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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Ali T. Akarca (University of Illinois at Chicago) |
| Abstract: | Strength of economic voting under single-party and coalition governments is investigated in the case of Turkey. The vote equation developed for this purpose is fitted to data covering 31 parliamentary and local administrations elections held between 1950 and 2015, and considers incumbency advantage, political inertia, strategic voting by the electorate, and political realignments as well. It is found that voters hold coalition governments less responsible for economic performance than single-party governments and minor members of a coalition government less responsible than its major member. The latter gap widens as fragmentation in the government increases numerically and/or ideologically. In governments involving many parties and parties with significantly different ideologies, some of the junior coalition members benefit rather than suffer from a bad economy. These findings may explain, at least partially, why economic performance is poor under coalition governments, particularly under those combining both left and right wing parties. |
| Date: | 2017–08–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erg:wpaper:1128&r=cdm |
| By: | Alice Solda (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Marie Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | The existing literature on ostracism in social dilemma games has focused on the impact of the threat of exclusion on cooperation within groups but so far, little attention has been paid to the behavior of the excluded members after their reintegration. This paper studies the effect of exclusion by peers followed by reintegration on cooperation once excluded individuals are readmitted in their group. Using a negatively framed public good game, we manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed ex-ogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation and compliance to the group norm of withdrawal after reintegration when exclusion is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness de end not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. Abstract The existing literature on ostracism in social dilemma games has focused on the impact of the threat of exclusion on cooperation within groups but so far, little attention has been paid to the behavior of the excluded members after their reintegration. This paper studies the effect of exclusion by peers followed by reintegration on cooperation once excluded individuals are readmitted in their group. Using a negatively framed public good game, we manipulate the length of exclusion and whether this length is imposed ex-ogenously or results from a vote. We show that people are willing to exclude the least cooperators although it is not an equilibrium strategy. Exclusion has a positive impact on cooperation and compliance to the group norm of withdrawal after reintegration when exclusion is followed by a quick rather than a slow reintegration and that the length of exclusion is chosen by the group. In this environment, a quicker reintegration also limits retaliation. Post-exclusion cooperation and forgiveness depend not only on the length of exclusion but also on the perceived intentions of others when they punish. |
| Keywords: | Ostracism, exclusion, reintegration, social dilemma, cooperation, experiment |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01579216&r=cdm |
| By: | Haoran He (School of Economics and Business Administration - Beijing Normal University); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Etienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions. |
| Keywords: | social image,experiment,Team,inequity aversion,preference aggregation |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00996545&r=cdm |
| By: | Joël Ntsondé (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Franck Aggeri (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In order to develop more sustainable projects and deal with the current global environmental crisis, an increasing number of actors are willing to set up models of circular economy and need to develop cooperative approaches to handle the complexity inherent to these models. However, in management literature, the field of collective strategies and inter-organizational cooperation is relatively emerging and still need to be expanded, especially regarding sustainable development issues. So the underlying question we address in this paper is to determine which processes socio-economic actors rely on to build up these collective strategies and inter-organizational cooperation. Empirically, our research focuses on food waste reduction initiatives, using a qualitative method to study several projects which aimed at applying models of circular economy to the food production and distribution chain in Paris Region in France. This research led us to identify a new form of collective action that we outline by introducing the concept of responsible innovation ecosystem. This concept can be used in management to understand how heterogeneous actors can cooperate to develop innovative and sustainable projects. |
| Keywords: | heterogeneous actors,innovation ecosystem, inter-organizational cooperation, responsible innovation, collective innovation, circular economy, food waste |
| Date: | 2017–06–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01494661&r=cdm |
| By: | Sébastien Courtin (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - UNICAEN - Université Caen Normandie - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Zéphirin Nganmeni (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Bertrand Tchantcho (ENSP - Ecole Nationale Supérieure Polytechnique [Yaoundé] - Université de Yaoundé I [Yaoundé]) |
| Abstract: | This work focuses on the evaluation of voting power in dichotomous multi-type games endowed with a coalition structure. Dichotomous multi-type games, introduced by Courtin et al. [2016], model games in which there is a number of non-ordered types of support in the input, while the output is dichotomous, i.e. the proposal is either accepted or rejected. In a game with a coalition structure, it is supposed that players organize themselves into disjoint coalitions wich are defined a priori. We extend the well-known Owen index (Owen [1977]) and Banzhaf-Owen index (Owen [1981]) to this class of games. A full characterization of these power indices is provided. |
