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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Salomo Hirvonen (Department of Economics, University of Turku.); Maarit Lassander (Prime Minister's Office, Finland.); Lauri Sääksvuori (Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, Finland.); Janne Tukiainen (Department of Economics, University of Turku.) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a large-scale randomized controlled trial to evaluate the effectiveness of short text messages (SMS) as a tool to mobilize young voters, and thus, ameliorate the stubborn gap in political participation between younger and older citizens. We find that receiving an SMS reminder before the Finnish county elections in 2022 increases the probability of voting among 18-29 year-old voters by 0.9 percentage points. Moreover, we observe that the most simplified message is more effective than messages appealing to expressive or rational motivations to vote. Using comprehensive administrative data and data-driven machine learning methods, we also examine treatment effect heterogeneity and spillover effects. We document that SMS based mobilization of voters does not only reduce existing social inequalities in voting between the age cohorts but also among the young citizens. Moreover, we remarkably find that over 100 percent of the direct treatment effect spilled over to non-treated household members. Our results highlight the importance of understanding spillover effects and treatment effect heterogeneities in the evaluation of get-out-the-vote interventions. |
| Keywords: | Get-out-the-vote, Field experiments, Spillover effects, Voter turnout |
| JEL: | C93 D72 |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp157&r=cdm |
| By: | Herrade Igersheim (BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - AgroParisTech - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg); François Durand (Nokia Bell Labs); Aaron Hamlin (The Center for Election Science, Redding); Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents data from a survey leading up to the 2016 US presidential elections. Participants were asked their opinions about the candidates and were also asked to vote according to three alternative voting rules, in addition to plurality: approval voting, range voting, and instant runoff voting. The participants were split into two groups, one facing a set of four candidates (Clinton, Trump, Johnson, and Stein) and the other a set of nine candidates (the previous four plus Sanders, Cruz, McMullin, Bloomberg, and Castle). The paper studies three issues: (1) How do US voters use these alternative rules? (2) What kinds of candidates, in terms of individual preferences, are favored by which rule? (3) Which rules empirically satisfy the independence of eliminated alternatives? Our results provide evidence that, according to all standard criterion computed on individual preferences, be there utilitarian or of the Condorcet type, the same candidate (Sanders) wins, and that evaluative voting rules such as approval voting and range voting might lead to this outcome, contrary to direct plurality and instant runoff voting (that elects Clinton) and to the official voting rule (that elected Trump). |
| Keywords: | US Presidential election., Approval voting, range voting, instant runoff, strategic voting |
| Date: | 2022–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03926997&r=cdm |
| By: | C.Y. Cyrus Chu (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan); Meng-Yu Liang (Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan) |
| Abstract: | Suppose that people in a capitalist society order policies mainly by comparing their wealth changes induced by various policies. We show that property prices play the role of aligning individual preferences, which naturally modifies the axiom of universal domain of the social decision function. Under reasonable and testable assumptions, we prove that this alignment effect eliminates the possibility of Condorcet Cycles (Condorce 1785) and warrants the transitivity of the majority voting mechanism. Taking away private property will reinstitute Condorcet Cycles, returning the inescapable conclusion of a dictatorial social decision rule, as claimed by Arrow (1951). Our result provides partial support to the practices of voting eligibility tests implemented in many democratic countries. |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sin:wpaper:22-a002&r=cdm |
| By: | Kyriacou, Andreas |
| Abstract: | It has been asserted that clientelism today is weaker in countries that were endowed with impartial public administrations prior to the extension of suffrage because the presence of bureaucratic checks undermines clientelism as a viable political strategy. We empirically examine this claim based on a cross-section of up to 136 countries. While we do not find evidence of a direct link between pre-suffrage impartiality and contemporary clientelism we do find evidence of an indirect effect working through post-suffrage democratic experience. Pre-suffrage impartiality in the guise of impartial public administrations or, more generally, the rule of law, enhances both democratic stability and democratic quality. Experience with democracy in turn helps rein in clientelism by increasing the credibility of programmatic promises thus reducing the need for vote-maximizing politicians to seek political support through clientelistic exchange. |
| Keywords: | sequencing, impartial bureaucracy, rule of law, democratic experience, extension of suffrage |
| JEL: | D72 D73 |
| Date: | 2023–01–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:115910&r=cdm |