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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Dimitrios Xefteris; Nicholas Ziros |
| Abstract: | This paper studies electoral competition between two non-ideological parties when voters are free to trade votes for money. We find that allowing for vote trading has significant policy consequences, even if trade does not actually take place in equilibrium. In particular, the parties' equilibrium platforms are found to converge (hence, there is no reason for vote trading) to the ideal policy of the mid-range voter, instead of converging to the peak of the median voter (as they do when vote trading is forbidden). That is, a market for votes may not change the outcome only by redistributing the political power among voters when the parties' policy proposals are fixed (e.g., Casella, Llorente-Saguer, and Palfrey, 2012, etc.), but also by acting as an invisible hand - modifying parties' incentives when platform choice is endogenous. |
| Keywords: | Electoral competition; invisible hand; vote markets; mid-range voter; Downsian model |
| JEL: | D72 |
| Date: | 2022–05–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:05-2022&r= |
| By: | Lucie Coufalová (Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic); Štěpán Mikula (Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic) |
| Abstract: | The effect of ranking and the effect of attention both increase the chances that candidates running in the top positions of electoral lists will win voters’ support. We exploit a variation in ballot layout (the location of the break between the first and second sides of the ballot) in the 2006–2017 Czech parliamentary elections to disentangle these effects and identify the effect of attention. We show that being listed on the reverse side of the ballot paper decreases electoral support by at least 50 %. |
| Keywords: | voting behavior; attention; preferential voting; Czech parliamentary elections |
| JEL: | D72 D91 P16 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mub:wpaper:2022-08&r= |
| By: | Pedro Molina Ogeda; Emanuel Ornelas; Rodrigo R. Soares |
| Abstract: | We show that the Brazilian trade liberalization in the early 1990s led to a permanent relative decline in the vote share of left-wing presidential candidates in the regions more affected by the tariff cuts. This happened even though the shock, implemented by a right-wing party, induced a contraction in manufacturing and formal employment in the more affected regions, and despite the left's identification with protectionist policies. To rationalize this response, we consider a new institutional channel for the political effects of trade shocks: the weakening of labor unions. We provide support for this mechanism in two steps. First, we show that union presence-proxied by the number of workers directly employed by unions, by union density, and by the number of union establishments-declined in regions that became more exposed to foreign competition. Second, we show that the negative effect of tariff reductions on the votes for the left was driven exclusively by political parties with historical links to unions. Furthermore, the impact of the trade liberalization on the vote share of these parties was significant only in regions that had unions operating before the reform. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that tariff cuts reduced the vote share of the left partly through the weakening of labor unions. This institutional channel is fundamentally different from the individual-level responses, motivated by economic or identity concerns, that have been considered in the literature. |
| Keywords: | trade shocks, elections, unions, Brazil |
| Date: | 2021–11–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1816&r= |
| By: | Carolina Concha-Arriagada (Department of Economics, Georgetown University); J.J. Naddeo (Department of Economics, Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | The extant literature suggests that precipitation—mainly in the form of rainfall—has a significant impact on electoral outcomes. This paper adds to this literature by investigating an understudied dimension of weather—sunshine. Using novel daily weather measurements from satellites, linked to county-level U.S. Presidential electoral returns from 1948-2016, we document how sunshine affects the decision-making of voters. We find that election-day exposure to sunshine increases support for the Democratic party on average. Additionally, we show that, contrary to prior findings that do not control for sunshine, precipitation has no detectable impact on partisan support, but universally depresses turnout. To rationalize our results we propose a mechanism whereby sunshine modulates voter mood which causes a change in voter choice, while precipitation only impacts turnout by increasing the cost of voting. We then build a theoretical model, which features this mechanism, and generates additional tests that we take to our data. Our results suggest that uninformative weather on election day, specifically sunshine, have detectable electoral impacts that teach us about voter choice. Classification- D7, D9, P1 |
| Keywords: | U.S. presidential elections, rainfall, weather, electoral outcomes, turnout, mood, voter choice, risk aversion, sunshine |
| Date: | 2022–03–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~22-22-02&r= |
| By: | Abbas Moosvi (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics) |
| Abstract: | With three long dictatorial regimes, frequent allegations of electoral rigging, dynastic parties, and an ever-expanding state with limited class mobility, Pakistan’s political landscape has consistently failed to meet the desires of ordinary people. This paper intends to outline the pitfalls of the electoral system through a three-tiered analysis of law, party behaviour, and potential technical interventions that may reshape the incentive structures guiding contestations for political power—thus leading to enhanced levels of political representation for citizens. |
| Keywords: | Electoral, Politics, Pakistan, Law, Parties, Innovation |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pid:kbrief:2021:45&r= |
| By: | Adar, Sinem; Seufert, Günter |
| Abstract: | Turkey's new Presidential System has failed to realise the goals that it was said to achieve with its introduction despite the disapproval of half the population. Contrary to the ruling party's claims in favour of the new governance system, two and a half years after its introduction, parliament is weaker, separation of powers is undermined, the judiciary is politicised, institutions are crippled, economic woes are mounting and authoritarian practices prevail. Despite the almost unlimited and unchecked power that the new system grants to the President over institutions, his space for political manoeuvre is, surprisingly, narrower than it was in the parliamentary system. Providing the otherwise divided opposition a joint anchor of resistance, the Presidential System unintentionally breathed life into the inertia of Turkey's political party setting. The formation of splinter parties from the ruling party, primarily addressing the same conservative electorate, alongside the changing electoral logic with the need to form alliances to win an election, poses a serious challenge to the ruling party and its leader - the President. Despite the oppositional alliance's electoral victory in 2019 local elections, it is at the moment unclear whether the forming parties share a common vision for steps towards democratic repair. Together with the institutional havoc caused by the Presidential System, the blurry outlook of the opposition requires caution about an easy and rapid positive transformation. While the European Union should be realistic in regard to expectations towards democratic reform, it should also strike a balance between cooperation in areas of mutual benefit and confronting Ankara when necessary to protect the interests of the European Union and its member states. |