| Keywords: | Dichotomous multi-type games, Coalition structure, Owen power index, Banzhaf-Owen power index |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01545772&r=cdm |
| By: | Olav Øye (Triarii BV); Laura Aelenei (LNEG - Laboratório Nacional de Energia e Geologia); Line Barkved (NIVA - Norwegian Institute for Water Research - Norwegian Institute for Water Research); Stan Beaubien (Dipartimento di Scienze della Terra - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" [Rome]); Teresa Bertrand (EnergyIn); Miriame Cherbib (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emily Creamer (School of Geosciences [Edinburgh] - University of Edinburgh); Sirin Engen (Bellona); Anna Ernst (Bellona); Vasiliki Gemeni (CERTH - Centre for Research & Technology Hellas); Minh Ha-Duong (CIRED - Centre International de Recherche sur l'Environnement et le Développement - CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Lucia Hrivnakova (Czech Geological Survey - Czech Geological Survey); Vit Hladik (Czech Geological Survey - Czech Geological Survey); Nikolaos Koukouzas (CERTH - Centre for Research & Technology Hellas); Carly Maynard (School of Geosciences [Edinburgh] - University of Edinburgh); Ron Overgoor (Triarii BV); Ana Picado (LNEG - Laboratório Nacional de Energia e Geologia); Stefano Pirrotta (ASI - Agenzia Spaziale Italiana); Melanie Provoost (Triarii BV); Sandra Ramos (CIUDEN - Fundación Ciudad de la Energía); Stijn Santen (Triarii BV); Konstantinos Sfetsioris (CERTH - Centre for Research & Technology Hellas); Simon Shackley (School of Geosciences [Edinburgh] - University of Edinburgh); Camilla Svendsen Skriung (ZERO - Zero Emission Resource Organisation); Robert van Der Lande (Triarii BV); Gert-Jan van Der Panne (Triarii BV); Samuela Vercelli (DICEA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" [Rome]) |
| Abstract: | The R&Dialogue project has facilitated ten low-carbon dialogues with representatives from energy, the low-carbon R&D community, social actors and others. In each of the ten countries involved, a ‘coalition of the willing’ explored the challenges and articulated their view on improving the dialogue. This European Dialogue Report is a collection of these experiences, and it reflects upon the themes emerging from those dialogues. |
| Keywords: | energy transition, Europe, Dialogue |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:ciredw:hal-01564600&r=cdm |
| By: | Zack Cooper; Amanda E Kowalski; Eleanor N Powell; Jennifer Wu |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the link between legislative politics, hospital behavior, and health care spending. When trying to pass sweeping legislation, congressional leaders can attract votes by adding targeted provisions that steer money toward the districts of reluctant legislators. This targeted spending provides tangible local benefits that legislators can highlight when fundraising or running for reelection. We study a provision - Section 508 – that was added to the 2003 Medicare Modernization Act (MMA). Section 508 created a pathway for hospitals to apply to get their Medicare payment rates increased. We find that hospitals represented by members of the House of Representatives who voted ‘Yea’ on the MMA were significantly more likely to receive a 508 waiver than hospitals represented by members who voted ‘Nay.’ Following the payment increase generated by the 508 program, recipient hospitals treated more patients, increased payroll, hired nurses, added new technology, raised CEO pay, and ultimately increased their spending by over $100 million annually. Section 508 recipient hospitals formed the Section 508 Hospital Coalition, which spent millions of dollars lobbying Congress to extend the program. After the vote on the MMA and before the vote to reauthorize the 508 program, members of Congress with a 508 hospital in their district received a 22% increase in total campaign contributions and a 65% increase in contributions from individuals working in the health care industry in the members’ home states. Our work demonstrates a pathway through which the link between politics and Medicare policy can dramatically affect US health spending. |
| JEL: | D72 H51 I10 I18 P16 |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23748&r=cdm |
| By: | Kevin Levillain (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Blanche Segrestin (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Armand Hatchuel (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | Among other challenges, hybrid organizations face a legal one as the law divides organizations into nonprofit and for-profit structures. For a few years however, new legal forms of corporations have emerged, whose claim is to overcome this challenge: profit-with-purpose corporations (PPCs), such as the Benefit Corporation. In this paper, we investigate how these innovative legal provisions have been designed to help solving this legal challenge, in a two-step process. First, we reexamine the origins of the legal divide through an historical analysis of the separation of UK and US corporations into two legal categories. We show that although early corporations were, in essence, profit-with-purpose organizations, business corporations have difficulties today to defend a public interest orientation because of a major shift in corporate governance that occurred in the 19 th century: the disappearance of corporate charters demanding public interest purposes, which led to hand the control of corporations over to shareholders through the generalization of fiduciary duties imported from unincorporated businesses' governance. Second, we exhibit the design process of PPCs to help solving this divide. We show that PPCs propose a way to " shift back ", yet not by restoring control by the State, but by reintroducing the corporate purpose into legal documents, and designing accountability mechanisms to control multiple purposes. We argue that studying the emergence of legal structures for profit-with-purpose organizations may open new avenues for research on hybrid organizations. |
| Keywords: | Profit-with-purpose Corporations,Hybrid organizations,Corporate law |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01497085&r=cdm |
