|
on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Grund, Christian (RWTH Aachen University); Harbring, Christine (RWTH Aachen University); Thommes, Kirsten (University of Paderborn); Tilkes, Katja Rebecca (RWTH Aachen University) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally analyze whether the opportunity to receive a permanent contract motivates temporary group members in a public good setting and how this affects the other group members. We compare an exogenous and an endogenous decision mechanism to extend the temporary agent's group membership. The exogenous mechanism to extend the contract is modeled by a random draw. In the endogenous setting, one other group member decides about the temporary agent's future group membership. Our results reveal that both — the decision to extend a contract and the decision mechanism itself — affect not only the temporary group member's effort but also the efforts of the permanent group members and, ultimately, also cooperation within the group after the decision has been made. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, experiments, groups, public good games, teams, temporary employment |
| JEL: | C9 M5 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12513&r=all |
| By: | Eric Kamwa (LC2S - Laboratoire caribéen de sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UA - Université des Antilles); Issofa Moyouwou (MASS - Université de Yaoundé I [Yaoundé], Université de Yaoundé I [Yaoundé]) |
| Abstract: | A voting rule is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox if some voter may favor the election of a more preferable outcome by listing only part of his sincere ranking on the competing candidates than listing his entire preference ranking on all the competing candidates (Brams, 1982, Fishburn and Brams, 1983). For three-candidate elections and for large electorates, this paper provides under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), an evaluation of the likelihood of the truncation paradox the whole family of the scoring rules and runoff scoring rules. |
| Date: | 2019–07–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02185965&r=all |
| By: | Antoinette Baujard (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Muriel Gilardone (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Our paper offers a novel reading of Sen's idea of justice, beyond the standard prisms imposed by theories of justice-resting on external normative criteria-and formal welfarism-involving the definition of individual welfare and its aggregation. Instead we take seriously Sen's emphasis on personal agency and focus on his original contribution to the issue of objectivity. Firstly, we demonstrate that Sen's idea of justice, with at its core "positional views", is more respectful of persons' agency than would be a theory based on individual preference or capability. Secondly, we argue that Sen's conception of objectivity considers that both information and sentiments are relative to a position. Such an alternative approach to subjectivity allows the formation of more impartial views through collective deliberation and a better consideration of justice by agents themselves. |
| Keywords: | Individual preferences,positional objectivity,sentiments,public reasoning,agency,justice |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02190946&r=all |
| By: | Espín, Antonio M.; Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Gamella, Juan; Herrmann, Benedikt; Martin, Jesus |
| Abstract: | Humans often punish non-cooperators in one-shot interactions among genetically-unrelated individuals. So-called altruistic punishment poses an evolutionary puzzle because it enforces a cooperation norm that benefits the whole group, but is costly for the punisher. Under the “big mistake” (or “mismatch”) hypothesis, social behavior such as punishment evolved by individual selection at a time when repeated interactions with kin prevailed. It then misfired in modern humans, who “mistakenly” apply it in sporadic interactions with unrelated individuals. In contrast, cultural group selection theories emphasize cultural differences in normative behavior and the role of intergroup competition and punishment for the emergence of large-scale cooperation in the absence of genetic relatedness. We conducted a series of multilateral-cooperation economic experiments with a sample of Spanish Romani people (Gitanos), who represent a unique cultural group to test the predictions of the two accounts: Gitano communities rely heavily on close kin-based networks, maintain high consanguinity rates and display a particularly strong sense of ethnic identity. A total of 320 Gitano and non-Gitano (i.e., the majority Spanish population) participants played a one-shot public goods game with punishment in either ethnically homogeneous or ethnically mixed (half Gitano and half non-Gitano) four-person groups. In the homogeneous groups, punishment was commonly used by non-Gitanos but virtually inexistent among Gitanos. In the mixed groups, however, Gitanos who did not cooperate were severely punished by other Gitanos, but also by non-Gitanos (particularly males in both cases). The results are more consistent with cultural group selection and also qualify some of its predictions. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, punishment, Gypsy/Roma, ethnicity, culture, evolution |
| JEL: | C93 H41 J71 Z13 |
| Date: | 2019–07–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:95423&r=all |