| Keywords: | Bilateral international relations |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:swprps:22021&r= |
| By: | Franz Dietrich (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Kai Spiekermann (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science) |
| Abstract: | Does pre-voting group deliberation increase majority competence? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is bene…cial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Simulations and theoretic arguments confirrm this. But there are five systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing failure (1). Our analysis recommends deliberation that is 'participatory', 'even', but possibly 'unequal', i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but possibly privileges some persons. |
| Keywords: | jury theorems,group deliberation,social choice theory,majority voting |
| Date: | 2022–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-03667931&r= |
| By: | Miquel-Florensa, Josepa; Joseph, George |
| Abstract: | We present a lab-in-the-field experiment with employees of the Addis Ababa Water and Sanitation Authority with the aim to understand how to improve coordination and collaboration in their daily crew work. Par-ticipants play a series of public good games under different rules: standard game, with identifiable set of partners, game with threshold, and game with a randomly selected anonymous leader with the power to punish. We show that a common goal, in the form of a threshold to be attained for the group success, is significantly more effective than a potentially pun-ishing leader to increase individual effort and ultimately group outcomes. This result advocates for the introduction of team goals as coordination and motivation devices in settings where tasks are performed by groups and are subject to free-riding and coordination challenges. |
| JEL: | J45 M50 O12 |
| Date: | 2022–05–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:126939&r= |
| By: | Bruno Castanho Silva (Cologne Center for Comparative Politics); Jens Wäckerle; Christopher Wratil |
| Abstract: | Western powers have discussed and implemented several policies in response to the full scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. One such possible answer was an immediate embargo on all Russian energy exports to the EU. While seen as a strong measure against Russia's war effort, some EU governments were unenthusiastic, due to potential negative economic impacts on the short run, by pressuring prices for consumers and fueling inflation. Public opinion also seemed divided on the matter. We use a framing survey experiment in Germany (n = 3,251) to test what factors influence support for an immediate embargo against Russian energy. Results indicate that out of seven possible frames tested, the only one that has an effect on embargo support is whether the rest of the German public is in favor or not. Results are in line with contemporary models of public opinion formation and legitimacy, and shed light on the conditions that may help framing other potentially costly issues to garner public support, such as measures to tackle climate change. |
| Keywords: | public opinion; survey experiment; Russian energy embargo; foreign policy; Ukraine war |
| JEL: | D91 |
| Date: | 2022–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:170&r= |
| By: | Sirini Jeudy-Hugo (OECD); Leon Charles |
| Abstract: | This paper explores modalities, enablers, and political moments that could help to translate the outputs of the global stocktake (GST) into an outcome that informs and enhances national and international actions as intended in the Paris Agreement. How to move from the collective outputs of the GST to desired outcomes is critical but not straightforward. Drawing on lessons learnt from previous international assessment and review processes under the UNFCCC and beyond, this paper sets out insights on modalities, outputs and enabling factors that could help ensure the GST leads to action on the ground. The paper concludes that achieving the outcomes of the GST requires a well-designed process that effectively engages Parties and non-Party stakeholders in separate but sequenced technical and political discussion tracks. The paper also finds that specific, actionable outputs that target different actors can facilitate subsequent follow-up. The paper identifies different enabling factors that could support the translation of GST outputs formulated at the collective level into national processes to update and enhance actions and support. It also highlights the importance of leveraging different political moments and building linkages with parallel processes, both within and outside the UNFCCC context, to maintain momentum on the GST and ensure operational action follows over time so that collective efforts are in line with the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. |
| Keywords: | Climate change, Global stocktake, LT-LEDS, NDCs, Outcomes, Outputs, Paris Agreement, UNFCCC |
| JEL: | Q54 Q56 Q58 F53 |
| Date: | 2022–05–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:envaab:2022/01-en&r= |
| By: | Dan Cao (Department of Economics, Georgetown University); Roger Lagunoff (Department of Economics, Georgetown University); Yingqi Xu (Department of Economics, Georgetown University) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the dynamic connections between wealth inequality and political decisions at the local level. We model a jurisdiction consisting of a politically dominant group and a marginalized one. At each date, the dominant group tries to appropriate ownership claims on productive assets. If its claims are legally challenged, the default outcome is determined by a right of possession (ROP) principle. Despite the ROP's assurance of equal protection, the jurisdiction systematically redistributes property claims toward the dominant group. The jurisdiction appropriates wealth by leveraging common assets - those that generate non-exclusive consumption flows - using zoning, takings, or NIMBY policies. We examine how this leverage varies across time and depends on whether a common asset is a public asset (generating benefits for all) or a NIMBY (generating benefits for the dominant group while harming the marginalized one). Finally, ROPs that prioritize some assets over others can exacerbate inequality. |
| Keywords: | Property assignment, wealth appropriation, right of possession, private, public, and NIMBY assets, zoning, takings, Dynamic Samuelson condition, asset durability and prioritization |
| JEL: | C73 D31 D78 H13 P48 R52 |
| Date: | 2022–05–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~22-22-07&r= |