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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Gradwohl, Ronen; Heller, Yuval; Hillman, Arye |
| Abstract: | We study the ability of a social media platform with a political agenda to influence voting outcomes. Our benchmark is Condorcet’s jury theorem, which states that the likelihood of a correct decision under majority voting increases with the number of voters. We show how information manipulation by a social media platform can overturn the jury theorem, thereby undermining democracy. We also show that sometimes the platform can do so only by providing information that is biased in the opposite direction of its preferred outcome. Finally, we compare manipulation of voting outcomes through social media to manipulation through traditional media. |
| Keywords: | Bayesian persuasion; Political agenda; Information manipulation; Condorcet Jury Theorem; Biased signals |
| JEL: | D72 D82 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–06–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:113609&r= |
| By: | Wenpin Tang; David D. Yao |
| Abstract: | We propose and study a new class of polynomial voting rules for a general decentralized decision/consensus system, and more specifically for the PoS (Proof of Stake) protocol. The main idea, inspired by the Penrose square-root law and the more recent quadratic voting rule, is to differentiate a voter's voting power and the voter's share (fraction of the total in the system). We show that while voter shares form a martingale process, their voting powers follow a super-martingale that decays to zero over time. This prevents any voter from controlling the voting process, and thus enhances decentralization. When the initial total volume of votes (or stakes) is large, we show a phase transition in share stability (or the lack thereof), corresponding to the voter's initial share relative to the total. We also study the scenario in which trading (of votes/stakes) among the voters is allowed, and quantify the level of risk sensitivity (or risk averse) that will remove any incentive for a voter to trade. |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2206.10105&r= |
| By: | Thomas Le Barbanchon (Bocconi University [Milan, Italy]); Julien Sauvagnat (Bocconi University [Milan, Italy]) |
| Abstract: | Only a quarter of the members of the world's national parliaments are women. Despite significant progress in recent years, women remain largely under-represented among elected politicians. This study provides some explanations for the under-representation of women in politics using data from the past seven French legislative elections. On the one hand, the analyses suggest that there is a preference bias among voters towards male candidates. In addition, political parties contribute to reproducing the under-representation of women in elected office by running fewer female candidates in constituencies where voter bias is high. To promote women's access to political office, the 2000 law to promote equal access of women and men to electoral mandates and elective offices, also known as the parity law, requires French political parties to nominate women as 50% of their candidates or face financial penalties. As expected, the application of this law has led to an increase in the proportion of women candidates. However, this proportion is relatively lower in electoral districts where the vote is close compared to those where a majority is more easily obtained. In these competitive districts, paying a fine for not complying with the parity rule is more advantageous than the risk of losing the election by running a woman rather than a man. This suggests that parties still prefer to put forward male rather than female candidates to increase their chances of winning. |
| Date: | 2022–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03693445&r= |
| By: | Victor Ginsburgh (ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium); Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide;) |
| Abstract: | We analyze and evaluate the rules and results at the 2021 Eurovision Song Contest. We first concentrate on the various voting procedures, and explore several alternatives (inspired by classical contributions in social choice and game theory) that could make a difference for the results. We also discuss other important issues, such as simplicity, contrast effects and whether experts are better judges than tele-voters. Our findings raise the question of whether the voting procedures used by the Eurovision Song Contest authorities are fail-safe. We endorse instead the use of the so-called Shapley voting procedure for judges as well as tele-voters. |
| Keywords: | Eurovision Song Contest, Voting, Borda, Shapley Method, Biases |
| JEL: | I10 I14 |
| Date: | 2022 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:22.09&r= |
| By: | Lia Q. Flores (School of Economics and Management, University of Porto); Miguel A. Fonseca (University of Exeter and NIPE, Universidade do Minho) |
