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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Yukihiro Nishimura (Corresponding author. Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University); Kimiko Terai (Faculty of Economics, Keio University) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the political process of tax competition among asymmetric countries, highlighting the role of the commitment to the electoral promises. The median voters deliberately elect a delegate whose preferences di?er from their own (strategic delegation), which is self-enforcing under symmetric countries. We ?rst show that the outcome of strategic delegation is replicated when the candidates do not make binding campaign promises in both countries, and the opposite scenario of the binding commitments to the platforms leads to the self-representation by the median voters. We then amplify the model by adding the pre-election stage where the citizens choose whether the credibility of election promises is critical, through subscription numbers of newspapers and social media which determine the cost of betrayal of the proposed platforms (or the lack of the proposal). We then show that, depending on the type of asymmetries under consideration, su?cient asymmetry or su?ciently equal income distribution generate the commitment to the election campaign promises as the equilibrium outcome. |
| Keywords: | Capital-tax competition; Election campaign promises; Asymmetric countries; Voting |
| JEL: | C72 D72 D78 H23 H87 |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2021r&r= |
| By: | Maxime Couvert (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne; Swiss Finance Institute) |
| Abstract: | Mutual funds must publish policies announcing how they generally vote on the different ballot items at the shareholder meetings of their portfolio firms. I manually collect 17,000 of these policies for a sample of 29 of the largest U.S. mutual fund families over 2006-2018. I find that voting policies are a major predictor of funds' voting behavior. Exploiting staggered changes in funds' voting policies, I show that investee companies adopt their mutual fund shareholders' preferred governance provisions. This adoption is the result of mutual fund shareholders' active voting. Announced voting policies also stimulate strategic proposal submissions by non-mutual fund shareholders. |
| Keywords: | Corporate governance, corporate social responsibility, proxy voting, mutual funds |
| JEL: | G20 G23 G30 G34 M14 Q56 |
| Date: | 2021–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp2142&r= |
| By: | Irene Maria Buso; Daniela Di Cagno; Werner Güth; Lorenzo Spadoni |
| Abstract: | Contributors to public goods with individual commitment power decide before voluntarily contributing, whether and when to join the (sub)group whose partners equally share the cost of their contributions. We analyse the voluntary formation of the cost sharing partnership, when it is internally (no partner wants to opt out) and externally (no outsider wants to opt in) stable, and how (un)stable partnerships affect contribution behaviour. All contributors decide between joining and not joining for all possible conditions before learning in which random sequence individual contributors successively enter or not the partnership. After being informed about whether there is no partnership and, when there is one, how many belong to it, and whether one is partner or outsider, all group members independently contribute. So participants can freeride not only by abstaining from voluntary contributions, but also by not joining the partnership. Theoretically participants would form a stable cost sharing partnership whose partners (outsiders) contribute maximally (minimally); experimental evidece shows that hardly any such benchmark behavior exists. Instead we confirm a strong inclination to join the partnership to avoid or at least weaken freeridng incentives. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous Public Good, Group Formation, Group Size. |
| JEL: | C92 H41 D85 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lui:cesare:2101&r= |
| By: | ENDO Yuya; ONO Yoshikuni |
| Abstract: | What stereotypes do Japanese voters have regarding men and women politicians? Women are extremely underrepresented in Japanese politics, and one possible reason for the underrepresentation is that voters have gender-based stereotypes that put women candidates at a disadvantage. Numerous studies have revealed the gender stereotypes of voters in the United States, but little is known whether Japanese voters have similar stereotypes as those found in the United Sates. In order to clarify gender stereotypes in the context of Japanese politics, we conducted a survey of approximately 3,000 Japanese voters in March 2020, employing the same questions and question format as used in a study conducted in the United States. Our results revealed similar stereotypes for men and women politicians regarding policy areas of expertise and salient personal characteristics as those found in the United States. We also found that gender stereotypes were shared among women voters as well as men voters, and that they varied by age and party support. These results are important because if gender stereotypes have any influence on voter decisions, then candidates and politicians may try to achieve the best results by acting in line with the stereotypes of their target constituencies to maximize their electoral support. |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:21061&r= |
| By: | Daron Acemoglu (Massachusetts Institute of Technology); Toumas Pekkarinen (Aalto University School of Business); Kjell Salvanes (Norges Handelshøyskole); Matti Sarvimäki (Aalto University School of Business) |
| Abstract: | Upon assuming power for the first time in 1935, the Norwegian Labour Party delivered on its promise for a major schooling reform. The reform raised minimum instruction time in less developed rural areas and boosted the resources available to rural schools, reducing class size and increasing teacher salaries. We document that cohorts more intensively affected by the reform significantly increased their education and experienced higher labor income. Our main result is that the schooling reform also substantially increased support for the Norwegian Labour Party in subsequent elections. This additional support persisted for several decades and was pivotal in maintaining support for the social democratic coalition in Norway. These results are not driven by the direct impact of education and are not explained by higher turnout, or greater attention or resources from the Labour Party targeted towards the municipalities most affected by the reform. Rather, our evidence suggests that cohorts that benefited from the schooling reform, and their parents, rewarded the party for delivering a major reform that was beneficial to them. |
| Keywords: | education, human capital, labor, schooling reforms, social democracy, voting |
| JEL: | P16 I28 J26 |
| Date: | 2021–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hka:wpaper:2021-040&r= |
| By: | Przepiorka, Wojtek; Andreas, Diekmann |
| Abstract: | Why do people adorn themselves with elaborate body piercings or tattoos, wear obstructing garbs, engage in life-threatening competitions and other wasteful and harmful but socially stipulated practices? Norms of cooperation and coordination, which promote the efficient attainment of collective benefits, can be explained by theories of collective action. However, social norms prescribing wasteful and harmful behaviours have eluded such explanations. We argue that signalling theory constitutes the basis for the understanding of the emergence of such norms, which we call signalling norms. Signalling norms emerge as a result of the uncertainty about who is friend and who is foe. The need to overcoming this uncertainty arises when different groups compete for scarce resources and individuals must be able to identify, trust and cooperate with their fellow group members. After reviewing the mechanisms that explain the emergence of cooperation and coordination norms, we introduce the notion of signalling norms as markers of group distinction. We argue that adherence to signalling norms constitutes a commitment promoting parochial cooperation rather than a quality-revealing signal facilitating partner choice. We formalize our argument in a game-theoretic model that allows us to specify the boundary conditions for the emergence of signalling norms. Our paper concludes with a discussion of potential applications of our model and a comparison of signalling norms with related concepts. |
| Date: | 2021–07–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:9tg2f&r= |
| By: | Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand |
| Abstract: | We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of a social good with positive effort complementarities (social effort). Agents differ in their motivation to exert social effort. Our model predicts that lowering incentives for selfish effort in one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results show that social good production more than doubles in the lowincentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our analysis highlights the important role of incentives in the matching of motivated agents engaged in social good production. |
| Keywords: | incentives,intrinsic motivation,self-selection,public service |
| JEL: | C91 D90 J24 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:318&r= |