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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Lagios, Nicolas (Université Libre de Bruxelles); Meon, Pierre-Guillaume (Free University of Brussels); Tojerow, Ilan (Free University of Brussels) |
| Abstract: | We study the electoral impact of protesting against the far right by investigating the demonstrations held during the 2002 French presidential elections against far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen. Instrumenting rally attendance with rainfall while factoring in that some municipalities never host protests, we find that larger protests reduced both the number of votes for Le Pen and the number of abstentions, while increasing the number of votes for Chirac. Regarding the mechanisms behind these results, we show that protests reduced the social desirability of voting for Le Pen, the support for his policies, and generated spatial spillovers through local media. |
| Keywords: | protest, election, demonstration, far right, populism |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2022–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp15589&r=cdm |
| By: | Duchoslav, Jan; Kenamu, Edwin; Thunde, Jack |
| Abstract: | Do electoral considerations play a role in the targeting of humanitarian transfers? We analyze the targeting of direct cash and food transfers distributed in Malawi in response to an exceptionally poor harvest following a late and erratic rainy season of 2015-16. Combining household survey data on transfers with a remotely sensed measure of drought and with the results of the 2014 and 2019 parliamentary elections, we show that transfers were disproportionately targeted at marginal constituencies. Rather than distributing the transfers based solely on need or mobilizing its tribal base, the government attempted to persuade swing voters to support its candidates in the next elections. We found no evidence that this strategy was successful at increasing the vote of ruling party candidates in subsequent elections. |
| Keywords: | MALAWI; SOUTHERN AFRICA; AFRICA SOUTH OF SAHARA; AFRICA; hunger; cash transfers; political systems; disaster relief; elections; food transfers; political economy; voting |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:masspp:39&r=cdm |
| By: | Gustavo de Souza |
| Abstract: | I describe a structural method to quantify the contribution of different elements of social choice to the level of redistribution. Estimating a DSGE model with microdata on the support for redistribution, I find that if voters disregarded their ideological views on welfare policies, redistribution in the U.S. would increase 117%. Because ideology is a more important determinant of voting behavior than income, increasing voter turnout or capping campaign contributions would have a small effect on redistribution. Among the drivers of ideology, I find that racial animosity and distrust of the government contributes to an 80% and 44% smaller redistribution, respectively. |
| Keywords: | Redistribution; Prefereces for Redistribution; Dynamic Macro Models of Political-Economoy |
| JEL: | E69 H11 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–10–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedhwp:94914&r=cdm |
| By: | Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib Anwar; Jorge Bruno; Sonali SenGupta |
| Abstract: | We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence. Contribution decisions are made by players simultaneously and independently, and the groups' total contribution is made sequentially. We try to capture both inter and intra-group behaviors and analyze different situations where players observe partial history about total contributions of their predecessor groups. Given this framework, we show that even when players observe a history of defection (no contribution), a cooperative outcome is achievable. This is particularly interesting in the situation when players observe only their immediate predecessor groups' contribution, where we observe that players play an important role in motivating others to contribute. |
| Date: | 2022–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2210.08328&r=cdm |
| By: | Niklas Potrafke; Felix Roesel |
| Abstract: | Does social media or offline social cohesion overcome collective action problems more effectively when both types of networks are prevalent? We investigate non-violent protests against a place-based economic reform in Austria—a country where one in two citizens uses Facebook but also one in two citizens is a member of a local club or civic organization. Our results show that protests spread more in places with strong offline networks as measured by real-life networks like village, folklore, or dialect clubs. We do not find that social media penetration intensifies local protests, a finding corroborated by microdata. |
| Keywords: | online and offline networks, social media, social cohesion, civic organizations, social capital, protest, economic reform, populism |
| JEL: | D71 D72 Z20 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9969&r=cdm |
| By: | Chatterjee, Sidharta |
| Abstract: | The goal of this paper is to examine and analyze how certain factors influence our social decision making process. I undertake an investigative study into the dynamics of rational choice theory which is behind making decisions rationally productive. The research touches on the foundational concepts of Social Choice Rationality—the theory that is grounded on searching and making choices socially rational for the decision maker. The welfare functional component of social choice theory underlying rational decision making have been examined, and new knowledge have been derived from the analysis that could be helpful for making collective decisions which concern public policy and social welfare. |
| Keywords: | Decision choice, rational choice theory, rational intelligence, social choice theory, social choice rationality. |
| JEL: | I3 I30 I31 |
| Date: | 2022–10–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:114985&r=cdm |