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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Hausladen, Carina I.; Hu, Shiang-Hung; Levin, Joel M. |
| Abstract: | Bouton et al. (2022) compare the properties of majority run-off and plurality rule elections in a laboratory setting, focusing on Duverger's prediction that plurality rule leads to higher levels of strategic voting. They produce a causal estimate of the difference in incidence of strategic voting across systems, finding more strategic voting under the plurality rule. However, they find that coordination is only higher under the plurality rule when voters are sufficiently divided over which candidate they prefer. They conclude that differences in electoral outcomes and voters' welfare are modest. We are able to computationally reproduce the original study's main findings using the authors' replication package. The replication package contained both raw data and a cleaned dataset, but did not include a script for cleaning the raw data or a codebook to make sense of it. Therefore, the majority of our work focused on producing code to evaluate and clean the authors' raw data. The authors sent a very helpful response to an earlier draft of this report and their communication improved the quality of our replication effort. |
| Keywords: | Majority run-off system, Plurality rule, Duverger's prediction, Voting behavior, Sincere voting |
| JEL: | C92 D70 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:i4rdps:99&r=cdm |
| By: | Luca Bellodi; Frederic Docquier; Stefano Iandolo; Massimo Morelli; Riccardo Turati |
| Abstract: | We study the effect of local exposure to populism on net population movements by citizenship status, gender, age and education level in the context of Italian municipalities. We present two research designs to estimate the causal effect of populist attitudes and politics. Initially, we use a combination of collective memory and trigger variables as an instrument for the variation in populist vote shares across national elections. Subsequently, we apply a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effect of electing a populist mayor on population movements. We establish three converging findings. First, the exposure to both populist attitudes and policies, as manifested by the vote share of populist parties in national election or the closeelection of a new populist mayor, reduces the attractiveness of municipalities, leading to larger population outflows. Second, the effect is particularly pronounced among young, female, and highly educated natives, who tend to relocate across Italian municipalities rather than internationally. Third, we do not find any effect on the foreign population. Our results highlight a foot-voting mechanism that may contribute to a political polarization in Italian municipalities. |
| Keywords: | Migration, Human Capital, Populism, Italian Politics |
| JEL: | D72 F22 F52 J61 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:baf:cbafwp:cbafwp24216&r=cdm |
| By: | Marco Di Cataldo (Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics); Elena Renzullo (Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice; Department of Geography and Environment, London School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | The EU Cohesion Policy, with its ability to influence the socio-economic trajectories of European regions and cities, also has the potential to shape the political preferences of citizens. While some evidence exists regarding the impact of EU funds on national electoral outcomes, their role for local elections remains largely unexplored, overlooking the inherently territorial nature of Cohesion Policy and the pivotal role played by local policymakers in its activation and implementation. This study leverages detailed administrative data on European development projects to investigate the impact of EU funds on the political support for local incumbent politicians in Italy. It studies the relationship between the inflow of European funds and the probability of re-election for Italian mayors, considering different project types that reflect the mayors’ ability to attract European funds. The results reveal that Cohesion Policy plays a critical role in shaping local voting behaviours. Larger and more visible projects significantly increase the chances of mayoral re election. Moreover, local contexts characterised by faster growth, where EU projects effectively improve municipal public services, witness the greatest electoral gains for incumbents. These results underscore the importance of the design, visibility, and effectiveness of local development projects in determining the political impact of EU redistributive policies. |
| Keywords: | EU Cohesion Policy, incumbent re-election, political preferences, redistribution, local voting behaviour |
| JEL: | D72 I38 H7 R58 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ven:wpaper:2024:02&r=cdm |
| By: | Anselm Hager (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin); Lukas Hensel (University of Oxford); Johannes Hermle (University of California, Berkeley); Christopher Roth (University of Cologne and ECONtribute) |
| Abstract: | Are political activists driven by instrumental motives such as making a career in politics or mobilizing voters? We implement two natural field experiments in which party activists are randomly informed that canvassing is i) effective at mobilizing voters, or ii) effective for enhancing activists’ political careers. We find no effect of the treatments on activists’ intended and actual canvassing behavior. The null finding holds despite a successful manipulation check and replication study, high statistical power, a natural field setting, and an unobtrusive measurement strategy. Using an expert survey, we show that the null finding shifted Bayesian posterior beliefs about the treatment’s effectiveness toward zero. The evidence thus casts doubt on two popular hypothesized instrumental drivers of political activism—voter persuasion and career concerns—and points toward expressive benefits as more plausible motives. |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:274&r=cdm |