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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | Meya, Johannes; Poutvaara, Panu; Schwager, Robert |
| Abstract: | We develop and test a theory of voting and turnout decisions that integrates self-interest, social preferences, and expressive motives. Our model implies that if pocketbook benefits are relevant, voters either perceive their impact on the outcome to be non-negligible, or expressive motivations do not play a role in the decision on how to vote. Conversely, if own pocketbook benefits do not explain voting, then voting is expressive. If the perceived probability of being pivotal is non-negligible, social preferences and expressive concerns are observationally equivalent. Our empirical analysis studies collective choices which are analogous to decisions on local public goods. We consider referenda among university students on whether to collectively purchase deeply discounted flat rate tickets for public transportation and cultural amenities. Individual us- age data allow quantifying the monetary benefits associated with each ticket. As voters had precise information on the individual costs and benefits, our setting comprises a real-world laboratory of direct democracy. We find that monetary benefits strongly influence participation and voting. However, social or expressive motives, such as stated altruism, environmental concerns, and paternalism, are decisive for a significant minority. Our results rule out purely expressive voting and imply that a substantial share of the electorate perceived their impact on the outcome to be non-negligible. |
| Keywords: | Pocketbook Voting,Social Preferences,Expressive Voting,Instrumental Voting,Public Goods,Altruism,Referendum |
| JEL: | D72 H41 D64 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:312&r=cdm |
| By: | Hideo Konishi (Boston College); Chen-Yu Pan (Wuhan University) |
| Abstract: | Although protectionism became a salient issue in the 2016 presidential election campaign, both Republican and Democratic adminis- trations have been silently promoting free trade for decades. We set up a two-party electoral competition model in a two-dimensional policy space with campaign contributions by a group (exporting/multinational firms) that is interested in promoting free trade, for which voters do not have positive sentiment. Assuming that voters are impressionable to campaign spending for/against candidates, we analyze the optimal contract between the interest group and the candidates on policy is- sues and campaign contributions. If voters' negative sentiment to free trade is not too strong, the interest group tends to contribute to both candidates to make free trade a nonsalient issue, and the candidates compete over the other (ideological) dimension only. If votersíneg- ative sentiment to free trade is strong, the interest group tends to contribute to a more malleable candidate only. |
| Keywords: | electoral competition, campaign contribution, trade negotiation, GATT, preferential trade agreement, populism |
| JEL: | C72 D72 F02 F13 |
| Date: | 2017–05–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:boc:bocoec:926&r=cdm |
| By: | Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We consider a model of opinion formation based on aggregation functions. Each player modifies his opinion by arbitrarily aggregating the current opinion of all players. A player is influential on another player if the opinion of the first one matters to the latter. A generalization of an influential player to a coalition whose opinion matters to a player is called an influential coalition. Influential players (coalitions) can be graphically represented by the graph (hypergraph) of influence, and convergence analysis is based on properties of the hypergraphs of influence. In the paper, we focus on the practical issues of applicability of the model w.r.t. a standard framework for opinion formation driven by Markov chain theory. For a qualitative analysis of convergence, knowing the aggregation functions of the players is not required, one only needs to know the set of influential coalitions for each player. We propose simple algorithms that permit us to fully determine the influential coalitions. We distinguish three cases: the symmetric decomposable model, the anonymous model, and the general model. JEL Classification: C7, D7, D85 |
| Keywords: | algorithm,social network,opinion formation,aggregation function,influential coalition |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:hal-01387480&r=cdm |
| By: | Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Karine Van Der Straeten (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics, Institute advanced for advanced studies in Toulouse - Institute advanced for advanced studies in Toulouse) |
| Abstract: | We propose a theory of strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A fixed number M of candidates are to be elected; each voter votes for as many candidates as she wants; the M candidates with the most votes are elected. We assume that voter preferences are separable and that there exists a tiny probability that any vote might be misrecorded. Best responses involve voting by pairwise comparisons. Two candidates play a critical role: the weakest expected winner and the strongest expected loser. Expected winners are approved if and only if they are preferred to the strongest expected loser and expected losers are approved if and only if they are preferred to the weakest expected winner. At equilibrium, if any, a candidate is elected if and only if he is approved by at least half of the voters. With single-peaked preferences, an equilibrium always exists, in which the first M candidates according to the majority tournament relation are elected. The theory is tested on individual data from the 2011 Regional Government election in Zurich. |
| Keywords: | Approval Voting,Elections,Voting behavior |
| Date: | 2016–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01304688&r=cdm |
| By: | Jean-François Laslier (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This theoretical paper contrasts two voting heuristics: overstating and replacing. Under the Alternative Vote, overstatement is inefficient but replacement is efficient. The paper argues that the “replacing" manipulation corresponds to a psychologically and politically plausible voter behavior. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral voting,Alternative vote,Manipulation |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-01168670&r=cdm |