| By: | Hicham Ezzat (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Pascal Le Masson (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Benoit Weil (CGS i3 - Centre de Gestion Scientifique i3 - MINES ParisTech - École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris - PSL - PSL Research University - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | In a fast-changing world, constantly innovating remains one of the principal challenges most organizations are facing nowadays. Survival of organizations became principally linked to the creative generation capacity of their staffs. Nonetheless, fixation imposes a key constraint to the aptitude of individuals to constantly come up with innovative ideas. Numerous studies have highlighted the significant role that could be played by leadership in this regard. Nevertheless, most of these works studied leadership's role from a social perspective, reducing the function of creative leaders as facilitators. From a more cognitive perspective, very few works have shed the light on the role of creative leaders during ideation processes. However, very recent studies showed that leaders could efficiently play the role of de-fixators, by preparing carefully their interventions (instructions, feedbacks, etc.) within the ideation process, according to their capacity to recognize the frontier between fixation and de-fixation of a project. In the present paper, we have furthered these findings, by exploring the effect of feedbacks, in specific cases in which leaders lead their teams in the unknown with imperfect knowledge. Based on varying levels of knowledge (leaders' ability to recognize if a particular idea generated by his team is inside or outside fixation), we implemented a theoretical model for ideation management using design and probability theories. Using a theory-driven experimental procedure, we showed in this paper that leadership strategies for ideation management should adopt less generic and universal tactics (such as brainstorming rules for example), but rather more situational approaches depending on followers' capacity to think out of the dominant design. 2 |
| Keywords: | leadership, creativity, ideation, fixation, contingency,Feedback |
| Date: | 2017–06–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01501808&r=cdm |
| By: | Christian Freudiger (Office Cantonal de l'Energie (OCEN), Département de l'aménagement, du logement et de l'énergie (DALE)); Jean-Sébastien Broc (B R & C - Broc Research & Consulting - IEECP - Institute for European Energy and Climate Policy); Jean-Marc Zgraggen (SIG - Services Industriels de Genève); Catherine Lavallez (AMSTEIN+WALTHERT) |
| Abstract: | Local authorities or other local stakeholders are increasingly involved in the implementation of energy efficiency policies, and in particular for the renovation of buildings. They can have more flexibility in their action plans, compared to national institutions. They often take the lead to experiment new approaches and are therefore key sources of policy innovation. However their means are smaller and they encounter difficulties in transforming pilot projects into large dissemination schemes. This paper presents a detailed review of 9 local and/or innovative initiatives aimed at boosting the renovation of dwellings, and in particular of multifamily housing, mostly in France, but also in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. This sample is not meant to be representative. The case studies were selected based on the interest they have raised in other local authorities or countries, and to have a diversity of approaches: from tailored support requiring a strong involvement of the homeowners to turnkey renovation services. The analysis is structured according to the support offered along the customer journey: 1) general information; 2) targeted technical advice; 3) financial engineering; 4) preparation of the works and selection of the professionals; 5) implementation of the works; 6) validation and follow-up. While in the past the initiatives tended to focus on some of these steps, the recent initiatives increasingly cover the whole journey. The case studies bring interesting experience feedback for each of these steps. Most of these schemes aimed at a renovation rate between one to ten thousand dwellings per year. The achievements vary and highlight key lessons learnt for experience sharing. This study was indeed made for the Public Energy Utility of Geneva and Geneva Cantonal Office of Energy in order to feed thoughts for the further deployment of an energy renovation programme. |
| Keywords: | refurbishment,renovation,multifamily buildings,collective housing,energy efficiency in buildings,local initiatives |
| Date: | 2017–05–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01577515&r=cdm |
| By: | Lant Pritchett (Center for International Development at Harvard University); Matt Andrews (Center for International Development at Harvard University); Michael Woolcock (Center for International Development at Harvard University) |
| Abstract: | Many reform initiatives in developing countries fail to achieve sustained improvements in performance because they are merely isomorphic mimicry—that is, governments and organizations pretend to reform by changing what policies or organizations look like rather than what they actually do. The flow of development resources and legitimacy without demonstrated improvements in performance, however, undermines the impetus for effective action to build state capability or improve performance. This dynamic facilitates 'capability traps' in which state capability stagnates, or even deteriorates, over long periods of time despite governments remaining engaged in developmental rhetoric and continuing to receive development resources. How can countries escape capability traps? We propose an approach, Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA), based on four core principles, each of which stands in sharp contrast with the standard approaches. First, PDIA focuses on solving locally nominated and defined problems in performance (as opposed to transplanting pre-conceived and packaged "best practice" solutions). Second, it seeks to create an 'authorizing environment' for decision-making that encourages 'positive deviance' and experimentation (as opposed to designing projects and programs and then requiring agents to implement them exactly as designed). Third, it embeds this experimentation in tight feedback loops that facilitate rapid experiential learning (as opposed to enduring long lag times in learning from ex post "evaluation"). Fourth, it actively engages broad sets of agents to ensure that reforms are viable, legitimate, relevant and supportable (as opposed to a narrow set of external experts promoting the "top down" diffusion of innovation). |
| Keywords: | state capability |
| Date: | 2017–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cid:wpfacu:240&r=cdm |