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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Romain Lachat (CEVIPOF - Centre de recherches politiques de Sciences Po (Sciences Po, CNRS) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Institut d'Études Politiques [IEP] - Paris); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | Declining levels of turnout and growing distrust in political elites are often seen as symptoms of a crisis of representative democracy. Various proposals of reform have been made to reinvigorate representation and political participation. This paper focuses on one aspect of that debate: finding an alternative to FPTP, which is the electoral rule most frequently used in single-member districts, but which is criticized, among others, for allowing only a limited expression of voters' preferences. Many alternative rules are in use or have been suggested, such as Two-Round majority, Instant Runoff, Approval Voting, Majority Judgement, or Range Voting. The literature on these decision rules has concentrated on their formal properties. Yet, we know surprisingly little about how frequently these rules would lead to different outcomes in normal electoral settings. This paper improves our understanding of these rules by examining their mechanical effects. We start from data on voters' party utilities from "real-world" settings, based on CSES data. This allows simulating and comparing the outcomes of different electoral rules under a variety of distributions of voters' party preferences. We then analyze how frequently they lead to different outcomes and identify the contextual characteristics that explain these differences. For the latter question, we focus on a number of party system or electorate's characteristics, which have been highlighted in debates on challenges to representation (such as ideological polarization, party system fragmentation, or affective polarization). |
| Keywords: | Electoral systems, Condorcet winner, Condorcet efficiency, Polarization, Party system fragmentation |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-04630321 |
| By: | Antoine Bouët; Anthony Edo; Charlotte Emlinger |
| Abstract: | We investigate the local effects of trade exposure and immigration on voting behavior in France from 1988 to 2022. We use the content of each candidate's manifesto to construct an anti-globalization voting index for each French presidential election. This index shows a significant increase in the anti-globalization positions of candidates, and a growing anti-globalization vote beyond the far right. We show that increasing local exposure to import competition and immigration increases anti-globalization votes, while increasing export exposure reduces them. We also find that imports have different effects depending on the products imported. While exposure to imports of final goods increases anti-globalization voting, exposure to imports of intermediate goods reduces it. |
| Keywords: | Voting;Trade;Immigration;Political Economy |
| JEL: | D72 F6 |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cii:cepidt:2024-12 |
| By: | Antonin Macé (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Rafael Treibich (SDU - University of Southern Denmark) |
| Abstract: | We propose a general model of repeated voting in committees and study equilibrium behavior under alternative majority rules. We find that repetition may significantly increase the efficiency of majority voting through a mechanism of intertemporal logrolling, agents sometimes voting against their immediate preference to benefit the group's long-term interest. In turn, this affects the comparison of majority rules, which may differ significantly relative to the static setting. The model provides a rationale for the use of super-majority rules, while accounting for the prevalence of consensus in committee voting. |
| Keywords: | Logrolling, Repeated games, Majority voting, Preference intensities, Consensus |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04610689 |
| By: | Jacob R. Brown; Enrico Cantoni; Ryan Enos; Vincent Pons; Emilie Sartre |
| Abstract: | Using data on the residential location and migration for every voter in U.S. states recording partisan registration between 2008–2020, we find that residential segregation between Democrats and Republicans has increased year over year at all geographic levels, from neighborhoods to Congressional Districts. Individual demographic information reveals that segregation increases for voters of most demographic backgrounds, but that Democratic and Republican trending places have starkly different demographic profiles, thus contributing to the growing confluence of demographics, partisanship, and geography in the United States. We further decompose the change in segregation into different sources. Increases in segregation have not been driven primarily by migration but rather by generational change, as young voters enter the electorate, causing some places to become more homogeneously Democratic, and by existing voters leaving the Democratic party and causing other places to become more Republican. |
| JEL: | D72 P00 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33422 |
| By: | Andrew E Clark (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Maria Cotofan (King‘s College London) |
| Abstract: | It is well-known that the wealthier are more likely to have Right-leaning political preferences. We here in addition consider the role of the individual's starting position, and in particular their upward social mobility relative to their parents. In 18 waves of UK panel data, both own and parental social status are independently positively associated with Rightleaning voting and political preferences: given their own social status, the upwardly-mobile are therefore more Left-wing.We investigate a number of potential mediators: these results do not reflect the relationship between well-being and own and parents' social status, but are partly linked to the individual's beliefs about how fair society is. We replicate these findings using US data and show that, in both countries, the choice of specification when controlling for the respondent's own status is crucial and may help explain some of the mixed findings in the literature. |