| By: | Musharraf Cyan (Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University); Michael Price (Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University); Mark Rider (Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | The nature and quality of institutions are important determinants of economic growth. Yet, there is little consensus in the academic literature about exactly how institutions should be designed; how to move from a system of anachronistic or maladaptive institutions to a better set of institutions; and whether and how foreign donors can assist in this process. One policy that is often used by donors to encourage participatory democracy in low-income countries is “community driven development” (CDD). The United Nations defines community development as “a process where community members come together to take collective action and generate solutions to common problems.” Such institutions developed organically in the Anglo-Saxon world to meet exigent circumstances. Of course, Great Britain and its former colonies have a long history of participatory democracy and local government. One approach to the challenges facing the developing world is to foster such institutions in conditions that may have no tradition of participatory democracy or providing public goods through collective effort. As a result, many important public goods may be underprovided or not provided at all. |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1710&r=cdm |
| By: | Tyutin, Anton; Zaporozhets, Vera |
| Abstract: | We study a simple influence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a legislature via monetary o¤ers to one or more members. The type of a legislator is the relative weight he/she places on social welfare as compared to money. We study the equilibria of this lobbying game under political certainty and uncertainty, and examine the circumstances under which the lobby is successful, and the amount of money invested in the political process. Special attention is paid to three primitives of the environment: the budget available for lobbying, the internal organization of the legislature and the proportion of "bad" and "good" legislators in the political arena. |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:31704&r=cdm |
| By: | Gregor Dorfleitner; Lars Hornuf; Martina Weber |
| Abstract: | In crowdfunding, start-ups can voluntarily communicate with their investors by posting updates. We investigate whether start-ups strategically use updates, which were previously shown to increase investments. To this end, we use hand-collected data of 751 updates and 39,036 investment decisions from the two major German equity crowdfunding portals Seedmatch and Companisto. We find evidence for strategic communication behavior of startups during an equity crowdfunding campaign. During the funding period, start-ups post updates with linguistic devices that enhance the group identity and the group cohesion. Furthermore, the probability of an update during the funding period increases with a strong competition of other contemporary crowdfunding campaigns. |
| Keywords: | Crowdfunding, Investor Communication, Entrepreneurial Finance, Sentiment Analysis, Linguistic Devices |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trr:wpaper:201704&r=cdm |
| By: | Balanzó, Rafael de (Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)); Rodríguez-Planas, Núria (Queens College, CUNY) |
| Abstract: | We use the adaptive cycle theory to improve our understanding of cycles of urban change in the city of Barcelona from 1953 to present. Most specifically, we explore the vulnerabilities and windows of opportunity these cycles for change introduced in the release (Ω) and reorganization (α) phases. In the two recurring cycles of urban change analyzed (before and after 1979), we observe two complementary loops. During the front-loop, financial and natural resources are efficiently exploited by homogenous dominant groups (private developers, the bourgeoisie, politicians or technocrats) with the objective to promote capital accumulation based on private (or private-public partnership) investments. In contrast, the back-loop emerges from Barcelona's heterogeneous urban social movements (neighborhood associations, activists, squatters, cooperatives and NGOs), whose objectives are diverse but converge in their discontent with the status-quo of conservation (the K phase) and their desire for a "common good" that includes social justice, social cohesion, participatory governance, and wellbeing for all. The heterogeneity of these social networks (shadow groups) fosters learning and social innovation and gives them the flexibility that the front-loop's dominant groups lack to trigger change not only within but also across spatial scale (local community-based, neighborhood, city) and time dimensions, promoting a cross-scale process of revolt and stabilization, also known as Panarchy. |
| Keywords: | adaptive cycle theory, crisis, urban change dynamics, urban resilience, social innovation, social justice, release (Ω) and reorganization (α) phases, back-loop, Barcelona's urban planning, Barcelona's urban (sustainable) design era and panarchy |
| JEL: | Q01 Q57 R0 |
| Date: | 2017–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp10748&r=cdm |
| By: | Tomoko Matsumoto (Japan Legal Information Institute, Nagoya University); Tetsuji Okazaki (Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo) |
| Abstract: | This study examines the difference between the regime transition phase and consolidation phase, dividing government elites into the pre-Meiji-Restoration-born group and the post-Meiji-Restoration-born group. Using the newly constructed government elites' data after the Meiji Restoration in Japan, we show that reformers' strategies to recruit government elites and establish a new intra-elite hierarchy changed from the regime transition phase to its consolidation phase. Initially, in order to contend against the incumbent elites, reformers recruited talented activists from the non-elite strata and assigned them to higher-level positions based on their abilities. On achieving a transfer of power, however, reformers' primary concern shifted to alleviating the dissatisfaction of the masses and the former elites. Therefore, while the barrier preventing access to the elite group keep lowering, which opened the way for non-elites to gain elite status, former elites are reintegrated into the elite group and the intra-elite hierarchy again comes to reflect the social stratum of the former regime. |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tky:fseres:2016cf1042&r=cdm |