| By: | Anelli, Massimo (Bocconi University); Colantone, Italo (Bocconi University); Stanig, Piero (Bocconi University) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the impact of robot adoption on electoral outcomes in 14 Western European countries, between 1993 and 2016. We employ both official election results at the district level and individual-level voting data, combined with party ideology scores from the Manifesto Project. We measure exposure to automation both at the regional level, based on the ex-ante industry specialization of each region, and at the individual level, based on individual characteristics and pre-sample employment patterns in the region of residence. We instrument robot adoption in each country using the pace of robot adoption in other countries. Higher exposure to robot adoption is found to increase support for nationalist and radicalright parties. Unveiling some potential transmission channels, higher robot exposure at the individual level leads to poorer perceived economic conditions andwell-being, lower satisfaction with the government and democracy, and a reduction in perceived political self-efficacy. |
| Keywords: | automation, nationalism, radical right |
| JEL: | D72 J23 J24 O33 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12485&r=all |
| By: | Emma von Essen (Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University); Marieke Huysentruyt (Strategy and Business Policy, HEC Paris, and SITE, Stockholm School of Economics); Topi Miettinen (Department of Economics, Hanken School of Economics, Helsinki, and SITE, Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes a two-person, two-stage model of sequential exploration, where both information and payoff externalities exist, and tests the derived hypotheses in the laboratory. We theoretically show that even when agents are self-interested and perfectly rational, the information externality induces an encouragement effect: a positive effect of first-player exploration on the optimality of the second-player exploring as well. When agents have other-regarding preferences and imperfectly optimize, the encouragement effect is strongest. The explorative nature of the game raises the expected surplus compared to a payoff equivalent public goods game. We empirically confirm our main theoretical predictions using a novel experimental paradigm. Our findings are relevant for motivating and managing groups and teams innovating not only for private but also, and especially so, for public goods. |
| Keywords: | Economics: Behavior and Behavioral Decision Making, Economics: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory, Economics: Microeconomic Behavior, Industrial Organization: Firm Objectives, Organization and Behavior, Decision analysis: Sequential |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D03 D83 O31 |
| Date: | 2019–08–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aah:aarhec:2019-10&r=all |
| By: | Naoki FUJIWARA (Associate Professor, Faculty of Regional Development Studies, Otemon Gakuin University, Osaka, Japan) |
| Abstract: | Urbanization has progressed in parallel with rapid economic development in Asia, and people living in the region’s megacities face severe urban environmental problems, with the water-environment problem being especially serious. Such cities must develop the infrastructure to provide clean water and process sewage in densely populated areas. Meanwhile, water-supply and sewerage services in Japan are conducted by municipalities as a public service, but their revenues are shrinking in response to a decreasing birthrate, an aging population, and the waterconservation movement. In this study, we investigated the overseas expansion of Japanese public water services as an effort to improve the living environment in developing Asian countries and to advance the sustainability of public water services. The research methods included scrutinizing preliminary research, conducting case studies through text analysis of materials issued by national and local governments, and conducting interviews with municipalities. We examined four urban municipal water services, including ones in Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, and Kitakyushu, that developed publicprivate cooperative platform associations for expanding abroad. As a result of the research, we first identified the overseas expansion of public water services as a collaborative model—based on an international inter-city network—for solving urban problems. Japan’s water-related public and private sectors have a motivation to share their technologies and experiences of solving urban waterrelated environmental problems with the growing cities of Asia, but it is difficult for Japanese public water services to sustain a unilateral contribution to developing countries because their business environment is becoming less hospitable in a shrinking domestic market. Therefore, with national governmental support, major municipal water services in Japan have aimed to expand their business abroad to achieve regional economic development, relying on trust based on the solidarity and cooperation of the international cities to reduce the transaction cost of international water-related project development. Second, we clarify that the public-private cooperative platform established by the leadership of municipalities enhances the accountability and transparency of the overseas expansion projects of public water services. Municipalities hold themselves accountable to be fair to citizens and stakeholders. The Public and private cooperative platform established by Japanese public water service, as an intermediate organization, not only develops the implementation capacity but also strengthens accountability and transparency of the international public water service 5 expansion projects’ sharing information about the water-environment problems of each cities and selecting project partner companies. Third, we find that the international city networks that municipalities build are evolving from one-to-one mutual networks to multilateral networks. To date, municipalities have developed international sister-city networks that centered more on cultural and educational administrative exchanges. Recent years, however, have witnessed the rise of more pragmatic city networks that focus on problem-solving city liaisons. Municipalities are realizing the efficiency of mutual project-making and of participating in international associations or organizations of cities for specific purposes. They even organize international meetings or conferences at which they seek business partner cities, promote their environment technologies to their region, and enhance their brand images as regional technology hubs. |
