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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Marchand, Joseph (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Wang, Yuhan (University of Alberta, Department of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Canada’s 2021 federal election was called early, two years after its previous 2019 election, rather than four years. The Liberal government’s perceived opportunity was to turn minority rule into a majority, based on their ongoing COVID-19 pandemic response and perfect incumbent success rate of recent provincial elections. Harmonizing official voting data of electoral districts to COVID data of more aggregate health regions, this is the first study to examine COVID-19 and voting in Canada, currently on the precipice of another election. Overall, COVID severity was associated with reduced voter turnout in the 2021 election, compared with 2019, as well as an increase in the Liberal vote share and a decrease in the Conservative vote share. Although these findings may have been anticipated, voters in Conservative dominant areas turned out more than voters in Liberal dominant areas, which may not have been anticipated, leading to Liberal gains well below a majority. |
| Keywords: | Canada; COVID-19; Early Elections; Public Health; Voting |
| JEL: | D72 H12 H51 I18 K16 |
| Date: | 2024–12–31 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:albaec:2024_011 |
| By: | Christoph Feldhaus (Department of Economics, Ruhr-University Bochum); Lukas Reinhardt (Centre for the Study of Social Cohesion, University of Oxford and Identity and Conflict Lab, Yale University); Matthias Sutter (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn, University of Cologne, Germany, University of Innsbruck, Austria, IZA Bonn, Germany, and CESifo Munich) |
| Abstract: | In a democracy, it is essential that citizens accept rules and laws, regardless of which party is in power. We study why citizens in polarized societies resist rules implemented by political opponents. This may be due to the rules’ specific content, but also because of a general preference against being restricted by political opponents. We develop a method to measure the latter channel. In our experiment with almost 1, 300 supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, we show that polarization undermines rule-following behavior significantly, independent of the rules’ content. Subjects perceive the intentions behind (identical) rules as much more malevolent if they were imposed by a political opponent rather than a political ally. |
| Keywords: | Political polarization, Social identity, Outgroup, Economic preferences, Experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D90 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2024_15 |
| By: | Jean Lacroix; Pierre-Guillaume Méon; Kim Oosterlinck |
| Abstract: | The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labeled pro-democratic dynasties, show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on 10 July 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians. |
| Date: | 2023–03–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/372587 |
| By: | Laurent Bouton; Micael Castanheira De Moura; Allan Drazen |
| Abstract: | Popular and academic discussions have mostly concentrated on large donors, even though small donors are a major source of financing for political campaigns. We propose a theory of small donors with a key novelty: it centres on the interactions between small donors and the parties' fundraising strategy. In equilibrium, parties micro-target donors with a higher contribution potential (that is, richer and with more intense preferences) and increase their total fundraising effort in close races. The parties' strategic fundraising amplifies the effect of income on contributions, and leads to closeness, underdog and bandwagon effects. We then study the welfare effects of a number of common campaign finance laws. We find that, due to equilibrium effects, those tools may produce outcomes opposite to intended objectives. Finally, we identify a tax-and-subsidy scheme that mutes the effect of income while still allowing donors to voice the intensity of their support. |
| JEL: | D71 D70 H31 |
| Date: | 2024–08–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/378528 |