| Abstract: | Is the phenomenon of people overestimating their skill relative to their peers (overplacement) exacerbated by group affiliation? Social identity theory predicts people evaluate in-group members more positively than out-group members, and we hypothesized that this differential treatment may result in greater overplacement when interacting with an out-group member. We tested this hypothesis with 301 US voters affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic party in the run-up to the 2020 Presidential election, a time when political identities were salient and highly polarized. We found there is a higher tendency for overplacement when faced with an out-group opponent than with an in-group opponent. Decomposition analysis suggests this difference is due to underestimating the opponent, as opposed to overestimating one's own performance to a higher degree. Moreover, any tendency to incur in overplacement is mitigated when faced with an opponent with the same political identity relative to one with a neutral one. Group affiliation biases initial priors, and that effect is unchanged when participants are asked to update their beliefs. |
| Keywords: | Overconfidence; Belief updating; Motivated beliefs; Overplacement; Social identity; Political affiliation; Competition |
| JEL: | E62 I31 I38 O30 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:cetedp:2202&r= |
| By: | Francesco Campo; Sara Giunti; Mariapia Mendola |
| Abstract: | This paper examines how the 2014-2017 ‘Refugee Crisis’ in Italy affected voting behavior and the rise of right–wing populism in national Parliamentary elections. We collect novel administrative data across all Italian municipalities and leverage exogenous variation in refugee resettlement induced by the Dispersal Policy. We find a positive and significant effect of the share of asylum seekers on support for radical-right anti-immigration parties. The effect is heterogeneous across municipality characteristics, yet robust to dispersal policy features. We provide causal evidence that the anti–immigration backlash is not rooted in adverse economic effects, while it is triggered by radical–right propaganda. |
| Keywords: | Immigration, Refugee Crisis, Voting Behavior, Dispersal Policy, Propaganda. |
| JEL: | D72 F22 O15 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mib:wpaper:495&r= |
| By: | Alweena Hasan (MPhil Scholar, PIDE); Abdul Khaliq (MPhil Scholar, PIDE) |
| Abstract: | This book preeminently focuses on understanding the Pakistani voters particularly the rural voters in depth. The book is revolving around the voting behavior of the rural people: why they vote and what they think about it. Most of the literature on Pakistan revealed that the rural voters are very constrained in terms of ability to consent as leaders and inclusion. |
| Keywords: | Crafty Oligarchs, Savvy Voters, Democracy, Rural, Pakistan, |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pid:wbrief:2021:32&r= |
| By: | Alberto Grillo (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université); Eva Raiber (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université) |
| Abstract: | Belgian and Swiss media regularly interfere during French elections by releasing exit polls before polling stations close. These foreign media profit from a law forbidding the same behavior by their French counterparts to receive large inflows of web visits from France. We exploit the unusual timing and degree of confidence with which exit polls were released in the second round of the 2017 presidential elections to investigate their effect on voter turnout. Our analysis is based on comparing turnout rates at different times on the election day, in the first and second round, and with respect to previous elections. We find a significant decrease in turnout of around 3 to 4 percentage points after the exit polls' publication which is suggestive of a causal effect, although similar trends were observed in previous elections. The effect is stronger in departments close to the Belgian border shortly after the release of the exit polls. We do not find clear evidence that either candidate benefited from the decrease in turnout, yet we cannot exclude the presence of a small underdog effect which reduced the winning margin by around 1 percentage point. |
| Keywords: | underdog effect,voter turnout,exit polls,bandwagon effect |
| Date: | 2022–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03670002&r= |
| By: | Markus Jokela (Department of Psychology and Logopedics, University of Helsinki.); Jaakko Meriläinen (Centro de Investigación Económica and Department of Economics, ITAM.); Janne Tukiainen (Department of Economics, University of Turku; VATT Institute for Economic Research.); Åsa von Schoultz (Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki.) |
| Abstract: | We present the first comprehensive evidence on the role of cognitive ability and personality traits in the selection of electoral candidates and election of politicians. Using unique data that combine population registers and election statistics from local government elections in Finland with tests of cognitive and non-cognitive ability of men administered by the Finnish Defense Forces, we document two main findings. First, political parties select candidates who fare better than the office-eligible population in both intelligence and personality tests that capture three dimensions of cognitive and seven dimensions of non-cognitive ability. Second, elected politicians possess more desirable traits than nonelected candidates. Our results show that a voter-oriented open-list system is able to select competent, motivated, and honest representatives. We also assess the relative importance of cognitive abilities and personality traits, present evidence of no trade-offs between politician quality and descriptive representation, and illustrate that political competition may be an important contextual factor shaping selection. |
| Keywords: | candidate entry, cognitive ability, election, open-list PR system, personality, political selection |
| JEL: | D72 J24 |
| Date: | 2022–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp152&r= |