: | Evgeny Yakovlev; Ekaterina Zhuravskaya (CEFIR / New Economic School) |
| Abstract: | The paper provides evidence that the welfare effect of decentralization in countries with weak democratic institutions depends on the multi-jurisdictional vs. single-jurisdictional span of interest group lobbies. Weak democracy leads to capture of local authorities. Captors who have multi-jurisdictional scope internalize inter-jurisdictional externalities of local policies to a larger extent than both the captors with interests in a single jurisdiction and not captured local politicians. Particularly, multi-jurisdictional captors lobby for lower inter-regional trade barriers than single-jurisdictional captors. Based on case study evidence and econometric analysis of a unique data set from Russia, we show that capture by multiregional interest groups leads to significantly better performance of firms with no political connections in the neighboring regions and worse performance of such firms in the captured region compared to capture by regional industrial interests with similar political power or situation of no capture. Our findings have implications for international trade as well: lobbying by multinationals leads to lower protectionism compared to lobbying by national corporations. |
| JEL: | P26 P27 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2006–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0093&r=cis |
| By: | Theocharis N. Grigoriadis (The European Union Delegation to Russia); Benno Torgler (University of California) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the relative impact of regional energy production on the legislative choices of Russian Duma deputies on energy regulation between 1994 and 2003. We apply Poole’s optimal classification method of roll call votes using an ordered probit model to explain energy law reform in the first decade of Russia’s democratic transition. Our goal is to analyze the relative importance of home energy on deputies’ behavior, controlling for other factors such as party affiliation, electoral mandate, committee membership and socio-demographic parameters. We observe that energy resource factors have a considerable effect on deputies’ voting behavior. On the other hand, we concurrently find that regional economic preferences are constrained by the public policy priorities of the federal center that continue to set the tone in energy law reform in post-Soviet Russia. |
| Keywords: | Energy Regulation, Energy Roll Law Reform, Energy Resources, Roll Call Votes, Legislative Politics, State Duma, Russia |
| JEL: | Q40 D72 K23 P27 P37 P31 R11 |
| Date: | 2006–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.146&r=cis |