nep-cdm New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2024‒09‒23
three papers chosen by
Stan C. Weeber, McNeese State University


  1. Why do community members support clientelistic deals? How collective voting decisions are taken in Uru Indigenous communities, Bolivia By Hirseland, Aline-Sophia
  2. Flip-flopping and Endogenous Turnout By Alexandre Arnout
  3. Can Electronic Voting Shape Election Outcomes in Developing Countries? Evidence from Peru By Rodrigo Chang; Laura Castellanos Author-Name: Esteban Penelas Author-Name: Javier Torres

  1. By: Hirseland, Aline-Sophia
    Abstract: This article explores the practice of "instructed voting" prevalent among rural Indigenous communities in Bolivia, referring to the taking of collective electoral decisions. It adds to the debate on clientelistic bloc voting by revealing voters' motives for participating in clientelistic deals, as based on interviews with Uru Indigenous community members and politicians. It shows the ambivalent significance of the practice for the Indigenous communities under study, being a protective mechanism against external threats on the one hand and a gateway to vote buying on the other. Social norms and trust in community authorities are found to be central drivers for achieving voters' compliance. The article adds another piece to the puzzle on how clientelistic deals happen in democratic systems under a secret ballot yet without apparent infringements of the law, which is the case in the communities under study here.
    Keywords: Bolivia, clientelism, bloc voting, collective voting decisions, Indigenous peoples
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:gigawp:302173
  2. By: Alexandre Arnout (Aix-Marseille University, CNRS, AMSE, Marseille France)
    Abstract: I consider an electoral competition model where each candidate is associated with an exogenous initial position from which she can deviate to maximize her vote share, a strategy known as flip-flopping. Citizens have an intrinsic preference for consistent candidates, and abstain due to alienation, i.e. when their utility from their preferred candidate falls below a common exogenous threshold (termed the alienation threshold). I show how the alienation threshold shapes candidates’ flip-flopping strategy. When the alienation threshold is high, i.e. when citizens are reluctant to vote, there is no flip-flopping at equilibrium. When the alienation threshold is low, candidates flip-flop toward the center of the policy space. Surprisingly, I find a positive correlation between flip-flopping and voter turnout at equilibrium, despite voters’ preference for consistent candidates. Finally, I explore alternative models in which candidates’ objective function differs from vote share. I show that electoral competition can lead to polarization when candidates maximize their number of votes.
    Keywords: flip-flopping, turnout, electoral competition, alienation, polarization
    JEL: D72 C72
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2423
  3. By: Rodrigo Chang; Laura Castellanos Author-Name: Esteban Penelas Author-Name: Javier Torres
    Abstract: This paper estimates the impact of the introduction of electronic voting technology on Municipal elections in Peru. Using a territorial regression discontinuity design, we estimate the impact on valid votes, and voter turnout. We find that, on average, electronic voting technology decreases blank votes by 1.8 percentage points and invalid votes by 4.4 percentage points. However, it did not have a significant effect on turnout rate. Difference-in-differences estimations and subsequent robustness checks confirm the validity of our results.
    Keywords: Electronic voting, political responsiveness, residual votes
    Date: 2024–09
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:203

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