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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Brian Duricy |
| Abstract: | This paper formalizes the lattice structure of the ballot voters cast in a ranked-choice election and the preferences that this structure induces. These preferences are shown to be counter to previous assumptions about the preferences of voters, which indicate that ranked-choice elections require different considerations for voters and candidates alike. While this model assumes that voters vote sincerely, the model of ranked-choice elections this paper presents allows for considerations of strategic voting in future work. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2301.02697&r=cdm |
| By: | Shuguang Jiang (Centre for Economic Research, Shandong University, Jinan, Shandong, 250100, China); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE UMR 5824, 93 Chemin des Mouilles, F-69130, Ecully, France. IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We study cheating as a collective-risk social dilemma in a group setting in which individuals are asked to report their actual outcomes. Misreporting their outcomes increases the individual’s earnings but when the sum of claims in the group reaches a certain threshold, a risk of collective sanction affects all the group members, regardless of their individual behavior. Because of the pursuit of selfish interest and a lack of coordination with other group members, the vast majority of individuals eventually earn less than the reservation payoff from honest reporting in the group. Over time, most groups are trapped in a “Tragedy of Dishonesty", despite the presence of moral costs of lying. The risk of collective sanction is triggered less frequently in small groups than in large ones, while priming a collectivist mindset has little effect on lying. |
| Keywords: | Dishonesty, Public Bad, Group Size, Collectivism, Individualism, Experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D01 D91 D62 H41 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2216&r=cdm |
| By: | Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp; Gänßle, Sophia; Budzinski, Oliver |
| Abstract: | Experts' voting behavior is conjectured to be more objective than peer voting (own group/peers) and public voters (everyone interested), who are supposedly influenced by all sorts of subjective aspects. We examine differences in voting behavior between these groups by analyzing the voting outcomes for all-star teams in American Football. This paper analyzes the impact of performance as well as non-performance markers and team effects on the voting outcome. It contains a comparative analysis across the mentioned groups to elaborate on differences. The econometric analysis uses unbalanced panel data of All-Pro and Pro Bowl player selections over 78 seasons (1951-2019). It applies panel probit regression to assess the impact of the markers on the outcome probability of winning one of the All-Star awards. We find that expert, peer, and public voting show similarities and are partially driven by the same performance and non-performance markers. However, none of the three analyzed voting systems is free from the influence of non-performance markers. We find exposure effects as well as effects from team affiliation in all of them, including in fact expert voting. Positive effects of team success are found in expert and, to a lesser extent, in peer voting. Team-specific effects are found in public voting, providing evidence for partisanship voting by fans. Our results shed doubt on the suspected objectiveness of expert voting. Furthermore, they fortify the notion of public voting being inefficient at identifying objective quality and extend the literature on voting biases among experts, peers, and the general public. |
| Keywords: | Voting Behavior, Voting Bias, Expert Voting, Public Voting, Sports Economics, National Football League, American Football |
| JEL: | D72 Z20 L83 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:170&r=cdm |
| By: | Kemal Kivanc Akoz (Faculty of Economic Sciences, HSE University); Arseniy Samsonov (Research Centre of Quantitative Social and Management Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and Economics) |
| Abstract: | How transparent are informational institutions if their founders have to agree on the design? We analyze a model where several agents bargain over persuasion of a single receiver. We characterize the existence of anagreement that is beneficial for all agents relative to some fixed benchmark information structure, when the preferences of agents are state-independent, and provide sufficient conditions for general preferences. We further show that a beneficial agreement exists if, for every coalition of a fixed size, there is a belief that generates enough surplus for its members. Next, we concentrate on agent-partitional environments, where for each agent there is a state where the informed decision of the receiver benefits her the most. In these environments, we define endorsement rules that fully reveal all such agent-states. Endorsement rules are Pareto efficient when providing information at all agent-states generates enough surplus, and they correspond to a Nash Bargaining solution when the environment is also symmetric. We provide two political economic applications of our model. In a running example, we discuss the implication of our model to bargaining of authoritarian elites over media policy. The last section applies the model to an electoral campaign in a multiparty democracy. |
| Keywords: | Persuasion; Bargaining solution; Efficiency |
| JEL: | C71 D82 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:azp:qsmswp:2301&r=cdm |