| Keywords: | cooperative platform, accountability, multilateral network |
| JEL: | L32 R11 R58 |
| Date: | 2019–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crc:wpaper:1909&r=all |
| By: | Fehrler, Sebastian (University of Konstanz); Schneider, Maik T. (University of Bath) |
| Abstract: | Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to lobbies’ willingness to pay and legislators’ preferences. Most of these results carry over to the simultaneous-move set-up but the predictive power of the model declines. |
| Keywords: | legislative lobbying, vote-buying, Colonel Blotto, multi-battleeld contests, experimental political economy |
| JEL: | C92 D72 |
| Date: | 2019–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12477&r=all |
| By: | Sida Peng |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a new method to identify leaders and followers in a network. Prior works use spatial autoregression models (SARs) which implicitly assume that each individual in the network has the same peer effects on others. Mechanically, they conclude the key player in the network to be the one with the highest centrality. However, when some individuals are more influential than others, centrality may fail to be a good measure. I develop a model that allows for individual-specific endogenous effects and propose a two-stage LASSO procedure to identify influential individuals in a network. Under an assumption of sparsity: only a subset of individuals (which can increase with sample size n) is influential, I show that my 2SLSS estimator for individual-specific endogenous effects is consistent and achieves asymptotic normality. I also develop robust inference including uniformly valid confidence intervals. These results also carry through to scenarios where the influential individuals are not sparse. I extend the analysis to allow for multiple types of connections (multiple networks), and I show how to use the sparse group LASSO to detect which of the multiple connection types is more influential. Simulation evidence shows that my estimator has good finite sample performance. I further apply my method to the data in Banerjee et al. (2013) and my proposed procedure is able to identify leaders and effective networks. |
| Date: | 2019–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1908.00663&r=all |
| By: | Antoine PERRIN (Université de Lorraine, Nancy (France)) |
| Abstract: | On the question of food and livelihood, international institutions and States call for efforts towards food security under the form of help in subsidies or better access to the market for farmers. Such efforts rely on large scale solutions and make food security depend on tall vertical institutions aiming at bringing change in a very large area at a time. On the other hand, small initiatives are born everywhere and take up on the question of access to healthy sustainable food. Farmers’ self-help groups, shared gardens, community supported agriculture, cooperative supermarket and other organisations make up this landscape and are being born everywhere. Such initiatives are often missed by observers as case studies of single organisations can not bring into light the global effort of such initiatives. Nevertheless, they can be put together and showed as being part of the same global movement. If their juridic forms, organisations, and goals are somewhat different, some trends can be established in the justification they offer to their action (Boltanski, Thévenot, 1991). In order to discover these justifications and establish trends, a study of the discourse and practices of such initiatives is offered in the following article. Namely, our study takes 20 initiatives dealing with agriculture and food. In order to find out trends, this article elaborates on the fieldwork of about 500 hours spent within said initiatives, and 50 interviews with project planners, coordinators, and motnitors. In order to show global trends, these initiatives have been chosen in two vastly different social and economic contexts: one takes place in Nancy, a medium French town, the other takes place in Ahmedabad, a very large Indian city. The results of the study show three major common trends between France and India, and between initiatives pertaining with small farmers, shared gardens, cooperatives and other social and solidarity initiatives. Firstly, there is a general call for localized, short food circuits, namely producers and consumers ask for a direct connection to each other, and even to grow the food they eat and eat the food they grow. Secondly, participants in said initiatives do not claim to be part of a recent innovative wave, but rather fall back on traditional ways to grow, sell, and cook food. Thirdly, despite the small size of such initiatives – with 200 participants at most and sometimes as small as 2 members – the ambition of these organisations is to change things on a global scale, make people from every path of life ask themselves questions and change their behaviour, and even, struggle against global climate change through small localized actions. |
| Keywords: | self-help groups; agriculture; France; India; social and solidarity economy; rural development; ecology |
| JEL: | A13 A14 D71 O52 O53 Q13 |
| Date: | 2019–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crc:wpaper:1912&r=all |