| Keywords: | Fairness, Social Mobility, Voting, Redistribution, Satisfaction |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04500774 |
| By: | González, Felipe (Queen Mary University of London); Prem, Mounu (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance) |
| Abstract: | Despite the adverse effects of economic crises, incumbents often retain significant electoral support. We attribute this resilience to the intensified political returns of transfers during crises. Our context is the largest infant nutrition program in the world, implemented by Salvador Allende and his left-wing coalition in Chile (1970-1973) as part of a large increase in spending that contributed to hyperinflation, scarcity of basic goods, and plummeting real wages. Using administrative data and surveys, we find that the delivery of three cups of milk per day to all preschoolers in the country lowered infant mortality and helped the left-wing government to remain electorally popular. We support the causal interpretation of results by exploiting a family planning program from the late 1960s, information campaigns targeting women, and voting in gender-segregated booths. Furthermore, novel measures of the local severity of the economic crisis reveal that transfers yielded greater political returns in areas hardest hit by economic hardship. Why did the crisis fail to translate into support for the opposition coalition? Survey evidence suggests that transfers swayed voters who perceived the crisis as unrelated to government policies. Overall, our findings demonstrate how direct transfers and heterogeneous perceptions of economic crises can sustain the electoral popularity of governments. |
| Keywords: | government support, transfers, crisis, hyperinflation, socialism |
| JEL: | H51 N35 N46 P35 |
| Date: | 2025–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17661 |
| By: | Ivo Steimanis; Natalie Struwe; Julian Benda; Esther Blanco |
| Abstract: | Interrelated global crises - climate change, pandemics, loss of ecosystem services and biodiversity - pose risks that demand collective solutions. Uncertainty about others’ behavior, coupled with the dependence on some to take collective efforts to mitigate risks for all (e.g. conservation of natural habitats by those living at wildlife boarders to reduce risk of zoonoses), complicates collective action. We extend the experimental collective risk social dilemma to consider that some individuals (’beneficiaries’) cannot protect themselves and must rely on others (’providers’) for collective protection. Our approach allows to disentangle the relevance of self-interest and uncertainty over the actions of others in explaining self-reliance by providers. Our findings show that reducing strategic uncertainty leads to more collective solutions, with more beneficiaries protected, less resources wasted, and lower inequality. Moreover, we show that institutions inspired by payments for ecosystem services that allow beneficiaries to make compensation transfers to providers of protection are highly effective in fostering collective solutions. Indeed, these voluntary institutions are similarly effective in alleviating the social dilemma as (the hypothetical case of) fully removing strategic uncertainty. Thus, we show that understanding the reasons for self-reliance in collective risk social dilemmas can help develop better institutions to enhance the use of collective solutions, and thereby enhancing social welfare. |
| Keywords: | Collective risk social dilemma, cooperation, mitigation, adaptation, strategic uncertainty, selfinterest, public good, donation, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | D70 H41 C92 D64 Q54 |
| Date: | 2025–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2025-02 |
| By: | Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Irénée Frérot (LKB (Jussieu) - Laboratoire Kastler Brossel - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - SU - Sorbonne Université - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate the potential of deliberation to create consensus among fully informed citizens. Our approach relies on a two cognitive assumptions i. citizens need a thinking frame (perspective) to consider an issue; ii. citizens cannot consider all relevant perspectives simultaneously only sequentially. Together this implies that citizens' opinions are intrinsically contextual i.e., they have quantum-like characteristics.We capture contextuality in a simple quantum cognitive model. We find that in a binary voting problem, letting two citizens with alternative thinking frames and opposite voting intentions deliberate under the guidance of a benevolent facilitator allows reaching consensus. Opinion change occurs as the result of citizens' action in terms of "putting themselves in another citizen's shoes". The probability for reaching consensus depends on the correlation between perspectives and on their sophistication (dimensionality). Maximally uncorrelated sophisticated perspectives give the best chance for opinion change. With more than two citizens, multiple deliberation rounds with experts allow reaching consensus with significant probability.A first central lesson is that with contextual opinions, the diversity of perspectives is beneficial and necessary to overcome initial disagreement. We also learn that well-design procedures managed by a facilitator are needed to increase the probability for consensus. An additional finding is that the richness of a thinking frame helps convergence toward a joint position. The optimal facilitator's strategy entails focusing deliberation on a properly reduced problem. |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-04725697 |