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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Jeanne Lafortune; Francisco Pino |
| Abstract: | Previous studies of female suffrage have interpreted the change in voting patterns as reflecting a change in voter composition, in part because only aggregate voting data was available. We exploit the existence of separate counts for women and men votes in Chile before and after female suffrage. We show that inference based on aggregates is inaccurate because men also change their voting behavior. Two potential explanations are provided: men responded to female suffrage through strategic voting and men previously represented in part women's vote due to negotiation within the household. We show evidence consistent with both hypotheses. |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp560 |
| By: | Dietrich, Franz; Spiekermann, Kai |
| Abstract: | Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory’, ‘neutral’, but not necessarily ‘equal’, i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons. |
| Keywords: | jury theorems; group deliberation; social choice theory; majority voting; group competence; sharing evidence |
| JEL: | D70 D71 D80 |
| Date: | 2024–07–24 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:123889 |
| By: | Jacopo Bizzotto; Davide Cipullo; André Reslow |
| Abstract: | This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting outcomes. We model a referendum in which a voter chooses between two policies. The voter relies on a forecaster to learn about the macroeconomic consequences of the policies. The forecaster favours one of the policies and faces a choice between lying to influence the vote and maintaining a reputation for honesty. The model yields three predictions. First, the forecaster is more likely to bias the forecast associated with the policy that is (i) less likely to be selected in the referendum and (ii) associated with greater macroeconomic uncertainty. Second, as the influence of the forecast on the voter’s decision increases, so does the likelihood that the forecaster lies. Third, the forecaster sticks to her biased forecasts even after the referendum, at least for some time. We show that these predictions are empirically supported in the context of the Brexit referendum. |
| Keywords: | Brexit, interest groups, forecaster behaviour, voting |
| JEL: | D72 D82 E27 H30 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11221 |
| By: | Michelle Blom; Peter J. Stuckey; Vanessa Teague; Damjan Vukcevic |
| Abstract: | Single Transferable Vote (STV) elections are a principled approach to electing multiple candidates in a single election. Each ballot has a starting value of 1, and a candidate is elected if they gather a total vote value more than a defined quota. Votes over the quota have their value reduced by a transfer value so as to remove the quota, and are passed to the next candidate on the ballot. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are a statistically sound approach to election auditing which guarantees that failure to detect an error in the result is bounded by a limit. A first approach to RLAs for 2-seat STV elections has been defined. In this paper we show how we can improve this approach by reasoning about lower bounds on transfer values, and how we can extend the approach to partially audit an election, if the method does not support a full audit. |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:msh:ebswps:2024-3 |
| By: | Emilia Brito; Jesse Bruhn; Thea How Choon; E. Anna Weber |
| Abstract: | How does gender composition influence individual and group behavior? To study this question empirically, we assembled a new, national sample of United States city council elections and digitized information from the minutes of over 40, 000 city-council meetings. We find that replacing a male councilor with a female councilor results in a 25p.p. increase in the share of motions proposed by women. This is despite causing only a 20p.p. increase in the council female share. The discrepancy is driven, in part, by behavioral changes similar to those documented in laboratory-based studies of gender composition. When a lone woman is joined by a female colleague, she participates more actively by proposing more motions. The apparent changes in behavior do not translate into clear differences in spending. The null finding on spending is not driven by strategic voting; however, preference alignment on local policy issues between men and women appears to play an important role. Taken together, our results both highlight the importance of nominal representation for cultivating substantive participation by women in high-stakes decision making bodies; and also provide evidence in support of the external validity of |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bro:econwp:2024-002 |
| By: | Troncone, Massimo |
| Abstract: | This article argues that in a context of widespread clientelism and poverty, local public goods provision is a tool for mass patronage. Clientelistic incumbents under threat entice economically vulnerable voters into supporting the regime by creating jobs in the construction sector through infrastructural investments. The theory is tested using data on public works projects funded by the Cassa del Mezzogiorno, a massive place-based policy for the development of Southern Italy introduced after WWII. Empirically, I exploit within-politician shocks in competition induced by the electoral rule of the post-war Italian Senate. The results reveal that public works investments increase when Christian democratic senators are threatened in their own districts by the election of a communist senator, that this effect is particularly strong in areas characterized by low levels of employment, and that this distribution generates electoral returns. |
| Date: | 2024–07–26 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:rgz9t |
| By: | Deniz Kattwinkel; Alexander Winter |
| Abstract: | A group of privately informed agents chooses between two alternatives. How should the decision rule be designed if agents are known to be biased in favor of one of the options? We address this question by considering the Condorcet Jury Setting as a mechanism design problem. Applications include the optimal decision mechanisms for boards of directors, political committees, and trial juries. While we allow for any kind of mechanism, the optimal mechanism is a voting mechanism. In the terminology of the trial jury example: When jurors (agents) are more eager to convict than the lawmaker (principal), then the defendant should be convicted if and only if neither too many nor too few jurors vote to convict. This kind of mechanism accords with a judicial procedure from ancient Jewish law. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.07293 |
| By: | Deepal Basak; Joyee Deb; Aditya Kuvalekar |
| Abstract: | We study a canonical collective action game with incomplete information. Individuals attempt to coordinate to achieve a shared goal, while also facing a temptation to free-ride. Consuming more similar information about the fundamentals can help them coordinate, but it can also exacerbate free-riding. Our main result shows that more similar information facilitates (impedes) achieving a common goal when achieving the goal is sufficiently challenging (easy). We apply this insight to show why insufficiently powerful authoritarian governments may face larger protests when attempting to restrict press freedom, and why informational diversity in committees is beneficial when each vote carries more weight. |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2407.14773 |